

# **News and Terrorism in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore**

**Sonia Nelson**

M.A. (Southeast Asian Studies) National University of Singapore

B. Social Communication (Journalism) FACOS, SP, Brazil

B. Social Communication (Public Relations) FACOS, SP, Brazil

A THESIS SUBMITTED

FOR THE DEGREE OF Ph.D. IN ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

2006

## **Acknowledgments**

I owe special thanks to Colin, my husband, for his encouragement, patience and help with editing. Researching and writing about media and terrorism is a very complex task. To Professor Leong Wai Teng I say thank you ever so much for your support and guidance. I have truly enjoyed working with you. Thanks to Andrew for his help with editing – together with Colin, you two made a wonderful editorial team. To my children Annelise, Dennis and Larissa, thank you for your cheerful support. Thanks also to friends who spared time to talk with me about the topic.

## **CONTENTS**

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Summary</b>	<b>x</b>
<b>List of Tables</b>	
1. World Press Freedom Index	27
2. Corpus Publications	37
<b>List of Figures</b>	
1. News frame of terrorism and its Consequences	229
<b>Chapter One: Contextual Review</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 The Thesis' Aims	3
1.3 Literature Review	4
1.3.1 Terrorism: Issues with definition	5
1.4 'Unity in diversity'	7
1.5 Islam	8
1.5.1 Islam in Indonesia	9
1.5.2 Islam in Malaysia	11
1.5.3 Islam in Singapore	13
1.6 Political Violence	14
1.7 Violence in Indonesia	18
1.8 Media Framing of terrorism	20
1.9 Media in Southeast Asia	26
1.9.1 The Media in Indonesia	27
1.9.2 The Media in Malaysia	30
1.9.3 The Media in Singapore	31
1.10 Media Theory: Constructionist	33

1.10.1	Framing	33
1.10.2	Critical Discourse Analysis	34
1.11	Methods	36
1.11.1	Analysis and period of examination	38
1.11.2	How the job was done	40
1.11.3	Hard copies	42
<b>Chapter Two: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)</b>		<b>44</b>
2.1	Portrayal of JI Before Announcements of Arrests <i>Straits Times</i>	44
2.2	Coverage of First Round of Arrests: <i>Straits Times</i>	46
2.2.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Straits Times</i>	50
2.2.1.1	Images of Terrorists	51
2.2.1.2	Roots of Violence	51
2.2.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	52
2.2.2	Insight	52
2.3	Coverage of First Round of Arrests: <i>Jakarta Post</i>	53
2.3.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Jakarta Post</i>	55
2.3.1.1	Images of Terrorists	55
2.3.1.2	Roots of Violence	55
2.3.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	55
2.3.2	Insight	56
2.4	Coverage of First Round of Arrests: <i>New Straits Times</i>	57
2.4.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>New Straits Times</i>	58
2.4.1.1	Images of Terrorists	58
2.4.1.2	Roots of Violence	59
2.4.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	59
2.4.2	Insight	60
2.5	Coverage of First Round of Arrests: <i>Tempo</i>	61
2.5.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Tempo</i>	62
2.5.1.1	Images of Terrorists	62
2.5.1.2	Roots of Violence	62

2.5.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	63
2.5.2	Insight	63
2.6	Second Round of Arrests	64
2.7	Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: <i>Straits Times</i>	64
2.7.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Straits Times</i>	65
2.7.1.1	Images of Terrorists	65
2.7.1.2	Roots of Violence	66
2.7.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	66
2.7.2	Insight	66
2.8	Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: <i>Jakarta Post</i>	69
2.9	Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: <i>New Straits Times</i>	71
2.9.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>New Straits Times</i>	72
2.9.1.1	Images of Terrorists	72
2.9.1.2	Roots of Violence	73
2.9.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	73
2.9.2	Insight	73
2.10	Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: <i>Tempo</i>	75
2.10.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Tempo</i>	76
2.10.1.1	Images of Terrorists	76
2.10.1.2	Roots of Violence	76
2.10.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	77
2.10.2	Insight	77
2.11	Comparative Analysis	78
 <b>Chapter Three: The 2002 Bali Bombings</b>		 <b>80</b>
3.1	Coverage of the 2002 Bali Bombings: <i>Straits Times</i>	80
3.1.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Straits Times</i>	81
3.1.1.1	Images of Terrorists	81
3.1.1.2	Roots of Violence	82
3.1.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	82
3.1.1.4	The Victims	83
3.1.2	Insight	84
3.2	Coverage of the 2002 Bali Bombings: <i>Jakarta Post</i>	94

3.2.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Jakarta Post</i>	95
3.2.1.1	Images of Terrorists	95
3.2.1.2	Roots of Violence	98
3.2.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	99
3.2.1.4	The Victims	100
3.2.2	Insight	101
3.3	Coverage of the Bali Bombings: <i>New Straits Times</i>	105
3.3.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>New Straits Times</i>	105
3.3.1.1	Images of Terrorists	105
3.3.1.2	Roots of Violence	106
3.3.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	106
3.3.1.4	The Victims	106
3.3.2	Insight	107
3.4	Coverage of the 2002 Bali Bombings: <i>Tempo</i>	114
3.4.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Tempo</i>	114
3.4.1.1	Images of Terrorists	114
3.4.1.2	Roots of Violence	115
3.4.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	115
3.4.1.4	The Victims	115
3.4.2	Insight	116
3.5	Comparative Analysis	119
<b>Chapter Four: Marriott Hotel Bombing</b>		<b>123</b>
4.1	Coverage of the Marriott Hotel Bombing: <i>Straits Times</i>	123
4.1.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Straits Times</i>	124
4.1.1.1	Images of Terrorists	124
4.1.1.2	Roots of Violence	125
4.1.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	126
4.1.1.4	The Victims	127
4.1.2	Insight	127
4.2	Coverage of the Marriott Hotel Bombing: <i>Jakarta Post</i>	132
4.2.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Jakarta Post</i>	133
4.2.1.1	Images of Terrorists	133

4.2.1.2	Roots of Violence	135
4.2.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	136
4.2.1.4	The Victims	137
4.2.2	Insight	138
4.3	Coverage of the Marriott Hotel Bombing: <i>New Straits Times</i>	143
4.3.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>New Straits Times</i>	143
4.3.1.1	Images of Terrorists	144
4.3.1.2	Roots of Violence	144
4.3.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	145
4.3.1.4	The Victims	145
4.3.2	Insight	145
4.4	Coverage of Marriott Hotel Bombing: <i>Tempo</i>	148
4.4.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Tempo</i>	149
4.4.1.1	Images of Terrorists	149
4.4.1.2	Roots of Violence	149
4.4.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	150
4.4.1.4	The Victims	151
4.4.2	Insight	151
4.5	Comparative Analysis	152
<b>Chapter Five: The Australian Embassy Bombing</b>		<b>156</b>
5.1	Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: <i>Straits Times</i>	156
5.1.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Straits Times</i>	157
5.1.1.1	Images of Terrorists	157
5.1.1.2	Roots of Violence	157
5.1.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	158
5.1.1.4	The Victims	159
5.1.2	Insight	160
5.2	Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: <i>Jakarta Post</i>	165
5.2.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Jakarta Post</i>	166
5.2.1.1	Images of Terrorists	167
5.2.1.2	Roots of Violence	168
5.2.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	168

5.2.1.4	The Victims	169
5.2.2	Insight	171
5.3	Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: <i>New Straits Times</i>	174
5.3.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>New Straits Times</i>	175
5.3.1.1	Images of Terrorists	175
5.3.1.2	Roots of Violence	176
5.3.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	176
5.3.1.4	The Victims	177
5.3.2	Insight	177
5.4	Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: <i>Tempo</i>	180
5.4.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Tempo</i>	181
5.4.1.1	Images of Terrorists	181
5.4.1.2	Roots of Violence	181
5.4.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	182
5.4.1.4	The Victims	182
5.4.2	Insight	182
5.5	Comparative Analysis	183
<b>Chapter Six: Bali Bombings in 2005 – ‘Bali 2’</b>		<b>186</b>
6.1	Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: <i>Straits Times</i>	187
6.1.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Straits Times</i>	187
6.1.1.1	Images of Terrorists	188
6.1.1.2	Roots of Violence	188
6.1.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	189
6.1.1.4	The Victims	190
6.1.2	Insight	190
6.2	Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: <i>Jakarta Post</i>	192
6.2.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Jakarta Post</i>	192
6.2.1.1	Images of Terrorists	193
6.2.1.2	Roots of Violence	193
6.2.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	193
6.2.1.4	The Victims	194



6.2.2	Insight	194
6.3	Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: <i>New Straits Times</i>	196
6.3.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>New Straits Times</i>	197
6.3.1.1	Images of Terrorists	197
6.3.1.2	Roots of Violence	197
6.3.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	198
6.3.1.4	The Victims	198
6.3.2	Insight	198
6.4	Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: <i>Tempo</i>	199
6.4.1	Conceptualization of Terrorism: <i>Tempo</i>	199
6.4.1.1	Images of Terrorists	200
6.4.1.2	Roots of Violence	200
6.4.1.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	201
6.4.1.4	The Victims	201
6.4.2	Insight	201
6.5	Comparative Analysis	202
<b>Chapter Seven: Comparison and Discussion</b>		<b>205</b>
7.1	Similarities in Construction of News on Terrorism	205
7.1.1	Definition and Labelling of ‘Terrorists’	206
7.1.2	Images of Terrorists	209
7.1.3	Roots of Violence	214
7.1.3.1	Jl and the creation of an Islamic caliphate	214
7.1.3.2	The Roots of the violence in the context of the bombings	215
7.1.4	Violence and Religion	217
7.2	Main Differences in News Construction of Terrorism	221
7.2.1	Main Differences in the Conceptualization of Terrorism	221
7.2.1.1	Concept of Terrorism in the context of the Jl arrests	222
7.2.1.2	Concept of Terrorism in the context of the Bombings	222
7.3	The Framing of News and its Implications	226
7.3.1	<i>Straits Times</i>	227
7.3.2	<i>Jakarta Post</i>	227
7.3.3	<i>New Straits Times</i>	228

7.4	News Production: Resources Utilized in the Framing of Terrorism	230
7.4.1	Media Patriotism	230
7.4.2	Use of Headlines to Convey Interpretations	233
7.4.3	JI ‘Official’ Gives Interview	234
7.4.4	Faceless Source of Information	234
7.4.5	Leak of Information	235
7.4.6	Foreign Policy Frame	235
7.4.7	‘Standardization’ of Sources of Information	236
7.5	Role of Journalists in their Social Context	237
<b>Chapter Eight: Inter-relationships of theories</b>		<b>239</b>
<b>Chapter Nine: Conclusion</b>		<b>249</b>
<b>List of References</b>		<b>253</b>
<b>Appendices</b>		
A.	Conceptualization of Terrorism	289
A.1	Images of Terrorists	290
A.2	Roots of Violence	291
A.3	Connection between Violence and Religion	292

## Summary

The study reveals how the Singaporean English daily newspaper *The Straits Times* (ST), the Indonesian English language daily *The Jakarta Post* (JP), the Malaysian English language daily newspaper *New Straits Times* (NST) and the Indonesian English language version of the weekly magazine *Tempo* have framed news to establish an understanding of the arrests of suspected terrorists in Malaysia and in Singapore as well as to report the high profile bombings in Indonesia during the period 2002 to 2005. These bombings are the 2002 Bali bombing, the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing, the 2004 Australian embassy bombing and the 2005 Bali bombing.

The study aims to understand the construction of terrorism in addition to providing alternative perspectives on the issue. The analysis of news media presented here stems from a critical constructionist media theory approach. Within this framework, a comparative and relational analysis of the press coverage of cases of terrorism has been conducted.

The findings show the relationships between types of labels chosen, media bias and the influence of the official sources of information on the news framing of terrorism. The limited coverage of alternative perspectives has contributed to a reduced understanding of the reasons why political dissidents or criminals look for violence as a way to express their dissatisfaction.

The global discourse on the ‘war on terror’ provided the larger frame for the reporting, with the publications tailoring and politicizing the content within each country’s or group’s interest. The tenets of journalism in the sense of “constructive

cooperation or partnership with government in nation-building” (Xiaoge, 2005:65) were heavily used in *The Straits Times* and *New Straits Times* while *The Jakarta Post*’s reporting was highly influenced by economic interests.

Terrorism was framed in the press as a threat to economic development because the bombings affect the tourism industry and undermine investor confidence. The Jemaah Islamiyah network was framed as a threat to existing state power. Public policy initiatives regulating and organizing citizen’s lives were put in practice in the name of national security. The media constructed a perceived emergence of terrorism from Islamic militants as a problem of crisis proportions.

# Chapter One: Contextual Review

## 1.1 Introduction

News is part of our everyday life. We take it for granted without asking questions about how information is gathered, the social influence on news reporting or the forces behind news organizations. Yet, we consume news with a strong appetite, particularly news on violence. Some acts of violence involving death and destruction make headlines. However, not all acts of cruelty make news. Violence and pain in the news carry political significance especially when caused by acts of terrorism.

The terrorist events in Washington and New York on September 11, 2001, televised repeatedly, derailed an American-led fight against Islamic radicals. The Bush administration declared Osama bin Laden, the Saudi-born militant who fought the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (1979-85), as the personification of evil. Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda group, formed by Muslim fighters who had joined the largely United States and Pakistani funded anti-Soviet resistance movement, were identified by the US as responsible for the terrorist attacks on American soil.

Following the events of 11 September and the US declaration of ‘war on terror’, the United States extended its fight against radicals in Afghanistan to “radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly those in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore”<sup>1</sup>. The Bush administration identified the region as the second front in the ‘war on terror’.

---

<sup>1</sup> Congressional Research Service, updated 2004, Report for Congress, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia”, US State Department Code RL 31672. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/35795.pdf>

The perception that the region is a cradle for terrorism was reinforced by the Bali bombing in 12 October 2002. The event was the first major terrorist attack after 11 September, 2001, and the worst act of violence against tourists in Indonesia.

Other bombings against foreign targets happened in Indonesia in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Foreign governments such as the United States, Australia and Singapore attributed the bombings to Islamic radical militants based in Indonesia. Those responsible for the attacks were identified as members of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group with links to the al-Qaeda network. Government officials and terrorism experts within and outside the region claimed the JI group aimed to create an Islamic caliphate encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the south of the Philippines.

The Southeast Asia region with its complex ethnic, cultural and religious richness offers a unique setting to study the implications of the global fight on terrorism. The region has the largest concentration of Muslim followers in the world. Writers such as Banlaoi (2004: 21, 35) claim that “Indonesia serves as the major hub of terrorist activities in Southeast Asia”; that “Malaysia is the place where terrorists from Asia and their al-Qaeda backers can meet”; and that “Singapore also played an important role in al-Qaeda’s fund-raising activities in Southeast Asia through JI cells in the city”. This stereotyping of the region has an influence on local media reporting on terrorism.

The media function as a source of information for public and policy-makers alike. The media interpretation of events affects how history is written. Yet, the interpretation it provides is value-laden. As in other parts of the world, the media in Southeast Asia function within some form of governmental, societal and economic

constraints. The media in the countries studied – Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – are structured to contribute to nation-building and economic development. The study demonstrates that the news framing of terrorism reflects both historical and current prevailing interests, and within the backdrop of the ‘war on terror’.

## **1.2 The thesis’ Aims**

This study seeks to understand the media construction of terrorism produced in the daily newspapers *The Jakarta Post (JP)*, from Indonesia, the *News Straits Times (NST)*, from Malaysia, *The Straits Times (ST)*, from Singapore and the English language version *Tempo* magazine, from Indonesia.

The overriding goal of the dissertation is to comprehend the nuances of press reporting and framing trends over time and between publications within the complex social and political activities in the selected countries. The study attempts to provide a valuable understanding into contemporary news reporting on acts of violence labelled as terrorism in Indonesia. It contributes to the undertaking of framing analysis as a cultural phenomenon rather than a narrow perspective on media content or a form of media effects. It opens the ground for future research. Framing fits within the social constructionist approach, such as the work of Goffman (1974), Entman (1993), and other associates who infer that frames contribute to the interpretation and evaluative definition of the social world (Van Gorp, 2007:62).

The reason for investigating the press coverage of the arrests of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members and the bombings in Indonesia (the 12 October 2002 Bali bombings; the JW Marriott Hotel on 5 August 2003; the Australian Embassy bombing

on 9 September 2004; and the 2 October 2005 Bali bombings) is to examine the connections, or lack of, which the stories make with the possible causes for the violence and to ascertain what are the implications with religion.

The motivation for pursuing such an enduring task was a result of my interest to understand media and terrorism in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. As a journalist covering events in the region and the Asian reaction to the September 11, 2001 events in the United States, very often I came across statements saying the Western media was to be blamed for the labelling of Muslims as terrorists around the world. Therefore, I decided to investigate how the selected mainstream publications represented the bombings and what type of public discourses the publications created from the Asian perspective.

Some of the limitations of the study centre on the fact that the research was limited to print newspapers and the period of two weeks from the first day of coverage of the events. This has been a conscious decision because after the first few days of the episode the news became more interpretative or the incident slid to inside pages. The study does not include views of analysts, experts or dissidents published after the two weeks period. Another limitation is that a broad range of books was published in 2006 on media and terrorism, but did not enter the literature review since the thesis had been submitted early in 2006.

### **1.3 Literature Review**

This section looks at the definitional issue on terrorism which is followed by an examination of the regional context and a review of the literature on the media framing of terrorism. An overview of the media in Southeast Asia is followed by an introduction to the media in Indonesia, in Malaysia and in Singapore.



### **1.3.1 Terrorism: Issues with definition**

Terrorism has been in the limelight since the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States. The amount of academic and journalistic work on the various aspects of terrorism is voluminous. One of the problems with such an intense academic and media interest is that still there is not a single, clear and global consensus on what is the definition of terrorism (Atkins, 1992; Held, 1997; Nacos, 2000; Jenkins, 2003; Sorel, 2003). This lack of consensus has implications for the characterization or labelling of acts of violence (Alali & Eke, 1991; Venkat, 2004). The definition is clearly important when deciding whether the perpetrators are to be labelled ‘criminals’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘freedom fighters’ (Alali & Eke, 1991; Jenkins, 2003). Despite the differences in the terms used, Atkins (1992) and Held (1997) argue that attempts to define terrorism are oriented around two concepts: the use of violence and a political aim behind the terrorist act.

As Laqueur (1987:72) points out “disputes about a detailed, comprehensive definition of terrorism will continue for a long time and will not make noticeable contribution towards the understanding of terrorism”. In his book *The Age of Terrorism*, considered a classic on the history of terrorism, Walter Laqueur (1987) suggests,

“Terrorism is the use or the threat of the use of violence, a method of combat, or a strategy to achieve certain targets... aims to induce a state of fear in the victim, that is ruthless and does not conform with humanitarian rules” (p.143).

By contrast, Marta Crenshaw (1995) defines terrorism as,

“A conspiratorial style of violence calculated to alter the attitudes and behaviour of multiple audiences. It targets the few in a way that claims the attention of the many”<sup>2</sup>.

From the murder of Julius Cesar to the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorists have been the cause of many atrocities. Brutus, the assassin of the Roman emperor Julius Cesar was seen as a hero. To many, violent resistance to authoritarian regime was not a crime. The history on terrorism can go back as far as the killing of Julius Cesar (44 B.C.), to the Zealots in Israel (100 A.D.) who fought the Roman occupation, to the Assassins in Iraq (1100 A.D.), who fought the Christian Crusaders with suicide tactics, to the Thuggees in India (1300 A.D.), who kidnapped travellers for sacrifice to their Goddess of Terror, Kali, to The Spanish Inquisition (1469-1600), which dealt with heretics, to The French Revolution (1789-1795), which under the name of The Terror destroyed its opponents by guillotining them. A more recent form of terrorism was the Macedonian insurgency (1893-1903) that fought against colonial rule.

Every period of history has brought a different meaning to terrorism and its definition has appeared to fluctuate according to historical and geographical contexts (Sinclair, 2003). Nonetheless, Rapoport (2006:4) suggests that by the 1970s the media had corrupted the term by often describing identical persons in the same account alternatively as terrorists, guerrillas, militants and soldiers. In Rapoport's views this inconsistency has also plagued academic accounts. The misunderstanding intensified

---

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.psupress.psu.edu/Justataste/samplechapters/justatasteCrenshaw.html>

when some former terrorists became legitimate political leaders. Such were the case of Nelson Mandela, who received a Nobel Peace Prize (1994), for his role in reconciling rival factions in South Africa and Yasser Arafat who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (1995) after signing the Oslo Accords.

Therefore, due to the complexity of designation of what terrorism is and the existence of several definitions, terrorism is understood and discussed here in terms of the publications' own representations. The question of definition should not subsist in an abstract construction of the concept of terrorism but in its practical application to the various political and social circumstances as the following chapters demonstrate.

#### **1.4 'Unity in diversity'**

Southeast Asia is characterized by ethno-cultural pluralism. The countries share a variety of complex issues in the area of geographic position, culture, religion and ethnicity. Scholars writing on the region have usually begun with a 'unity in diversity' approach, which relies on a consideration of the geographic and cultural elements general to the area (Acharya, 2000). Among the sources of diversity are the size of the countries, their cultures, races, languages and development experiences. In the region there are no fewer than thirty-two ethno-linguistic groups, and each state contains at least four major ethnic communities (Yao, 2001). Other sources of Southeast Asia's diversity are found in the presence of most of the world's major belief systems, that is, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity. In contrast, in this wide range of variety, Kadir (2004) argues that 'modernization, Islamization and globalization are producing new tensions within the community, creating new or changing existing horizontal linkages between the community organizations'(p.358).

In this thesis, religion is not to be understood either as a matter of individual belief or a cultural system, but is reflected from the news stories in the publications as construed between violence and religion. As Franks (2006:79) points out, “religion can certainly play a major role in the generation of conflict”, it can be exploited by the political elites; it can function as fuel for violence. Nevertheless, brief aspects of Islam in Indonesia are incorporated in the literature review and any link between violence and religion in this study is drawn from the texts.

### **1.5 Islam**

Beyond the complexity of the heritage, Southeast Asia is the geographic area in which the world’s largest number of Muslims is concentrated. Over two hundred million Muslims live in the region (Mitsuo, 2001). In many areas Islam has become intertwined with pre-existing values and belief systems associated with folk religions, Buddhism and Hinduism. Esposito (1987:12) defines Islam as a brotherhood of believers based upon a shared faith whose identity, unity and solidarity is supposed to transcend all other loyalties, such as family, tribe and nationality. This sense of association is strong among Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia. Despite the general brotherhood assumption, scholars such as Kadir (2004) bring new elements to the understanding of Islam in the region by suggesting that, “specific to Southeast Asia, tensions between secularism and Islam are tied to the colonial experience and nationalist struggles in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century” (p.358). The point Kadir makes is that several issues on Islam, democracy and secularism remain unsolved in various parts of the region.

### **1.5.1 Islam in Indonesia**

Indonesia is considered to be the most populous Muslim country in the world. About 88% of its estimated population of 241,973,879 are Muslims<sup>3</sup>. However Indonesia is not a Muslim state and Islam has not been adopted as a basis for national consciousness. As Greg Barton (2005) notes, in order to start to comprehend Indonesia it is necessary to recognize the pattern of the country's history, the functions of Islam in society and the contemporary context. Sidel (2006:41, 42) claims that the Dutch colonial rule left Indonesia with a pattern of class relations unique in Southeast Asia: a blueprint in which political class, educational background and achievements figure prominently and problematically.

Sidel (2006:37) argues that religious identity, education and access to state power was established during the Dutch colonial period: "the division between enclaves of Catholics, Protestants and Muslims resulted in separate religious school systems, religious political parties, and a host of religiously orientated service agencies such as housing development, unions, newspapers, radio stations and hospitals".

Sidel's argument supports the views of Kadir (2004:106) that since the colonial period there has never been one Islam in Indonesia but versions of Islam in both theory and political contexts. Wanandi (2002) furthers his reflection on Islam in Indonesia with the suggestion that throughout Indonesian history there have been attempts to 'purify' Islam. Wanandi cites that one of such attempts had been made by the Muhammadiyah organisation, which was established in 1912 to educate and modernize Muslims with the purpose of confronting Dutch colonialism; for that to happen, Islam had to overcome the animistic beliefs, which hampered modernization

---

<sup>3</sup> <http://geography.about.com/library/cia/blcindonesia.htm>

and development (p.105). In 1962, in a reaction to those efforts, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was established to respond to the challenge of ‘purification’ that would put an end to the role of local ulama’s or scholars. NU has caught up with modern Islamic thinking because, as Wanandi claims, many of its followers have received overseas training (p.106).

Muslim organizations supported the establishment of the Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime<sup>4</sup> and many took an active part in the destruction of the Indonesian communist party, the PKI (Uhlen, 1997:63-83). There are two main Muslim organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.

Nahdlatul Ulama members base their views on Islamic tradition as handed down by history whereas Muhammadiyah members represent the reformist or modernist wing of Islam in Indonesia. The modernists believe Islam should play a greater role in government. Crouch (2002) argues that Indonesia has experienced an Islamic revival, and that this could be partly attributed to the “emergence of radical groups, which have been very prominent in protesting against the American intervention in Afghanistan” (p.2).

It is necessary to recognise the functions of *madrassah* and *pesantren* in order to properly understand the position of Islam in society in Indonesia. Sidel (2006) defines *madrassah* as modernist Islamic schools whereas *pesantren* are considered to be traditional boarding schools. Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, had established a network of modern schools known as *madrassah*, which were intended to combine

---

<sup>4</sup> Reading suggestion: *Intel Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence Service*, Ken Conboy (2004). Jakarta:Equinox.

new forms of religious instructions with a kind of Western-style schooling (Sidel, 2006:37).

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), founded in 1926, in reaction to Muhammadiyah, aimed to defend the long-established system of rural Islamic boarding schools. In these *pesantren* (or *pondok*, *surau*, or *dayah*, as they are sometimes referred to), the method of learning is based on the vocalization and interpretation of the Qur'an, the holy Muslim book. The *pesantren* network was not a set of educational institutions from which students graduated and launched themselves into the world but rather a milieu within they accumulated cultural, intellectual, and social capital. Sidel (2006) argues that the *pesantren* retained more distance from the modern school system than the *madrassah* (p.38). In the 1980s Abdurrahman Wahid, as chairman of the NU, opened up the education system of the *pesantren* (religious boarding schools) with the aim to make them equal to public schools (Wanandi, 2002).

### **1.5.2 Islam in Malaysia**

Malaysia is a multi-racial and multi-religious society in which Islam dominates politically and culturally. The dominant ethnic group is the Malays, who make up about 60 percent of the population. Constitutionally, a Malay is a Muslim (Hitam, 1996; Hassan, 2001). When Malaysia became independent in 1957, ending British colonial rule, Islam was enshrined as the official religion. It became a critical element in Malay cultural identity and a potent organizing force. Hamid (2002) is of the view that Malay-Muslim society has been polarized between those harbouring a desire to 'Islamize' the conduct and operations of the state, and the moderate Malay-Muslims who regard the present developments as not necessarily un-Islamic.

Malaysia has embarked on its 'Islamization race' in 1981 when then Prime Minister Mahathir, who was also president of the ruling party UMNO- United Malays National Organization, came to power. The focus was on modernity, economic progress and material development. Some critics argue that the Islamization quest was a political initiative, rooted in the effort for the control and the representation of the Malay Muslim majority in the country.

However, Peletz (2005) claims the revival of Islam in Malaysia is a consequence of dissatisfaction with the government's commitment to modernity. The New Economic Policy (NEP) sought to eradicate poverty among all Malaysians and to restructure society (p.245). The reactions to the NEP took various forms including active and passive resistance. The *dakwah* movement was a call for the "Islamic cause". Peletz claims it is a home-grown association but also it has been inspired by Islamic groups and Islamic revitalization elsewhere (p.246). PAS- Party Islam Se Malaysia (the Pan Malaysia Islamic party) is the political opposition party to counterbalance UMNO, and has been a major contender in the Malaysian politics since its formation in 1951. Its basic objective is the establishment of an Islamic state. Much of its support derives from the rural areas that are said to have been marginalized or largely skirted by the state sponsored development and modernity (Peletz, 2005:268). PAS alleges that the ruling party, UMNO, has failed to safeguard the interests of the Malay community, especially with regard to Islam. In parallel, Farish Noor (2003:201) advocates that,

"The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 altered the political fortunes of PAS for good. Worldwide the fear of 'Islamic militancy' was used by a number of governments to demonize Islamist



movements and parties in their own countries, and PAS was caught in the net as well”.

### **1.5.3 Islam in Singapore**

Muslims comprise 15 percent of Singapore’s four million plus multi-ethnic population according to an official survey in November 2000 by the Census of Population Office of Singapore Department of Statistics, and cited in the International Religious Freedom Report of 2004 by the US State Department. Virtually all ethnic Malays are Muslims.

In Kadir’s (2004) view, “Islamic society in Singapore has not only evolved through different phases but also become increasingly more pluralistic and complex”. Kadir argues that the relationship between state and society can be characterized by attempts at centralization of religious authority and careful administration. Furthermore, emerging tensions between the state and Islam may not be about the infringement of religious rights of a minority Muslim community or about a marginalized Malay community but are a consequence of the growing complexities within Muslim society itself (pp.369-371).

Kadir (2004) also suggests that, “growing religious consciousness among Muslims in Singapore should not lead to an erroneous assumption of homogeneity brought on by the global Islamic revivalism. In Singapore, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, religious revivalism has not produced a homogenous Islamic identity” (p.360).

## 1.6 Political Violence

Virginia Held (1997) suggests that terrorism usually has the purpose of creating fear or terror among a population whereas political violence may or may not have the purpose of causing fear among a populace (p.189). Held advocates the definition of political violence as acts greatly influenced by the actors' beliefs about what is politically right or wrong, and that the actors' beliefs were formed in contexts of their cultural influences. Held cites as examples of political violence the World Trade Center bombing in New York City on February 26, 1992; the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995; the bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma City in April 1995.

Tuman (2003:12) suggests that the distinction between political violence and terrorism depends on how the words *political and violence* themselves are defined and used. Tuman argues that there are no wars that do not involve political motivations and gain; he also argues that virtually any individual act of violence toward the state, or toward another individual, may be considered terrorism. In parallel, Rapoport (2006) observes that in the 1930s terrorism referred to state activities, as the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union but in the 1960s, when non-state groups used violence for political ends, terrorism was associated with rebels (p.16).

In the Indonesian context Nugroho (2006:207) identifies the conflicts in Maluku, Aceh, Sambas and Jakarta as political violence. To put it simplistically, the conflict in Aceh can be said to be one that "has moved from a problem of separatism, to religious, to disputes between military Acehnese and non Acehnese personnel over military involvement in prostitution, gambling and other activities that were seen to conflict with local standards" (Drexler 2006:168). Since the present study is not

directly concerned with the various acts of violence in Indonesia but rather the press representation of the bombings which have been labelled as acts of terrorism after the events of September 11, 2001, further consideration of these definitions are deferred.

As Farid (2006) claims that “under the Suharto regime, it was fairly easy to understand most cases of large scale violence as state violence, [...] However, once the Suharto regime disappeared from the scene, the major cause of political violence, the violence did not abate. Having only this paradigm of state violence, many analysts of Indonesian politics have been caught flat-footed in trying to understand recent cases of mass violence that have emerged from complex social conditions” (p.269).

Taking the examples above, it is problematic to establish a clear distinction between ‘political violence’ and ‘terrorism’. Some of the scholars cited above have defined the violence during the Suharto regime as ‘political violence’; by contrast, Atwood (2003:48) describes the mass killings in Indonesia as state sponsored terrorism. Moreover, critics could argue that the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in February 1992 and the bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma City in April 1995 were acts of terrorism rather than political violence. As Held (1997:192) argues, “governments apply the label that better suits their foreign policy whether it is an act of violence, an individual or a group of terrorists”.

Therefore, for the purpose of clarification of my own understanding of political violence it is here defined as actions taken for political purposes. These actions can be committed by nation states against other nations, such as the United States operation in Iraq; nations against groups that are alleged to be a threat, such as the al-Qaeda network and the violence committed by armed groups such as the Christian and Muslim groups.

The actions by nation states against their own population, such as the mass killings during the Suharto regime against alleged communists, the Khmer Rouge regime headed by Pol Pot in Cambodia during 1975-79 or Benito Mussolini's use of chemical weapon against Ethiopians, Saddam Hussain's action against Iraqi Kurds are in my understanding state sponsored terrorism.

I could venture to include an act of violence that does not seem to present a rationale to society at large as terrorism. However, that is interpretative and therefore contestable. Furthermore, as Tuman (2003) argues, it is probably not easy for someone or a small group of individuals to take up bombs and go out to kill 'x' number of persons without having strong convictions of justifications (p.10).

However, throughout the study I will adhere to the terms *terrorism* and/ or *political violence* in accordance with the news stories. I will use the term '*acts of violence*' as my own words to describe or comment on the events. Violence is often defined in varying terms, but for the purpose of this study, it is here defined as the intentional act that has caused physical harm to human beings or major damage to property. The discussion on what constitutes *political*, or *violence*, or *physical aggression*, or *harm*, within the sphere of terrorism can create a sense of *political correctness* but also can obscure the understanding of violence.

Nonetheless, every state in Southeast Asia has experienced at some stage a revolutionary organization whose explicit goal was the overthrow of the prevailing political order (Kingsbury, 2001). Prior to the discovery of Jemaah Islamiyah (White Paper, MHA, 2003) as a regional terrorist network, political violence associated with radical groups was considered an internal domestic issue. The radicals were called insurgents, separatists, bandits, gangs and so forth. In Malaysia, for example,

members of the self-styled Malayan Races Liberation Army were officially designated 'communists' in 1952, as a result of the efforts of the British government in Malaya to link the 'bandits' with international communists. The decision to do so, taken during a committee meeting, stated that "on no account should the term 'insurgent', which might suggest a genuine popular opposition, be used" (Carruthers, 1996).

Since the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, radical groups in Southeast Asia are seen as advocates of a pan-regional movement intent on creating an Islamic state in the region. Thayer (2004) argues similarly as Chalk (2005:29) that "although there is as yet no concrete proof verifying the existence of an entrenched Islamic network dedicated to the creation of a transnational Southeast Asian caliphate, intelligence sources, both internal and external to the region, view such a development as a distinct possibility".

Additionally, in recent years there has been concern emerging about religious-inspired militancy by radical groups (Salleh, 1995; Tan, 2002, 2003; Chalk, 2005). Indonesia has had periods of violence characterized by religious motivation; some of the examples are the anti-witchcraft campaign in Java and inter-religious conflicts in Central Sulawesi and Maluku in 1998-2001. Sidel (2006: xii) suggests that each phase of religious violence in Indonesia over the past ten years has been associated with one of more religious hierarchies. He cites the example of the 1995-97 riots in provincial towns. Sidel asserts that these riots were followed by calls from members of the All-Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals (ICMI) to push for new claims on a bigger representation of Islam in Indonesia. Also, in 1999 armed groups of Christians and Muslims in Ambon in the province of Maluku engaged in sporadic

attacks that left more than 4,000 dead over a period of two years. At the same period in Poso in Central Sulawesi armed members of the Dayak and Malay communities engaged in confrontations in March 1999 and early 2001 (ibid:2).

However, any discussion of Islam and its possible connection to terrorism is potentially open to misinterpretation. Nevertheless, several acts of violence in the region have been directly linked to Jemaah Islamiyah and to Islamic militants (Chalk, 2005; Thayer, 2005). Esposito (2003) has observed that the use of sensationalist headlines about Islam and events in the Muslim world hinders the public's ability to distinguish between the religion and the actions of extremists. It also reinforces the tendency to equate all Islamic movements with terrorism.

### **1.7 Violence in Indonesia**

Levels of violence have shaken Indonesia since the monetary crisis of 1997 and the fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998. However, as Colombijn and Lindblad (2002) argue, violence has a long history in Indonesia, dating back to the struggle for independence, beginning in 1945, when groups such as Darul Islam and Permesta were involved in the post- independence movements.

The editors of *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*, Colombijn and Lindblad claim that the interest shown in violence in Indonesia after 1996 by the media, academics and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) brought about the dissemination of news of violence to all corners of Indonesia and internationally. Before 1996 most Indonesians relied on news from the state press and could easily be left unaware of the violence in the country. Erman (2002) argues that violence in Indonesia goes back to the colonial

period and cites as examples the use of violence against criminals in the Ombilin coalmines at the end of the nineteenth century. Barton (2005) notes that history reveals that the style of struggle seen in modern day resembles that performed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in parts of West Sumatra and the Darul Islam rebellions. They all had a focus on local concerns (pp.128, 129).

Farid (2006) observes that the local circumstances of conflicts in Indonesia should be studied in their wider overall context without falling into the trap of thinking of them as separate incidents. Farid furthers his assessment by suggesting the direct involvement of the military in funding and ordering civilian militias to attack other civilians, as in East Timor in 1999, by provoking tension and conflict between groups or by exacerbating conflict, such as the armed militant groups in Maluku and Ambon (p.271).

Sidel (2006:4) points out that conflicts involving armed paramilitary groups in Indonesia started to attract attention from journalists and academics, and as consequence, these conflicts were engulfed in the worldwide opinion of 'Islamic terrorism' (p.4).

By contrast, Smith (2005) argues that the growing terrorist threat in Indonesia is rooted in many ways in political movements that were once suppressed under Suharto. On the other hand, Zachary Abuza (2005) proposes that militant Islam is growing in the region because of economic dispossession, the lack of political freedom, the failure of secular education, and an increased number of religious students attending madrassahs (Islamic schools) in Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. The various interpretations only imply that there is no single answer, for that reason, the contribution offered by Carl Thayer (2005) is valuable. Thayer

suggests that to properly understand terrorism one must understand the specific context in which it occurs. Thayer argues that most specialists in terrorism tend to focus their analyses on the regional or international dimension rather than providing a deeper understanding of terrorism within local context, involving local politics and culture (pp.92, 93).

### **1.8 Media Framing of Terrorism**

The news framing of terrorism has an impact on how events are portrayed and made to be understood. Dobkin (1992) argues that the framing through news accounts tells the audience 'how to understand unfolding events', while Louw (2005) observes that its influence is determined by the extent to which the media is integrated in the political process such as adherence to 'the official line'.

Since the events of September 11, 2001 a large number of academic articles and books have been released. The literature on media and terrorism has blossomed; nevertheless, most discuss terrorist events elsewhere within the macro frame of the 'war on terror'. Works, such as *ReThinking Global Security, Media, Popular Culture, and the 'war on terror'* (Martin & Petro, 2006), discuss media and terrorism relationships under the perspective of popular culture. The authors in this edited book explore the ways in which our notions of fear, insecurity and danger are fostered by intermediary sources of information such as the television, radio, film, satellite imaging and the Internet. Several of the essays are drawn from television programmes picturing torture such as the examples of the Abu Ghraib spectacle, the French television programme *The Intimate Enemy* (pp.218, 223), and films such as *The Peacemaker* (p.29), *Saving Private Ryan* (p.118), and *The Battle of Algiers*



(p217). The essays provide a further understanding of media framing of terrorism in a sanitized and pre-packaged style of information.

Thussu (2006) for example looks into media reporting of terrorism with focus on television news where he explores the media's use of legitimizing narratives and mythologies such as the alleged Islamic terrorism, the myth of nuclear threat, the myth of atrocities, the myth of morality to convey information. His analysis takes the post Cold War period as the new epoch when a radicalized Islam has replaced Communism as the trans-national threat. For Thussu, as television has become one of the main sources for information and entertainment, the circulation of the myths facilitates viewers' acceptance as 'natural' something which in fact is manufactured reality (p.4).

Kellner's work *Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy* (2005) deals with the political scenario in the United States, particularly "the theft of the election in 2000 and the bias of the corporate media" (p.xviii), "the hysteria following the 9/11 terrorist attacks" (p.x), and how "following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the aggression and militarism of the Bush-Cheney regime was brazen on the global scale" (p.x). Thus, Kellner provides one more perspective on how the framing of terrorism can be used by personalities, actors and the media. Using value laden words such as 'banditry', 'stolen', 'deliberate lies', 'Bush-Cheney Gang', Kellner admits to be partisan and sharply critical (pp.x,xii,xv) towards democracy, social justice, accurate information, and good journalism. The author acknowledges his effort to develop a critical theory of contemporary media and society and their influence on U.S. politics. Kellner's work delves into the complex nuances of democracy and

corporate relationships in the United States and perhaps the nuances of other forms of government with corporate relationships elsewhere.

Another approach to the understanding of media framing of terrorism is offered by Jeff Lewis (2005). He looks into the construction of the debate on terrorism from a language perspective, particularly accepting Foucault's view on discourse and political power (p.3). Taking as examples the terrorist events in Beslan (2004), Abu Ghraib (2004), Iraq invasion (2003) and the Bali bombings (2002), Lewis (2005) attempts to elucidate the discussion about audience and public responses to mediated terrorism and other models of political violence. The author of *Language the role of Media and Culture in Global Terror and Political Violence* argues that "through the force of a U.S. dominated global order, the networked media culture has become both context and weapon in the progress and articulation of violence" (p.249). In his assessment, Lewis, citing the example of the Bali bombings (2002), claims that groups such as the "Jamaah Islamiyah and Laskar Jihad are in many ways reacting to the processes of globalization and modernization" (p.168). Nevertheless, as Slocum (2005:3) observes, al-Qaeda is a by-product of globalization and modernity. The groups Jemaah Islamiyah<sup>5</sup> and Laskar Jihad are dealt with in the following chapters.

Reinforcing the perspective on globalization, Ben-Shaul (2006) analyses the television news images of conflicts in the Middle East. He discusses the 'new world order' and the 'war on terror' as an expansion of capitalist elites that want to maintain their power within the economic and political domains, and shows how mainstream television news has embedded the dominant ideologies of the U.S. into their coverage of terror (p.149).

---

<sup>5</sup> I will adhere to the different spellings of Jemaah Islamiyah in direct quotations.

On the other hand, Peter van der Veer (2004) explores the responses to the attacks in the United States in 2001 by looking at terrorism and media from the perspective of the “Western Enlightenment and the Clash of Civilization”. Veer claims that the assaults against the World Trade Center in New York, and on the Pentagon in Washington, have a combination of both notions (p.1). By suggesting the interconnectedness of national and global issues, Veer offers a collection of articles where the construction of public opinion is moderated by the electronic media. With essays representing different perspectives, the editor of *Media, War, and Terrorism Responses from the Middle East and Asia* assembles a combination of contributors exploring theoretical uses of the media as an instrument of warfare.

Smith (2005) similarly looks into terrorism under the macro frame of the ‘war on terror’ and the events of September 2001. However, the editor of *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia Transnational Challenges to State and Regional Stability* takes a regional approach and argues that terrorism in Southeast Asia can be related to deep social and economic issues that have been evolving for decades (p.xi). The collection of essays deals particularly with issues of security and ideology, except for the contribution from Shyam Tekwani that carries an examination of the media.

Tekwani (2005) argues that new media technologies have an impact on the spread of terrorism. He suggests that Internet, cellular telephones, and computers have given terrorist groups a new venue for instant and clandestine communication. Tekwani notes that modern communications and transportation technologies have enabled groups in Southeast Asia to connect their local grievances to the globally networked al-Qaeda (p.235). Similarly, Giroux (2006) investigates how fear and anxiety are ‘marketed’ in the media spectacle of terrorism. With focus on the new media Giroux

discusses the ‘spectacle of terrorism’ in the aftermath of the events in September in the United States and the need to understand how the electronic technologies have been used to propagate a culture of fear, thereby merging the ‘war on terror’ and violence with new forms of politics (p.63). The perspectives Tekwani and Giroux offer are examples of what and how scholars can look into the media and terrorism relationships and the different frames that emerge.

Nevertheless, the violent nature of terrorism increases the drama and therefore its news value, and it is easily turned into a media ‘spectacle’. As Seaton (2005: xvii, xix) puts it, “from a production point of view, bad news is good news... [but] news is not just about marketplace” it is also about social values. News can be construed with the intention to canonize or demonize (xxii). It is able “to inspire emotional feelings for different purposes” but “particularly close to the feelings that politics seeks to mobilize” (p.140). As Slocum (2005) puts it, “the transformation of violent action into terrorism typically requires an agent to explain the political, moral, or discursive frames through which events are understood” (p.12).

In *Covering Islam* (1997), Edward Said has argued that the oil crisis of the 1970s and the Iranian occupation of the American embassy in Teheran in 1978 were turning points in the Western media’s portrayal of Islam and Muslims, leading to a less sympathetic interpretation of the Middle East.

Jenkins (2003) observed, terrorism has entered the realms of popular culture with films produced “for spectacular violence and demoniac villains [are] loosely related to actual events in the news headlines” (p.150). Citing examples such as Alfred Hitchcock’s 1936 British production *Sabotage*, the 1973 European production directed by Costa-Gavras *State of Siege*, the 1997 US-Brazilian production *Four Days*

in *September, The Official Story*, the 1999 Indian production *The Terrorist*, and the 1989 Israeli film *Streets of Yesterday*, Jenkins points out that “each individual society naturally reflects the different concerns and political interaction of the nation in question” (p.150).

In sum, political concerns and social values function as agenda setting to the news framing of terrorism while popular culture assists with the definition of what is terrorism and the personification of the villains.

The broad range of views on media and terrorism presented above shows that media framing of terrorism is not restricted to print media or to popular culture, or the new media. Different scholars have different perspectives in trying to understand the phenomenon. Instead of reducing the ‘spectacle’ that is terrorism into a few established familiar boxes of awareness one should adventure to step out of the script.

Surely, the relationship between media and terrorism is one of the most controversial aspects of studies on terrorism. As White (1991:265) puts it, “approaches to the topic are sharply debated”. Thus, regardless of any of analytical positions taken about the media, intellectuals will disagree over the meanings of terrorism, the analysis of media-terrorism linkages and so forth

One of the failures of the literature review is that there is very little about the media in Southeast Asia and terrorism in the region. Furthermore, even the literature on terrorism in Southeast Asia operates in a type of circle with writers frequently citing each other. One of the examples is the edited book by Paul Smith (2005), in which Carlyle Thayer cites Peter Chalk who cites Zachary Abuza and all of them cite Rohan Gunaratna, a well established terrorism expert based in Singapore. The writers

also cite newspapers articles; it is a circle that has to be acknowledged. Nonetheless, one could argue that there is nothing wrong with circular references.

### **1.9 Media in Southeast Asia**

The media sector in Southeast Asia, like the media in all parts of the world, functions within some form of governmental, societal and economic constraints. Hatchen (1996) notes that even the most independent press systems must deal with varying degrees of regulation. The media in Southeast Asia, generically, operates under three broad models of control (McCargo, 2003): the first is one of direct state control, as practised in Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos, where the media are monopolized and serve as the propaganda arm of the ruling party (Dixit, 1999). The second form of control is the licensing of private media, which is practised in Singapore, Malaysia and until 1998 in Indonesia. Only licensed publications can be produced and sold, and publications licenses can be revoked on technical or editorial grounds. The third model is the ‘free-for-all press’ as seen in the Philippines and in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto’s<sup>6</sup> regime in 1998. Thailand’s media fell into the third model until the election of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001. Since then, the Thai Journalists’ Association has noted that challenges to the media’s rights and freedoms began shortly after Shinawatra’s political party rose to power in 2001.

The system of media ownership in some countries in Southeast Asia is often unclear. Powerful holders of public office may themselves have shares in media companies, while media shareholders can be divided into two kinds: open and shadow shareholders. In some cases the shadow shareholders may control most or all of the

---

<sup>6</sup> I will adhere to the different spellings of Suharto in direct quotations.

assets of a media organization (McCargo, 2003). Even formal share listings might not reveal the real owners (George, 2002). The different kinds of media ownership can have an impact on the role played by the media in the region and readers should be aware of any association a newspaper may have with specific groups.

The concept of media freedom in the region is central to an understanding of the political role of the media. Censorship is practised at various levels (Chonkittavorn, 2002) as a way to “sacrifice freedom temporarily to achieve rapid economic development” (Kingsbury, 2001:53). The levels of freedom experienced by print and broadcasting media in the nations of Southeast Asia vary from freewheeling in the Philippines to totalitarian in Myanmar and to something in between in Malaysia and Singapore. The Reporters without Borders’ annual World Press Freedom Index in the last five years presented the following table:

**Table 1      World Press Freedom Index –**  
**Higher score represents less press freedom.**

	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Indonesia	57	110	117	102	103
Malaysia	110	104	122	113	92
Singapore	n/a	144	147	140	146
Thailand	65	82	59	107	122

### **1.9.1 The Media in Indonesia**

Since the resignation of dictator Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia has witnessed improved levels of media freedom. As Weintraub (2006) notes, the fall of Suharto brought an expansion of private television stations, popular print media and a loosening of the state’s control over media content. However, a controversial draft of the criminal code being prepared by the government threatens the initial flurry of

press freedom, with journalists having been tried as criminals and jailed for defamation (Amnesty International, 2003; Pacific Media Watch, 2005).

Woodier (2006) notes that any consideration of the media environment in Indonesia has to take into account the military and their place in the politics and culture of the state. Additionally, the military continue to influence the political life of the country (p.48). In Woodier's view the political and military elite are yearning to control communications even though it is becoming more impractical due to the expansion of the media industry in the country (p.55). While old big companies have maintained their dominance, new publications are flourishing as a result of government initiatives to ease the rules requiring individuals and groups to secure licences before printing (Heryanto & Adi, 2001). Hobart (2006) notes that following the fall of Suharto there was a period of remarkable enthusiasm and exploration across much of the mass media with the rejuvenation of the film industry, the thriving of the print and broadcasting industries... if only to try to keep market share and attract advertisers (p.395). On the other hand, Woodier (2006) suggests that while the competition has to a certain extent improved the quality of the media, it has also become more sensationalist; and that a wide spread of corruption, intimidation and influence on the media from regional and national political forces is taking place. Stanley (2006) observes that despite the surfacing of many new media outlets, from a journalist standpoint there has not yet been any significant progress in the situation freedom of the Indonesian press (p.196).

For decades, the state had sponsored and controlled media developments as part of the consolidation of nation-state building. During the Suharto era, from 1965 to 1998, Suharto made sure the press was limited in its criticisms of the New Order.



Stories that could inflame racial, ethnic or religious tensions were off-limits. McCargo's (2003:7,42) view of the Suharto regime is that it was based on a blend of economic development, military influence, centralized power structure and strict limits on popular political participation. McCargo (2003) claims that when Suharto took over the country's governance and replaced the constitutional democracy for his 'guided democracy', he gradually refined mechanisms for state control of the press (p.78). McCargo (2003), citing Hill (1994) and Hanazaki (1996), claims that Indonesia used to have an outspoken press during the period of the revolution (1945-9) and in the early years of independence from the Dutch. Possibly, the period McCargo refers to is when the media was dominated by well-known figures such as Rosihan Anwar, B. M.Diah and Mochtar Lubis<sup>7</sup>. It is defined as the period of idealism within the press, an era when writers such as Burhanuddin Muhammad Diah was a journalist and a resistance fighter.

With the fall of President Suharto in 1998, the Vice-President, B.J. Habibie, took office. The new government had plans to amend laws in the areas of social, economic, political and the media policies. As Angela Romano wrote, "Topics once considered taboo were now under public discussion" (Romano, 2000:68). The government of B.J.Habibie did not last long. One year later, in October 1999, the Muslim leader and intellectual Abdurrahman Wahid replaced Habibie as president. One of Wahid's first acts as president was to abolish the Ministry of Information, arguing that the ministry was the propaganda arm of the Suharto regime. Independent media watch groups were established around the country while groups of journalists began working together for the abolition of the repressive media legislation, and an amendment of the constitution to guarantee press freedom (Harsono, 2000).

---

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.asiamediaforum.org/node/572>

In less than two years into his presidency, Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur, was complaining that the press had engaged in a concerted campaign against him. Romano (2003:167), observed “Wahid, once located at the very heart of the reformasi [reforms] push, who most directly attempted to reverse the flow of press liberalization [that Habibie initiated] by trying to instigate various controls”. Gus Dur was impeached by the Parliament and Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri replaced him in August 2001. In the view of McCargo (2003) and foreign journalists covering Indonesia, Megawati appeared less committed to press openness.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was sworn into office on October 2004. Under his administration, the Indonesian journalist Kafil Yamin<sup>8</sup> (2006) has argued, the culture of telephone call journalism is back in use; it was a mechanism employed under the regime of Suharto. As Yamin puts it, the *budaya telepon* or the culture of the telephone call was the first phase of control under the ‘New Order’ when a story could be dropped or run on the basis of a high military official giving orders over the telephone. Yamin implies that state influence over media in Indonesia is still prevalent today.

### **1.9.2 The Media in Malaysia**

The role of the press in Malaysia is to contribute to national unity and nation building. The press is supposed to be an agent of national unity and therefore must avoid reporting or raising issues that would inflame racial sentiments amongst the population. The press is supposed to be an agent of mobilization during the launching of campaigns or during social intervention programs (Anuar, 2000; Massey & Arthur Chang, 2002). It is not uncommon for the Malaysian government to use the Internal

---

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.asiamediaforum.org/node/572>

Security Act against journalists. As a result, editors' and journalists' self-censorship practices play an important role in curbing press freedom in Malaysia (Asian Communication Handbook, 2003).

Anuar (2000) claims Malaysia has one of the longest histories of journalism in the region dating back to the British colonial period. After independence in 1957, radio and newspapers gained prominence as useful tools of national development. From the 1970s on, the media have been designed to play a role as partner of the government in promoting unity and development. It was during this period that the press system began to take shape, with various laws and regulations being enacted, most of them, if not all, still prevailing. With that in view, much of the media in Malaysia are still under the government's control (Nain, 2002), and political parties (Glen Lewis, 2006).

### **1.9.3 The Media in Singapore**

'Developmental journalism' is just one of many characterizations of the media situation in Singapore (Wong, 2004). Development journalism prescribes a theoretical model of state-media dynamics which is cooperative and serves the objective of national development (Heng, 2002; Massey & Arthur Chang, 2002). In Singapore the role of the press is interlaced with the goals of national agenda, such as fostering social cohesion and the education of Singaporeans concerning government's ideology, policy and actions (Bokhorst-Heng 2002:561). George (2003) argues that when dealing with print and broadcast media, the Singapore authorities have been able to tailor their political interventions narrowly so that these actions did not smother their economic priorities. Media freedom has been markedly absent in

Singapore, says Garry Rodan (2000:219), who argues, “the government remains determined to use what power it has to curtail critical and investigative media reporting on social and political issues”.

The press system is maintained by tight legal controls (George, 2002). Another source of control is the Internal Security Act, under which journalists can be detained without trial (Rodan, 2002; 2003). Journalists can be fined or jailed if they breach laws dealing with contempt of court or contempt of parliament. The punishment is an effective tool of repression. The Official Secrets Act also works as a deterrent. Libel laws induce writers to take extreme care with any comments that could be claimed to hurt officials’ reputations. Lim (1996) says, “Newspapers in Singapore readily accept the need to work within the constraints of the law. As such, self-censorship has, over the years, become the norm and is exercised at various levels” (p.75).

Despite media control, the advanced infrastructure of Singapore makes the place the ideal base for reporting on Southeast Asia. In 2000, Rodan calculated that seventy-one foreign news organizations were then based in Singapore. Many of these are wire services that give emphasis to business reporting and other non-sensitive material but avoid local social or political issues. Nevertheless, agencies such as the former *The Asian Wall Street Journal* renamed *The Wall Street Journal Asia*, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, *Time*, *Asiaweek* and Bloomberg.com resigned themselves to the special conditions applied to operating in Singapore after being in dispute over, and penalized for, their coverage of Singapore (Rodan, 2000:220). These disputes not only involved the content of articles but also the Singapore government’s insistence on the right to have replies to such content published in unedited form in the offending publication.

### **1.10 Media Theory: Constructionist**

Media data can be analysed in a variety of ways. I have chosen the social constructionist approach. It is often concerned with the unmasking of the taken-for-granted understanding of social reality (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002:210). As Van Gorp (2007:62) puts it, “Social constructionism is concerned with the creation and institutionalization of reality in social interaction”.

In the context of media studies Van Gorp suggests that the media tend to stress different kind of issues, for that reason, offering the public a narrow number of alternatives. The construction of reality in media studies emphasizes that there is no ‘single’ reality but rather a construed interpretation of reality (Williams, 2003:11, 16).

The constructionist approach to news framing is concerned with the processes by which sources come to describe or explain the world in which they live, a product of historical and cultural processes (Johnson-Cartee, 2005:3). The cultural process is here understood as the shared beliefs of a collective society.

#### **1.10.1 Framing**

For this study the examination involved a look into the theories of news framing offered by Goffman, (1974); Entman (1993); Pan and Kosicki, (1993); Reese, Gandy and Grant, (2001); Norris, Montague and Just, (2003), and Johnson-Cartee, (2005). In fact, they are all associated with Goffman’s initial work on framing of news within the social constructionist approach. Erving Goffman (1974) sketched the theoretical foundation of frame analysis as symbolic interactionism constrained by structure and social organization (1974:13). Frames are windows that set the parameters ‘in which

citizens discuss public events' (Tuchman, 1978: iv). The role of framing is to focus attention and selectively emphasize situations or events, and is defined as a symbolic interpretative construction (Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980). Van Gorp (2007) suggests that frames, in a constructionist approach, refer to the different ways the news media can cover an issue, but also it includes the processes that takes into account the role of journalistic production (p.70).

Entman (1993:52) has defined it as:

“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and to make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation”.

Approaches to media studies have been applied with the use of news framing analysis (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Gilboa, 2002; Brewer, Graf & Willnat, 2003). People think in terms of narratives and that production of stories is central to the news. To fit events into predetermined frameworks, stories are shaped in ways that demonize and canonize, create semi-fictions, exploitation and dramas, but there are also more professionally produced stories that are good, serious (Seaton, 2005: xxi, xxii).

### **1.10.2 Critical Discourse Analysis**

Within the methodological applications of frames, some researchers opt for a qualitative approach such as discourse analysis (e.g. Pan & Kosicki, 1993), whereas others apply the traditional content analysis (e.g. Tankard, 2001), or still others prefer

quantitative methods (e.g. Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). I have chosen Norman Fairclough's (2001) approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA).

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has drawn upon a variety of theoretical and analytical traditions, including theorization of ideology, hegemony, as well as the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (e.g. Foucault, 1978; Wodak, 1989, 1996; Wodak & Busch, 2004; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2001; Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002).

Authors of texts draw on already existing discourses or set of beliefs. One of the main purposes of Fairclough's approach is to show the links between discursive practice (power relations) and the broader social and cultural developments and structures. Critical discourse analysis recognises that while texts shape, and are shaped by social practices. Thus ideological representations are built into frames. CDA therefore shows the links between discursive practices, ideologies, power relations and the broad social structures.

The general principles of critical discourse analysis (CDA) are concerned with social problems rather than language use per se (Wodak, 1996). Edward Said's (1978) analysis of the discourse of Orientalism is an example of textual analysis without drawing on any linguistic theory (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999:6). As noted by Schudson (1982) and Tuchman (2002), news texts provide a supplementary understanding of social and cultural contexts; the identification of specific frames of understanding news involving justice, nationalism and political issues, such as weak government. CDA as an interdisciplinary method requires, as a precondition, comprehensive information about prevailing social and historical settings. The method implies a relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies

and power relations. Another example of critical discourse analysis without drawing from linguistic theory can be found in Michel Foucault's work. Foucault (1978) sees the modern power not as a form of coercion from the outside but as a form of discipline and consent.

The work of Norris et al. (2003), Tuman (2003) and Picard (1991) on news framing of terrorism was also examined in order to apprehend how the press either defined or interpreted the answers to the research questions. Riessman's (1993) introduction to narrative analysis was taken as a preliminary understanding of the weaknesses and strengths of qualitative methods.

### **1.11 Methods**

This thesis is a comparative study of the press coverage of cases of terrorism reported by the Singaporean mainstream English language newspaper *The Straits Times* (*ST*), the Indonesian English language daily *The Jakarta Post* (*JP*), the Malaysian English language newspaper *New Straits Times* (*NST*) and the Indonesian English language version of the weekly magazine *Tempo*.

The *ST* is a public listed company, with the majority of its shares held by companies linked to Singapore's ruling People's Action Party (PAP) (George, 2002). *JP* is considered to be the most independent and credible English language daily in Indonesia (Sen & Hill, 2000; McCargo, 2003); the *JP* belongs to a consortium of business groups led by the Kompas-Gramedia Group, which dominates the publishing industry in Indonesia. *NST* is closely linked to UMNO (United Malay National Organisation), the ruling political party in Malaysia (Nain, 2002). *Tempo* magazine is an influential weekly news magazine, founded in 1971 by the writer Goenawan Mohamad and considered independent. The English edition dates from 2000. The *ST*,



*NST* and *JP* were chosen because as mainstream they are considered to be quality newspapers read by the well educated people, whom political scientists describe as the ‘attentive public’ (McNair, 1998). English is the lingua franca used in Singapore, while in Indonesia and Malaysia English is widely used by the business and intellectual elites.

**Table 2      Corpus Publications**

<b>Newspapers</b>				<b>Magazine</b>
	<b>Singapore</b>	<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>Malaysia</b>	<b>Indonesia</b>
<b>Title</b>	Straits Times ( <i>ST</i> )	Jakarta Post ( <i>JP</i> )	New Straits Times ( <i>NST</i> )	Tempo ( <i>Tempo</i> )
<b>Variables</b>	State influence	Relatively auto-nomous	State influence	Independent
<b>Readership</b>	Local & Expatriates	Local & Expatriates	Local & Expatriates	Local & Expat.
<b>Competition</b>	Basically none	Strong	Considerable	Considerable
<b>Format</b>	Daily	Daily	Daily	Weekly

The use of comparative analysis methodology is seen by Phillips and Jorgensen (2002), as a way for the researcher to distance him/herself from the material under analysis. Livingstone (2003), in *On the Challenges of Cross-National Comparative Media Research*, sees positive aspects in cross-national projects where the identification of similarities and differences contributes to international understanding. Such studies also help in learning of policy initiatives, national stereotypes and so forth. Sreberny (2004) notes that by analyzing the media output of different societies, and comparing and contrasting the outputs with one another, one can demonstrate the relationships between society, culture and how the media has been defined within each socio-cultural system, either working under a process of repression or one of hegemony.

### **1.11.1 Analysis and Period of examination**

The study examined the terrorist attacks of the 12 October 2002 Bali bombing, the 5 August 2003 JW Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, the 9 September 2004 Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta, the 2 October 2005 Bali bombings and the two rounds of arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) activists in Singapore. The reason for examining these events was a result of my own interest as a journalist to understand the press performance in the reporting of those acts as explained in further details in the section 1.2 of the thesis' aims.

The object of the analysis was news stories, news analyses, editorials and op-ed pieces during two weeks of reportage of the events. Letters to the editors were not included in the study. In line with the argument put by McNair (1998), editorials are important because they represent a newspaper's official position on issues. In similar argument put by Picard (1991), op-ed pieces and commentaries reflect the opinions of individual authors; however, newspapers often run op-ed pieces that are in line with their editorial slant, although dissenting opinions are also used to promote balance and discussion.

The reason for concentrating on two weeks of coverage is because after this period news tends to slide off (the front page) and give space to co-related issues or other events. In some cases, such as the coverage of the Australian Embassy bombing, the number of stories devoted to this issue reduced sharply in less than one week, probably because of the Indonesian presidential election. Moreover, in a case of saturated coverage, as happened with the Bali bombings in 2002, a longer review period would have generated greater volume of data but would be unlikely to materially affect the findings. The period of analysis of the coverage of the JI arrests

in Singapore exceeded a period of two weeks due to the complexity of the topic. Contrary to the hard fact events of the bombings where two weeks provided enough material, I felt the need to make sense of the announcement of the arrests and the various issues the press associated with them. The coverage of the bombings was straightforward mainly because the newspapers and the magazine were reporting on factual events and not on politically loaded circumstances, which contrasted with the case of the arrests of JI members.

The research questions were:

RQ 1: What was the conceptualization of terrorism presented by the newspapers?

RQ 2: Who was represented as being the terrorists?

RQ 3: What reasons did the stories advance as the cause for the arrests and the motivation for the bombings?

RQ 4: What was the connection between violence and religion presented by the newspapers?

In addition, in the cases of the bombings the researcher investigated how the publications discussed the victims of the attacks. This subject should provide ground for future research on the regional media treatment of the victims.

The two phases of the arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members in Singapore initially was not planned to be part of the study. However, during the course of the research it became apparent that the wider investigation of the JI arrests would contribute to a better understanding of the press coverage in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore since the bombings were reported within the discourse of Jemaah Islamiyah.

Early drafts of the analysis of the bomb attacks were written with the newspapers as the units of focus, but a close reading showed that the events had lost their relevance to the study of press reporting on terrorism. Consequently, the material was rewritten to put the events themselves at the centre of the framework of the study rather than the newspapers.

For each newspaper and the magazine the researcher considered it important to put the findings into their social context at the end of each event analysis, referred to as 'Insight'. The findings are discussed in chapter seven.

While the researcher critically reflected upon questions such as 'what constitutes terrorism', 'who are the terrorists', 'what is their causal motivation', 'what are the connections between acts of violence and religion', she has also examined the reliability of sources of information, specifically whether the stories had been written by staff or been provided by newswire services (Koo, 2005).

The study was already in its final phase when a series of explosions rocked parts of the Indonesian resort island of Bali on October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2005. As a result, a brief chapter on the 2005 Bali bombings, described in the study as Bali 2, was added. It is in chapter six. The reason for including this episode was that small changes were observed in *JP*'s reporting in that the stories were more professionally produced.

#### **1.11.2 How the job was done**

The analyses involved a comprehensive examination of each story and the selection of those elements that answered the questions about aspects of journalistic practices in respect of each of the events reported. This meant reading each text a few times,

taking notes, registering findings and finally reporting comparatively with examples from the newspapers and accounts of historical contexts (Tischer, Meyer, Wodak & Vetter, 2000). The process was developed as follows: (a) read each article at least three times; (b) write down the overall message of the story; (c) answer the research questions; (d) compile the answers.

In order to grasp the central frames of the stories, I have used the four points elaborated by Entman (1993): the problem definition, the causal interpretation of the issue, the moral evaluation presented in the text and the solution the text has advanced to the problem. For example, some of the frame packages work on moral panics to generate fear and anxiety, calling for more social control. Further details are provided in chapter seven.

Once the entries and research questions were answered another phase took place with the writing of a handwritten, rough draft of each chapter, where I have combined observations with examples from the newspapers and of the historical context. Handwritten material was then developed by computer, using Word, where further details and observations were added or refined. This exercise proved valuable since the same findings repeated themselves, which demonstrated a consistency in the method of analysis. The consistency was tested in the press coverage of the 2005 Bali bombing, 'Bali 2', when it became clear the process of analysis was efficient and replicable. Apart from answering the main questions, attention was given to aspects of journalistic practices, such as the use of public diplomacy, media patriotism, and the domestication of news reporting, faceless sources of information, leaks and sensationalism. These are details that have to be understood in the media framing analytical process.

### 1.11.3 Hard copies

Original copies of the publications were used for analysis. In cases when these were not available, I visited the National University of Singapore library to examine the microfilms. Notes on the date, title and page number of the stories were taken. With such information it was possible to extract the articles from Internet archives, using either the lexis nexus or the factiva system. Despite this being a rather laborious approach, it provided the researcher with further details on article placement, photos and captions that together attract the readers' attention.

The *Jakarta Post* was not available either on newsstands in Singapore nor in the National University of Singapore's library. Editions of *JP* were available for a limited period of time at Singapore's National Library; however, after being available for a set period of one month, copies of *JP* would be removed for recycling. Asked if I could purchase the discharged *JP* editions, I was told that it was not possible since it was not part of the library's policy to sell newspapers. I visited *JP*'s office in Jakarta, Indonesia, where editions for each of the study case were examined and pages photocopied. Similarly, original editions of *Tempo* magazine were examined and stories photocopied, albeit at the National University of Singapore's library. Contacts were established with people in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, and systems put in place so that the required newspapers could be delivered to me in Singapore.

Despite my awareness that as an academic enquiry this study also requires careful attention to being systematic and consistent in my findings, I sometimes found it difficult to write about the coverage of *The Straits Times*. There were occasions when time was spent in the search for 'the right way' or 'the right words' to describe and explain the findings. Self-censorship was the main obstacle. This form of hindrance

was due to my knowledge that attempts to challenge academic studies have been made in the past. An example of such challenge happened to a team of economists from Nanyang Technological University (NTU), who had arrived at conclusions that did not match the expectations or official views regarding the number of jobs occupied by foreigners in Singapore (Chia, R. “NTU Economists: we made honest error”, *ST*, 2 August 2003).

## Chapter Two: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

The Singapore authorities disclosed in early January 2002 the arrests of a number of men in connection with an alleged plot to attack US and other targets in the island state. The arrests were revealed weeks after they took place. Again, in September 2002, government sources revealed the arrests of another group of men. As in the previous case, the announcement was made weeks after the arrests. The Singapore authorities defined the group of men as belonging to Jemaah Islamiyah, which was also operating in Malaysia and Indonesia (Nathan, D. *ST*, 7 January 2002, p.1; ‘American establishments here were group’s main targets’, *ST*, 7 January 2002, p.3).

It should be noted that the name of the group Jemaah Islamiyah<sup>9</sup> is written differently in the various newspapers studied; it is also often referred to as ‘JI’, a practice that is also adopted here. Similarly, the names of various suspected terrorists are written differently in *The Straits Times* (*ST*), *New Straits Times* (*NST*), *The Jakarta Post* (*JP*) and *Tempo*, and their different spellings will be adhered to in direct quotations.

### 2.1 Portrayal of JI before Announcements of Arrests: *Straits Times*

Following the September 11 attacks in the US, the *ST* reflected the view of the Singaporean authorities in stating, “there is no group here that is linked to Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect in the terrorist attack on the US” (‘S’pore is free of Osama links, says DPM Lee’, *ST*, 23 September 2001). Just one month later, however, the government revealed that, “A Middle-East terrorist group tried to cultivate and recruit Singaporean Muslims into its fold” (Lim, L., *ST*, 15 October 2001, p.1), noting the

---

<sup>9</sup> I will adhere to the different spelling of Jemaah Islamiyah in direct quotations.



“dramatic revelation that the Internal Security Department (ISD) uncovered the plot last year”. And in early January 2002, the *ST* revealed the arrest of 15 people for terrorism-related activities (‘American establishments here were group’s main targets’, *ST*, 7 January 2002, p.3).

An analysis of the press coverage of the arrests in Singapore of people suspected of ‘terrorism activities’ provides some background for understanding the coverage of the bombings that have taken place in Bali and Jakarta. The official disclosures of arrests in Singapore were made in January and September 2002. The newspapers *The Straits Times (ST)* in Singapore, *New Straits Times (NST)* in Malaysia, *The Jakarta Post (JP)* in Indonesia and *Tempo* magazine presented different perspectives at the time of the arrests.

A full chapter on the coverage of the Jemaah Islamiyah network is justified by the prominence given to the group in the *ST*’s discussion of the ‘war on terror’, and by the way in which the other newspapers implicated the Jemaah Islamiyah group in their coverage of the Bali bombings in 2002, the JW Marriott Hotel bombing in 2003 and the blast near the Australian embassy in 2004.

The *ST*’s reporting assumed from the beginning a connection between those arrested and the Jemaah Islamiyah group as well as the al-Qaeda network (‘A tale with many beginnings’, *ST*, 12 January 2002; Long, S., *ST*, 14 January 2002). The *JP* focused on addressing the general issue of whether Indonesia was ‘a hotbed for terrorism’; while *NST* linked members of the political opposition group Kumpulan Militant Malaysian (KMM) to Jemaah Islamiyah. Both the *JP* and *NST* alluded extensively to Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda in their reporting.

The arrests in January 2002 will be referred to as ‘first round’ and the arrests in September 2002 as ‘second round’.

## **2.2 Coverage of First Round of Arrests: *Straits Times***

The first round of arrests was revealed some weeks after it was carried out on 9 and 24 December 2001 (‘American establishments here were group’s main targets’, *ST*, 7 January 2002, p.3). Government officials identified the suspects as radical Muslims belonging to Jemaah Islamiyah, and several key contentions by the government were reported as facts: attacks had been planned in 1999; there were plans for attacks to be carried out in 2002; and there was a connection between members of JI and the Afghanistan fighters of the 1980s (‘A tale with many beginnings’, *ST*, 12 January 2002; ‘No US tip-off before ISA arrests’, *ST*, 19 January 2002). The *ST* said “the group had two plans” (‘A tale with many beginnings’, *ST*, 12 January 2002), one to blow up a regular shuttle bus for US personnel and the Yishun MRT (Mass Rapid Transport) station, and one to blow up Sembawang Wharf and US naval vessels. The *ST* presented as obvious its statement that “September 11 was of course another beginning for the Jemaah Islamiyah here” (ibid). It described Jemaah Islamiyah as a “clandestine group” that began surveying locations in Singapore frequented by Americans in January 1997.

The coverage guided the reader’s interpretation of the arrests through several devices. At times, essentially the same story was repeated under different headlines (e.g. ‘American establishments here were group’s main targets’, *ST*, 7 January 2002, p.3; ‘A tale with many beginnings’, *ST*, 12 January 2002; Pereira, D., *ST*, 20 January 2002; ‘Three countries targeted’, *ST*, 11 February 2002; Pereira, D., *ST*, 11 February

2002) with minor structural and stylistic variations. This may partly have been the result of harried sub-editors scrambling on deadline to fill column space, but it also had the effect of reinforcing the government's version of events and establishing it as incontrovertible. In fact, the official announcement of the arrests, made five days after the news was first officially leaked (Shin-Ian, Lee, *NST*, 6 January 2002, p.6), was presented as a fresh news story on January 12, 2002, allowing all of the details to be presented yet again.

The *ST* used a question-and-answer style, for example, "Is this group connected with the Kumpulan Militant Malaysia (KMM)?" and "Is this group connected with Al-Qaeda?" ('American establishments here were group's main targets', *ST*, 7 January 2002, p.3), which allowed it to raise theories in readers' minds even where hard evidence for those theories was limited at the time. It also presented the discovery of the JI plot as an entertaining and suspenseful process of discovery, for example, "we piece together the story" ('A tale with many beginnings', *ST*, 12 January 2002); this was vivid journalism and thus calculated to win readers for the newspaper, but it also suggested the facts in the story had been established by rigorous and independent investigation, rather than merely by relying on information provided by the government. The format of the stories is also like a movie with a plot, and with good and bad guys: dramatization.

The *ST* appealed to readers' patriotism and moral judgment by stressing that the suspects, as Singaporeans, had benefited from services and opportunities provided by the government and society:

"They went to national school, all but one were gainfully employed: managers, businessmen, printers, drivers, technicians and engineers. All but

one lived in Housing Board flats. They apparently were not zealots and did not come across as fanatics. They were heartlanders. They were average Singaporeans. They were, all in all, the most unlikely- looking suspects ('A tale with many beginnings', *ST*, 12 January 2002).

This description of the JI members as 'the most unlikely suspects' also allowed the *ST* to reinforce the government's calls for "Singaporeans to report any suspicious activities, and be especially alert of people going around taking pictures of 'sensitive places', and while staying vigilant, Singaporeans should also stay calm" (Long, S., *ST*, 14 January 2002). The residents of Yishun suburb made headlines when they participated in a session to watch video footage showing possible targets near the train station; the video was said to have been part of preparations for an attack planned for 1999, but it was not clear from the story whether or not the residents were informed of this (*ibid*).

In subsequent weeks, the arrests continued to make headlines with stories linking the JI group to al-Qaeda and the Afghanistan fighters, and probing the existence of the group in Singapore ('A tale with many beginnings', *ST*, 12 January 2002; 'No US tip-off before ISA arrests', *ST*, 19 January 2002). The coverage soon expanded to include Indonesia, as in, for example, "Is there an Al-Qaeda connection in Indonesia?" (Pereira, D., *ST*, 20 January 2002). This story presented various possibilities and theories, which were not always clearly distinguished from assumptions or facts. For example, the newspaper asserted that "recent arrests of Islamic extremists in Singapore and Malaysia have raised the worrying spectre of Indonesia becoming a regional center for Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda terrorist network". It quoted unnamed intelligence officers as well as a "JI official, who declined to be named but who wanted to be known as the third most senior member of

the organization in Indonesia” (ibid). Faced with these impressive-sounding sources, which could not, however, be checked because of their anonymity, many readers would by the end of the story have concluded that at a minimum, there was a high possibility of Indonesia becoming a centre for al-Qaeda.

In addition, on occasion the *ST* did not hesitate to introduce its own judgements into the story: “Could this have been more than just solidarity among Muslims? Probably” This story (Pereira, D., *ST*, 20 January 2002) linked JI to other radical Muslim groups and figures in Indonesia, including the Mujahideen Council of Indonesia, the Indonesian Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, and the Kumpulan Militant Malaysian (KMM). This perspective was reinforced by another story written by the same writer in the same edition, ‘A potent force with network in region’ (Pereira, D., *ST*, 20 January 2002), which interwove a historical account of the establishment of JI as a regional group with details of its functioning, ideology and physical training, based on anonymous JI and other sources. It was not always clear whether the information attributed to JI sources was in fact obtained second-hand from government security services.

In subsequent stories, terrorism experts were also quoted to reinforce the newspaper’s view that JI was set up by al-Qaeda to attack Western interests in the region and to set up an Islamic state (Rekhi, S. *ST*, 25 January 2002).

The *ST*’s reporting included the contents of a document allegedly discovered by Indonesian intelligence and passed on to an *ST* correspondent in Jakarta about the operations of terrorists in Asia (Pereira, D., *ST*, 20 January 2002). The document, identified by the newspaper as ‘Operation Jihad’, had extensive details on alleged plans to bomb US embassies and installations in Jakarta, Singapore and Malaysia in

December 2002. The *ST* repeated the information ten days later with the emphasis on “Three countries targeted in attack plan.” [sic] (Pereira, D. *ST*, 11 February 2002). The *ST* did not explain the apparent contradiction in its assertion that intelligence decided to keep the document secret while giving a copy to *The Straits Times* (Pereira, D., *ST*, 11 February 2002).

In subsequent weeks, the ‘Operation Jihad’ document became the source of a number of stories on more planned attacks in Kuala Lumpur and in Jakarta. The *ST* did not elaborate on whether it was referring to previously published plans or newly revealed plans, but the result was to create a perception of an extensive campaign of violence. This backed up *ST*’s warnings that “S’pore is not safe even with the arrests of 13 Muslim extremists” (Latif, A. & Karen Wong, *ST*, 18 February 2002). It is against this background that the main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorist, roots of violence, and the connection between violence and religion.

### **2.2.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Straits Times***

The idea of terrorism first presented by the *Straits Times* was related to threats against American targets in Singapore. But as the coverage stretched into weeks after the news of the arrests, it expanded to include threats against Singaporean targets and Western interests in the country by Islamic radicals (Long, S., *ST*, 14 January 2002; Pereira, D., *ST*, 11 February 2002; ‘Now is time for moderates to speak up’, *ST*, 11 February 2002).

### **2.2.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The stories provided names and details of the ‘terrorists’, not only of those arrested in Singapore but also of those alleged to be suspected of terrorist activities in other countries. The suspects were linked to both Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda groups. In the earlier stages of coverage, the JI members “appeared to be dominated by foreign elements and subscribed to these elements’ extremist ideology and its [sic] Anti-American, and anti-West Agenda” (‘A tale with many’, *ST*, 12 January 2002). The ‘terrorists’ were also referred to as “deviant Muslims” (Latif, A. & Karen Wong, *ST*, 18 February 2002). The principle ‘innocent until proven guilty’ was not applied in the reporting approach.

### **2.2.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The newspaper argued that the fall of Indonesia’s President Suharto<sup>10</sup> had allowed al-Qaeda-linked Islamic militants to roam free in that country (Pereira, D., *ST*, 20 February 2002; ‘Jakarta reactions to SM Lee ‘puzzling’, *ST*, 21 February 2002; Asmarani, D., *ST*, 22 February 2002; Pereira, D., *ST*, 22 February 2002;). The newspaper blamed the Indonesian government’s inertia in dealing with militants and stressed Jemaah Islamiyah members’ goals of establishing an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. The reporting stressed that the use of violence had its origins in extremist ideology dating back to the war in Afghanistan.

---

<sup>10</sup> The variation in the spelling of Suharto/Soeharto will be adhered to in direct quotations.

### **2.2.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

Officials' statements linked the teachings in madrassahs (Islamic religious schools) with extremist Islamic ideology, seeing them as a breeding ground for terrorists (Pereira, B., *ST*, 10, February 2002). The connection between violence and religion was reflected in Singapore government policy that religious teachers had to be registered with an official local institution in order "to stop anyone else from abusing the position of religious teacher" ('ISA detainees cooperative, coping well', *ST*, 24 January 2002).

### **2.2.2 Insight**

What started as press coverage of the arrests developed into extensive and wide-ranging reporting on various issues related to the discourse of global terrorism in the context of the 'war on terror'. Muslim communities as well as 'madrassahs' (Islamic schools) were put in the spotlight. The *Straits Times* reinforced the perception that even if Islam as a faith was not under scrutiny, Muslims as individuals were.

In news production there was a pattern of repeating information, either in the same edition of the newspaper or several days later, without making it clear to readers that the information had already been published (Pereira, D., *ST*, 20 January 2002; Pereira, B., *ST*, 10 February 2002). The newspaper also made use of a polished style of persuasive communication involving a variety of discourses. This type of reporting was not observed in the other publications studied.



### 2.3 Coverage of First Round of Arrests: *Jakarta Post*

The *Jakarta Post's* (JP) coverage of the first round of arrests was to a large degree reactive, because the news initially broke in Singapore and the Indonesian media faced the task of responding to the *ST's* contention that terrorism had roots in Indonesia. The *ST* contended this early on, claiming JI had cells in Malaysia and Indonesia. ('A tale with many', *ST*, 12 January 12, 2002; Long, S., *ST*, 14 January 2002; 'No US tip-off', *ST*, 19 January 2002). It stated that,

The Indonesian government's official position up to now is that there are no terrorist cells linked to Osama bin Laden in the sprawling archipelago. American and Indonesian intelligence think otherwise... The truth lies somewhere in between... There is growing evidence that the Saudi-born Osama and his lieutenants had [sic] worked actively in the past five years to cultivate radical Muslim groups in Indonesia by providing them with training and funds from his war chest to get them to effect his vision of Islamic theocracy in Asia; their efforts have boosted the military capabilities of some of these groups and hardened their ideological framework. (Pereira, D., *ST*, 20 January 2002).

The above scenario was followed by a story based on statements made by the top political leader in Singapore, who was quoted as saying,

"The arrest of the 13 Muslim extremists in December has not made things safe for Singapore. It is just a setback, a disruption to the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) cells. Singapore continues to face danger because the masterminds are still at large in Indonesia, said Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew" (Latif, A. & Karen Wong, *ST*, 18 February 2002).

It was in such a context that the *JP* reported on the arrest of JI members in Singapore and repeated information disclosed by the *ST* that terrorists in Indonesia were planning to blow up US embassies in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia

(Tahilramani, Y., *JP*, 12 February 2002, p.2; Tahilmarani, Y. *JP*, 14 February 2002, p.1). The *JP* also reproduced stories published in the American press ('Wolfowitz rules out direct U.S. attack on RI', *JP*, 9 January 2002, p.1), quoting US officials as lumping together Indonesia with Somalia, Yemen and the Philippines as sanctuaries for terrorist organizations.

The *JP* published both these allegations and the reactions of local Muslim organizations and Indonesian police officers, denying a link between Indonesians and the al-Qaeda network (Hari, K., *JP*, 29 January 2002, p.8).

To some degree, the coverage by the *JP* and the *ST* was a public political issue between Singapore's allegations and Indonesia's rebuttal (Nurbianto, B., *JP*, 7 January 2002, p.1; Tahilramani, Y., *JP*, 14 February 2002, p.1; Siboro, T. & Tahilramani, Y., *JP*, 15 February 2002, p.2; Emmanuelle, A. & Siboro, T., *JP*, 18 February 2002, p.8). Religious leaders in Indonesia urged the government not to arrest people indiscriminately (Nurbianto, B., *JP* 7 January, 2002, p.1) while the police and the security authorities demanded that Singapore officials substantiate their allegations ('Indonesia asks for patience in dealing with terrorism', *JP*, 31 January 2002, p.3; Tahilramani, Y., *JP*, 23 February 2002, p.8; Unidjaja, F.D., & Siboro, T. *JP*, 23 February 2002, p.3). However, while repeating the views of Indonesian government officials, politicians and religious groups, the *JP* did not take a decisive stand on whether or not there was terrorism in the country; instead suggested the authorities should investigate the allegations.

### **2.3.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Jakarta Post***

The conceptualization of terrorism presented in the stories is one of anarchy caused by “a number of militant groups in Indonesia [sic] were championing an Islamic state for Indonesia, but thus far their numbers were small and they had not resorted to violence” (Nurbianto, B., *JP*, 7 January 2002, p.1). The term ‘anarchy’ was used in the stories rather than the researcher’s choice of word (ibid).

#### **2.3.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The concept of terrorists was related to Muslim militants, Indonesian Mujahidins, radical groups and subsequently to individuals such as Bashir, Hambali, Iqbal and others. The list of names was extensive.

#### **2.3.1.2 Roots of Violence**

Possible motivations for the existence of terrorists, defined in the discourse as radical Muslim militants, were given as inequality, corruption and disenchantment with the government and society; people interviewed by the newspaper cited these factors. However, the *JP* did not deeply investigate any of these issues in its reporting.

#### **2.3.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The stories led readers to understand that the connection between religion and violence was a struggle by radicals to create an Islamic state in Indonesia.

### 2.3.2 Insight

One characteristic of the *JP*'s coverage was that it did not seriously question the sources of the *ST*'s allegations about the identity of members of the *JI* network and terrorist activities in Indonesia. Many of the Singaporean allegations were based on the 'secret' Indonesian intelligence document that it had obtained, but the *JP* was uncritical of the use of this document. It did not ask questions such as how is it possible that the *ST* had access to supposedly confidential information. And who or what was behind the release of the intelligence document to journalists from a foreign country? Instead, the *JP* largely confined itself to reporting the allegations made by the foreign press and the reactions by Indonesian communities. One possible explanation could be that in the past, journalists would send their material for publishing outside the country<sup>11</sup>, therefore this reflects a historical practice.

A few aspects of Indonesians' understanding of the situation became apparent. For example, it was clear from the reporting that the existence of radical groups operating in Indonesia was not something new. In the past, the activities of radical groups represented anarchy but did not represent a danger to national stability. Also in the past, during the Suharto era, the press was discouraged to report on inter-group conflicts. Given the diversity and multitude of islands and people, 'anarchy' is not only tolerated but also understood as normal in Indonesia (Nurbianto, B., *JP*, 7 January 2002, p.1). However, according to the report, since there were international allegations about terrorist activities in the country, they should be investigated.

The *JP* mainly used religious leaders and government officials as its sources of information; these provided somewhat conflicting and varied accounts so the *JP* did

---

<sup>11</sup> Professor David T. Hill's presentation, Asia Research Institute, NUS, January 9, 2007.

not present the kind of single, consistent ‘news discourse’ that the *ST* presented. Instead of coming down on one side or other of the allegations and views, the *JP* appealed to Indonesian authorities to investigate the *ST*’s allegations, thus leaving the reader with the impression that many facts remained unproven and conclusions could not yet be reached with confidence.

#### **2.4 Coverage of First Round of Arrests: *New Straits Times***

When the *NST* covered the arrests in Singapore, it quickly correlated them with statements by Malaysian authorities that police in Malaysia “are looking for 200 people linked to the group Kumpulan Militant Malaysian- KMM”, and “that the police have established the group has a close link with [sic] Jemaah Islamiyah group in Singapore and the al-Qaeda network” (Singh, J., *NST*, 25 January 2002, p.1).

In early January 2002, the *NST* reported the arrests of several KMM members from a second wing in Malaysia and said the people arrested in Singapore were believed to be KMM members (Shin-Ian, Lee, *NST*, 6 January 2002, p.6). Citing Malaysian official information, the *NST* reported, “over the past month... 10 KMM members were arrested under the ISA [Internal Security Act] for militant activities” (Singh, J., *NST*, 25 January 2002, p.1). The Malaysian Internal Security Act prohibits the promotion of feelings of ill-will between different races in the same way it prohibits actions that are considered prejudicial to public order. Still reflecting official views, the newspaper revealed that KMM was linked to Jemaah Islamiyah and to al-Qaeda based on the training they had received in Afghanistan and Mindanao, in the Philippines.

The *NST* registered the ‘discovery’ of the document ‘Operation Jihad in Asia’ by a Singaporean journalist, but the paper did not explore the content of the document in any detail. The *NST*, reflecting an official’s view, said that, “police have yet to receive concrete evidence if the report, apparently in a 15-page document uncovered by intelligence sources in Jakarta, was true” (‘Police on alert for terror teams working with Jemaah Islamiah’, *NST*, 13 February 2002, p.4).

#### **2.4.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *New Straits Times***

In the reporting of the first group of arrests in Malaysia, which involved two university lecturers, the *NST* presented the view of Malaysian authorities that “KMM had plans to overthrow the government through militant means” (Singh, J., *NST*, 25 January 2002, p.1), adding that KMM members had received “ideological training from three Indonesian ulamas” (religious teachers), particularly from Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali (ibid).

##### **2.4.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The *NST*’s reporting contended early on that KMM members wanted to establish an Islamic state, and said the group had “violent intentions” (Baharuddin, N.A., *NST*, 17 February 2002, p.2). But the newspaper’s initial reporting on the arrests in Malaysia referred to KMM as a militant group, not as a ‘terrorist’ group. The ‘terrorist’ label came later, with allegations of the involvement of KMM with JI and al-Qaeda, saying “KMM had links with Al-Qaeda” (Singh, J., *NST*, 25 January 2002, p.1). In an earlier publication (Shi-Ian, L., *NST*, 5 January 2002, p.1) the story said, “13 KMM men

were held under the Internal Security Act because they were holding secret meetings to discuss the formation of an Islamic state in the region”.

#### **2.4.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The reason for the alleged terrorists’ actions was presented by the *NST* as a desire to overthrow the government in order to establish an Islamic state. This was based on police official’s claims that “the arrested men had made preparations to wage jihad [struggle] against the government to form an Islamic nation” (Shi-Ian, L., *NST*, 6 January 2002, p.6). The newspaper revealed that the group’s action “came to light after the botched Southern Bank robbery” (ibid). This reflected a tendency among some police officials to lump violent crime with terrorism; after the Marriott Hotel bombing, for example, Malaysian police announced new patrols in residential areas to fight crime that could be associated with terrorist activities (Joheng, J., *NST*, 10 August 2003, p.2).

#### **2.4.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The connection between violence and religion was assumed when the *NST* quoted Malaysian officials as describing terrorists’ ideological training. The newspaper noted that the people arrested had copies of training manuals that included ideology, motivation and the activities of groups in Chechnya, Kashmir and Afghanistan. They were also trained in guerrilla warfare. In addition, the newspaper linked terrorists to Islamic extremism and asked for actions against the many fringes of religious schools which are disseminating ideas about martyrdom and salvation.

In its editorial ‘Curbing the deviants’, dated 17 January 2002, the *NST* called on the government to

“Review the role of religious speakers and schools while at the same time Government and the religious authorities should ensure that these schools fulfil their objectives of providing proper religious instruction, not the dissemination of barmy ideas about martyrdom and salvation” (*NST*, 17 January 2002, p.10).

#### **2.4.2 Insight**

The *NST* actually disclosed the arrests in Singapore, with relatively few details, one day before the Singaporean authorities made it public: “Singapore police have arrested between 10 and 15 men in the republic last month believed to be KMM members” (Shi-Ian, L., *NST*, 6 January 2002, p.6). In fact, the disclosure of the arrests by Malaysian officials may well have prompted the *ST* to publish Singaporean officials’ statements on the events. Whereas the *ST* presented the arrests as an event with major political and security significance for the region, and carried saturation coverage, the *NST*’s coverage was much smaller and less sensational. The newspaper did not report extensively on the ‘Operation Jihad’ document that the *ST* cited repeatedly. However, the *NST* did quote Malaysian officials as saying police were looking for KMM members linked to JI and al-Qaeda.

Reporting on the arrests of alleged KMM members, the *NST* essentially treated them as a domestic Malaysian issue rather than a regional one. It reported but did not closely examine a political opposition’s claim that the arrests in Malaysia were designed to cause fear among the population in view of the Indera Kayangan by-election (“Arrests an attempt to cause fear.”, *NST*, 6 January 2002, p.6). Despite being



a government influenced newspaper, the *NST* provided space for the opposition to express its views. The approach suggested that the *NST* was determined to retain some space for dissenting voices in its pages.

## **2.5 Coverage of First Round of Arrests: *Tempo***

The weekly magazine *Tempo*'s initial coverage of the arrests in Singapore largely portrayed them as a domestic Singaporean matter. Its coverage intensified when the *ST* reported on the 'Operation Jihad' document. *Tempo* discussed whether the intelligence community in Southeast Asia was cooperating in the hunt for terrorist suspects, or whether the document was merely part of US propaganda ('Al- Qaeda Angels?' *Tempo*, 19-25 February 2002). The magazine said that Indonesian authorities doubted the existence of JI, and published a story about Hambali in response to an article by the *Los Angeles Times* quoting Malaysian and Philippines officials' claims that Hambali had links with JI and al-Qaeda.

*Tempo*'s story 'Multiple charges against Hambali' was a profile based on an 'inquiry'. The story said, "as a child, Encep – as Hambali used to be called – was known as a taciturn and obedient boy", and that "prayer groups in his village described him as a very vocal figure. However, outside his community he turned introvert and rarely talked". *Tempo* described Hambali as the second child of a family with 12 children, someone who

"was slightly open only to his father. His activities while in Indonesia were obscure. Indonesia has linked him with the church explosions in Bandung and Jakarta. America charges him with involvement in the plan to bomb 12 aircraft in 1995 and the WTC tragedy. Singapore associates him with the US embassy

bomb plot that involved Jemaah Islamiyah. Malaysia will blame him for masterminding acts of violence committed by Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)” (*Tempo*, 19-25 February 2002, p.23).

### **2.5.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Tempo***

The magazine did not offer any clear conceptualization of terrorism, but reported the claims made by other institutions about a radical movement planning to attack US interests in three countries, and international allegations about the existence of an underground movement called JI, which was involved with Islamic radicalism.

#### **2.5.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The identification of terrorists was based on names claimed by *The Straits Times* such as Hambali, Abu Bakar Bashir, Al Ghazi, Bafani, Halim, Fathur Rahman and so forth. Terrorists were described as members of ‘a radical Muslim network’, as ‘alleged members of JI’, ‘arms smugglers’, ‘suspects’, ‘alleged terrorists’, ‘Islamic activists’, and as members of ‘KMM, a radical organization’.

#### **2.5.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The motivation for violence ascribed to the alleged terrorists was based on allegations by international sources that the suspects wanted to harm US interests and set up an Islamic state.

### **2.5.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

*Tempo* made the connection between religion and violence by describing the militant groups as hard-line organizations with Islamic ideology.

### **2.5.2 Insight**

The magazine questioned the existence of the ‘Operation Jihad’ document obtained by the *ST*. In its reporting the magazine reported on the document in an ironic tone saying,

“The finding of this document is like a much needed thread linking Indonesia and the international terrorist movement. But to some, it all seems just too good a piece of luck. For the United States and its allies, that is. After all, the US has been pressing the countries of Southeast Asia to join in the fight against terrorism after [sic] the attacks of September 11 last year, when the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington were hit by aircraft hijacked by terrorists” (*Tempo*, 25 February 2002, p.4).

Nevertheless, the magazine published in-depth background stories on the various suspects, including Al Khozi, Hambali and Fathur (‘Al Qaeda, made in Madiun?’ 4 February 2002, p.16).

*Tempo* noted the claim made by the *ST* that the document had been obtained some time previously, and that the *ST*’s journalist who broke the story, Derwin Pereira, had claimed to have checked and rechecked the document’s veracity. The magazine then emphasized the views of Indonesian officials, who doubted the authenticity of the document. *Tempo* also reported the arrests in Malaysia of 22 people suspected of

terrorist activities (*Tempo*, 4 February 2002, pp.16-18). No particular style of news production was noticed.

## **2.6 Second Round of Arrests**

In September the authorities in Singapore revealed the arrest of 21 people on suspicion of having links to international terrorism ('Another 21 arrested here over terrorism plans' *ST*, 17 September 2002, p.1). This was the second government announcement of arrests in less than nine months. For the purpose of the analysis this will be referred to as the second round of arrests.

Since when the first round of arrests was revealed in January and the second round in September 2002 the governments and media in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia intensively discussed Jemaah Islamiyah. However, this period, from March to middle September when the government revealed the second round of arrests, is not included in the analysis.

## **2.7 Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: *Straits Times***

On 17 September 2002, the *ST* ran a front-page story headlined 'Another 21 arrested here over terrorism plans'. It stated that the Singaporeans arrested "last month" were connected with terrorism, in association with the JI plot to blow up several targets in Singapore. The story claimed that several of the men arrested were trained in "terrorist camps in Afghanistan and in the Philippines". The story linked the latter arrests to the arrests carried out in December 2001 (but only made public in January 2002), and to a story published by *Time* magazine about a confession made by an al-Qaeda associate (Omar al-Faruq) to American intelligence agencies after he was

handed over to the United States by Indonesian authorities (Pereira, B. & Go, R., *ST*, 17 September 2002, p. H1; Ratnesar, R., *Time* magazine, 23 September 2002).

### **2.7.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Straits Times***

What started as a plot against American, Western and Singaporean targets had evolved in the *ST*'s coverage to an issue of national and international security, since there was an alleged intention by the terrorists to create inter-ethnic friction between Malaysia and Singapore, and to overthrow the government of Malaysia with the ultimate goal of creating an Islamic caliphate ('JI plan to disrupt relations 'naïve', *ST*, 21 September 2002, p. H7; Teo, L. & Chia, S., *ST*, 25 September 2002, p. H4; Zaobao, L., *ST*, 30 September 2002, p.14).

#### **2.7.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

Following the official Singaporean line, the *ST* furnished readers with a large amount of information on the terrorist suspects, from their names and details of their family background to their military service and other forms of training. According to the newspaper, all suspects were members of JI and al-Qaeda. The main focus of the coverage was on the cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, alleged by Singapore and the US media to be the 'spiritual leader of JI', and on Hambali, claimed by the media to be the supervisor of JI activities in Southeast Asia and the link between the regional group and the al-Qaeda network.

### **2.7.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The clearest account of the suspects' alleged motivation was produced in an editorial ('Terror Threat', *ST*, 21 September 2002, p.30), which said the aims of the group were to incite religious-ethnic conflict between Singapore and Malaysia, to blow up targets in both countries, to overthrow Malaysian government and to establish an Islamic caliphate.

### **2.7.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The *ST* made the connection between violence and religion through commentaries, opinionated pieces and reporting of official statements. The *ST* also reported extensively on the creation in Singapore of a code of good behaviour for religious teachers, and the need for them to be registered with the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS), referred to hereafter by its Malay acronym 'MUIS'. The paper also called for reforms in the teaching of Islam in the madrassahs (Islamic religious schools). Experts on terrorism were also quoted as linking the arrests to other broad issues, such as radicalism in Islam and politics in Islam ('Friday sermons stress Islam rejection of violence', *ST*, 21 September 2002, p. H6; Rekhi, S. *ST*, 29 September 2002, p.20; Chew, Lee K., *ST*, 30 September 2002, p.14).

### **2.7.2 Insight**

In reporting the arrests, the *ST* linked them to information disclosed by *Time* magazine, which claimed that Jemaah Islamiyah planned a string of "terror plots

...including a failed assassination attempt against Indonesia President Megawati Sukarnoputri” (‘Another 21 arrested here over terrorism plans’, *ST*, 17 September 2002, p.1). The information extracted from the magazine and repacked into news stories was presented as ‘timely’, even though it appeared that some of the information was out of date. For example, the information on the alleged plan to kill Megawati was inserted in the third last paragraph of the story. It said that, “He [Omar al- Faruq] is also said [sic] to have confessed to involvement in a string of terror plots over [sic] three years, including a failed assassination attempt against Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri”. Paragraphs and pieces of information from the article in the magazine became topics for entire stories in the *ST*; for example, the line from *Time* magazine “Abu Bakar Baashyir [sic] authorized Omar to use JI operatives and resources to conduct the planned bombings of the embassies” (ibid), became a headline in the newspaper (Rekhi, S. & Go, R. *ST*, 18 September 2002, p. H5.). The scope of the alleged plots reported in this second round of arrests was broader in comparison to the first round.

A pattern of claiming, explaining and providing solutions was present in the *ST*’s general news stories, as well as in its op-ed pieces and editorials. The newspaper extensively explored the context of Jemaah Islamiyah’s ideology, existence and regional agenda.

To illustrate the danger the group represented, the newspaper referred to a terrorist act several decades ago, noting that, “a water mains was bombed at St Francis Road by Indonesian militants during Konfrontasi in March 1965...when Indonesia carried out hostilities against Malaysia and Singapore” (‘Water system secure’, *ST*, 22 September 2002, p.34).

To a large degree, the *ST* presented the people arrested not as suspects but as confirmed terrorists. For example, in an illustration headlined ‘The JI’s Ground Troops – A look at the Profile of the 21 arrested last month’ (*ST*, 22 September 2002, p.3), it was published the information on the racial composition of those arrested, their education, national service records and illegal military training. In other words, before a criminal trial was held, the suspects were presumed guilty of the alleged crimes. Another article asked questions such as “why did they turn to terrorism”, and then suggested answers, such as “was it their socio-economic status? ...more likely, the cause was their charismatic religious teacher Ibrahim Maidin, 51, and the way he taught Islamic precepts”. The *ST* went further, implicating the Muslim community as a whole by stating: “since the arrests came to light – first in January and then again just last month – the Muslim community has been engaged in some soul-searching” (Teo, L., & Chia, S., *ST*, 25 September 2002, p. H4).

At the same time, the *ST* published several stories repeating official recommendations on how Singaporeans should react to the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist plots, such as condemning extremist elements. It said, “Muslims should not be defensive and non-Muslim should not be prejudiced by the actions of a few, whom even the Malay/Muslim community reject” (Maine, W.S., & Osman, A., *ST*, 22 September 2002, p.3; ‘Don’t let actions of a few destroy the social fabric’, *ST*, 22 September 2002, p.34). The stories reflected the official initiative to create a code of practice governing how different faiths should interact (‘Unions act to allay fears of anti-Muslim bias’, *ST*, 26 September 2002, p.4). Interviews supporting this initiative were conducted with representatives of the Hokkien Huay Kuan (Hokkien clan association), the National Council of Churches of Singapore and the Islamic Fellowship Association (‘We’ve been through this before’, *ST*, 21 September 2002, p.



H5.). Stories quoted Chinese community leaders as saying that JI's attempt to stir up racial tension was also a tactic used by Chinese communists in the past.

The *ST* used official speeches and statements, experts' views and analyses and religious and community leaders' opinions to sustain the perspective that the group of men arrested was dangerous, but that Muslims in Singapore should nevertheless not feel uncomfortable. The *ST* also engaged in conducting international relations by identifying the presence of threats in other countries, and urging foreign governments, e.g., Indonesia, to make decisions. The *ST* claimed that terrorism had spread to Thailand and Aceh in Indonesia.

The *ST* presented its news in a polished communications style. It presented a discourse on international affairs, practising diplomacy; a discourse on religion by linking the arrests to the teaching of Islam; a discourse on changing social behaviour by introducing policy on the interaction of faiths; a discourse on ethnicity, and a discourse on national security. Thus, while addressing a domestic audience, the newspaper sought some kind of influence on regional affairs.

## **2.8 Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: *Jakarta Post***

The announcement of the second round of arrests in Singapore had an impact in Indonesia, where authorities started to address the concerns of the international community that terrorists were active in the country. The authorities stepped up a campaign against the alleged presence of an al-Qaeda network in the country despite continued official denials of its existence (Unidjaja, F., *JP*, 19 September 2002, p.1).

The *Jakarta Post* devoted considerable space to stories about the war on terrorism and on the Western leaders' attitudes towards Muslims (Nafik, M., *JP*, 16 September 2002, p.3). Two events were addressed in this context. Firstly, a man named Omar al Faruq was arrested in June and deported by Indonesia to the US; he was presented to the press as a mid-level operative of the al-Qaeda terrorist network (Muninggar S. Saraswati, M.S. & Tiarma Siboro, *JP*, 20 September 2002, p.2). The second event was the publication by the *JP* of a CIA document on the existence of al-Qaeda 'operatives' in Indonesia, including a plot to assassinate Megawati Sukarnoputri (Muninggar S. Saraswati, M.S. & Tiarma Siboro, *JP*, 21 September 2002, p.1). The 'leaked' CIA document, containing a confession by Omar al Faruq to American intelligence officers, was widely published by the Indonesian media, which referred to an article published in *Time* magazine (Ratnesar, 23 September 2002).

The *JP* noted that Indonesian security officers had arrested and deported Faruq without interrogation. It did not sensationalise the information; however, the *JP* made it clear that Omar al Faruq was not the only suspected terrorist whisked secretly out of the country, mentioning "another al-Qaeda suspect, Muhammad Iqbal Saad Madni, 24, was deported [sic] to Egypt on board a Gulfstream V flight, only two days after he was arrested on Nov. 9, 2001 by immigration officials at his residence in Matraman, Central Jakarta" (Muninggar S. Saraswati, & Tiarma Siboro, *JP*, 21 September 2002, p.1).

The *JP* started to warm up towards the issue by stressing that Indonesian politicians and organizations should be working together on how best to deal with the threat of terrorism. In its editorial, 'The threat of terrorism', it said,

“Indonesia has to come up with a firm plan on how it will handle the threat. As an emerging democracy, it will have to deal with the issue without trampling on the rights of those suspects to be part of the international terrorist group” [sic] (*JP*, 23 September 2002, p.6).

In a change from its previous emphasis on the issues of Islam in Indonesia, the growth of radicalism in the country and the threat represented by radical groups, the *JP* called for a legal framework to combat terrorism, “specially since intelligence sources hinted that there was enough evidence to support reports of the presence of an al-Qaeda’s terrorist network here” (Siboro, T., & Wijaksana, D., *JP*, 26 September 2002, p.1). From this article in addition to the editorial, ‘The threat of terrorism’ (*JP*, 23 September 2002, p.6), *JP* showed it was beginning to take an international frame of reference in reporting on the arrests of the alleged terrorists and to put pressure on the Indonesian government to tackle terrorism.

In this round of the *JP*’s reporting on JI, there was no new conceptualization of terrorism, the images of terrorists, the roots of violence or the connection between religion and violence, outside the repetition of allegations made by the *Straits Times* and *Time* magazine.

## **2.9 Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: *New Straits Times***

The second round of arrests in Singapore was reported by the *NST* but not presented as a major event. Nevertheless, the *NST* quoted then Prime Minister Mahathir as saying, “if such elements were positively identified then they should be arrested as militants could not be allowed to undermine democracy” (‘We’ll act against terrorists, says PM’, *NST*, 18 September 2002, p.2). This statement equated militants with

terrorists and described them as a threat to ‘democracy’. The newspaper did not discuss what type of democracy the prime minister was talking about. In reporting on the perceived terrorist threat, the *NST* went on to tackle other issues, such as robbery and the need for police surveillance in some housing areas (Johen, J., *NST*, 28 September 2002, p.1; ‘63 with links to KMM arrested’, *NST*, 28 September 2002, p.4).

### **2.9.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *New Straits Times***

The *NST* reflected the official view that “terrorism creates discord between the people of various races and religious beliefs in Malaysia and in Singapore; it creates chaos, anarchy” (‘DPM: No benefit in creating discord’ *NST*, 24 September 2002, p.3). Terrorism was also reported as a threat to democracy (‘We’ll act against terrorists, says PM’, *NST*, 18 September 2002, p.2).

#### **2.9.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The *NST* reported on terrorists based on information disclosed by the police, such as the names, profession and age of those arrested. The officials described the members of KMM as belonging to the JI network, and then also as belonging to the JI group based in Singapore (‘Strengthening co-operation on security issues’, *NST*, 24 September 2002, p.4).

### **2.9.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The *NST* repeated official allegations that KMM members wanted to undermine democracy, to overthrow the government and establish a pan-Islamic state.

### **2.9.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The connection between violence and religion was reported as a radical Islamic intention to establish a pan-Islamic state, a claim mostly done by government officials.

## **2.9.2 Insight**

The *NST*'s reporting of the second round of arrests developed from a focus on the threat to democracy to include ethnic and religious arguments; it therefore covered a broader range of issues in comparison to the coverage of the first round of arrests in January. In the reporting of the first round of arrests, the JI members in Singapore were said to be KMM affiliates. In the second round of arrests, the suspected terrorists were firmly linked to KMM: "A leader of the Johor Kumpulan Militant Malaysia, who is also believed to have links with Jemaah Islamiyah in Singapore, was detained in Kelantan today" (Joheng, J., *NST*, 28 September 2002, p.1). In addition, the reporting stated that the Singapore-based JI desired to establish a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia ('Strengthening co-operation', *NST*, 24 September 2002, p.4).

In their reporting of the first round of arrests, the *ST* and the *JP* did not claim that there was a JI-KMM connection. Instead, the connection had been made by Malaysian authorities ('DPA seeks early briefing on al-Qaeda from Norian', *NST*, 12

January 2002, p.2; 'Link among militant groups, says PM', *NST*, 13 January 2002, p.4; Singh, J. *NST*, 25, 2002, p.1). The *NST*'s reporting also implicated the Indonesian Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir as the leader of "a wing within KMM that had violent intentions" ('63 with links to KMM arrested', *NST*, 28 September 2002, p.4). The newspaper said, "the existence of KMM came to light on May 18 last year after the group was involved in a botched Southern Bank robbery in Jalan Gasing, Petaling Jaya, when the bank's security guard shot three armed robbers, killing two" (Joheng, J., *NST*, 28 September 2002, p.1). This was the same allegation the newspaper had printed when it quoted claims made by the police in January (Shi-Ian, L., *NST*, 6 January 2002, p.6). It appeared that as in the case of the *JP*, the *NST* had begun framing the issue of the KMM in terms of a discourse of international terrorism.

The *NST* reported on Singapore's initiative to establish a code of interaction between religious communities but did not explore this in depth ('Singapore's code of interaction for religious harmony', *NST*, 29 September 2002, p.4).

The *NST* did not resort to a glossy style of reportage or the use of any particular news framing technique, except for the fact that KMM was initially cited as a militant group and then described as part of al-Qaeda. The KMM's objective was initially said to be subversion, which then evolved into the creation of an Islamic state according to the paper's reporting. In the first round of arrests, the *NST* gave space to the political opposition to express its view of the arrests; however, the newspaper did not report any dissenting voices in the second round. Little background information on suspects was provided except for name, profession and age. The connection between JI and al-Qaeda was simply asserted by officials and reproduced by the newspaper, having been taken at face value.

### **2.10 Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: *Tempo***

*Tempo* did not pay much attention to the second round of arrests in Singapore. Instead, it focused on stories on Hambali, Al Ghazi and Abu Bakar Bashir, all accused by foreign governments of inciting terror in the region ('Al Qaeda target?', *Tempo*, 24-30 September 2002, pp.11-35).

*Tempo* referred to "an American intelligence report linked to *Time* magazine" (Ratnesar, 23 September 2002) about two failed attempts to kill Megawati Sukarnoputri. The *Time's* report centred on a confession allegedly made by Omar al Faruq, who had been arrested in Indonesia and whisked out of the country. *Tempo* published the reactions from representatives in Indonesian society, questioning why Indonesian intelligence handed al-Faruq over to another country without interrogating him first, and why Indonesian intelligence did not follow the case up with American intelligence.

*Tempo* published an interview with Abu Bakar Bashir regarding international pressure on Indonesia and allegations of his involvement with terrorism, as reported by *Time*. It wrote that the problem started in May 2002 with a three-day visit by an American journalist to Bashir's boarding school ('Abu Bakar Ba'asyir: I don't know Omar Al-Faruq', *Tempo*, 30 September 2002, pp.33-35). In its coverage *Tempo* repeatedly asked for evidence, not only concerning the allegations made by foreign sources about Abu Bakar Bashir but also from sources in Indonesia concerning al-Faruq.

### **2.10.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Tempo**

The conceptualization of terrorism in *Tempo*'s reporting was one of an Islamic terrorist movement, but it also published *Time*'s conceptualization of terrorism as an 'ideology from Abu Bakar Bashir'.

#### **2.10.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The images of terrorists reproduced by *Tempo* were based on names put forward by foreign sources; *Tempo* described terrorists as members of militant Islamic groups, radical circles and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MIFL), a militant group based in the Philippines.

#### **2.10.1.2 Roots of Violence**

*Tempo* repeated the view that the motivation for violence was to build a community based on Islamic Sharyah [Islamic law], and the refusal of the Bashir boarding school to accept Pancasila's dogma of monotheism, in addition to the alleged intention to create an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's Pancasila democracy principles are: belief in one supreme God; humanitarianism; nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; consultative democracy; and social justice. The people's interests should come first and not group or private interests (Elson, 2002).



### **2.10.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

*Tempo* presented its coverage within the context of historical accounts of militant Muslim groups being used by intelligence agencies, and the campaign that took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s to encourage Muslim youth groups to fight in Afghanistan.

### **2.10.2 Insight**

*Tempo*'s reporting of the second round of arrests reflected the allegations published by *Time* magazine, based on the CIA document; this was in contrast to the first round, when *Tempo* questioned the validity of the 'Operation Jihad' document produced by the *ST*.

*Tempo* also reported that the arrests in Malaysia and Singapore were carried out under each country's Internal Security Act (ISA). It reported on the lack of evidence against the suspects arrested, on suspicions about the degree of US involvement in the operation, and on the attractive military and financial aid package that had been offered by the United States to countries in the region to join the fight on terrorism.

*Tempo* reported on the radical Islamic movement Darul Islam<sup>12</sup>, which was started in 1940, and the histories of Abu Bakar Bashir and other Indonesians accused of terrorist activities. *Tempo* repeated Indonesian officials' views that while there was no proof of Abu Bakar Bashir's involvement in terrorism, there would be no arrests ('Lifting the veil', *Tempo*, 24-30 September 2002, p.16), but it reported the claim that Islamic boarding schools in Solo were a "nest of terrorists, says Uncle Sam" and that

---

<sup>12</sup> See *Intel Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service*, Ken Conboy, 2004. Jakarta: Equinox.

they were training centres for terrorists. *Tempo* asked for evidence, and also asked for Indonesian authorities to explain to the public the operation involving the arrest and transfer of al- Faruq to another country. To a certain extent *Tempo* reflected concerns with human rights and the right of the Indonesian public to be fully informed.

### **2.11 Comparative Analysis**

The two rounds of arrests in Singapore were reported within a different context by each of the publications analysed. *The Straits Times* reported on the first round of arrests within the discourse of the ‘war on terror’ launched by the United States following the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. In the second round of arrests the news was framed within a string of plots against targets in the region. The *ST*’s coverage was based on extracts from *Time* magazine’s reportage. The *ST*’s reporting on the arrests was politicized, apparently in order to create a state of mind within the discourse of international terrorism and the ‘war on terror’. The *ST* was the only medium to make extensive use of sophisticated styles of reporting.

There was a change of perspective in the *JP*’s reporting of the second round of arrests. The newspaper started framing the issue of JI within an international perspective by stating that the Indonesian government, politicians and organizations should work together to deal with the threats of terrorism. In the first round of arrests, the *JP* merely reproduced the views and opinions of politicians and government representatives while in its editorial ‘The threat of terrorism’, (*JP*, 23 September 2002, p.6) it had appealed to Indonesian authorities to investigate the allegations made by the *ST*. The change may have been due to difficulties in maintaining an independent view on such a complex issue, or it could have been a response to

readership concerns since most of its readers are foreigners, English-educated business leaders, political opinion leaders (Sen & Hill, 2000); there has been one argument, however, that the newspaper 'can now boast that 45% of its readers are locals', as it has been pointed out<sup>13</sup>.

The *NST*'s reporting linked the Singapore arrests to other arrests carried out at the same time in Malaysia, namely of members of the Kumpulan Militant Malaysian (KMM). Initially, the KMM was described as an opposition group with a subversive agenda, but in the second round of arrests, the *NST* reported on KMM's goal as overthrowing the government and stirring up racial friction in order to set up a pan-Islamic state. The *NST* framed KMM within the discourses on Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda. The *NST* neglected to produce background information on the existence and purpose of KMM, but equated first the whole group and later a 'wing' of the group with terrorists with 'violent intentions'. The *NST* reporting focused on a domestic Malaysian audience.

To a certain extent, *Tempo* was able to maintain an independent perspective by stating its doubts about the existence of the *ST*'s 'Operation Jihad' intelligence document, and by asking whether the US might be involved in the arrests since the American administration was actively trying to persuade Southeast Asian states to join the 'war on terror' with attractive military and economic aid packages.

---

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.thejakartapost.com/adspecial/medkit06/readprof.html>

## Chapter Three: The 2002 Bali Bombings

Explosions ripped through two popular nightclubs in Kuta on the Indonesian resort island of Bali in October 12, 2002. The bombings killed 202 people and injured more than 300.

The 2002 Bali bombings (referred to as such here since there was another bombing attack in 2005) provided Indonesian authorities with the evidence that terrorism cells were active in the country. Jakarta could not continue denying claims by several countries, among them Singapore and Malaysia, that terrorists were active in Indonesia. The blasts were the worst terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Foreign tourists were the main victims, but Indonesia also had its share of victims – more than one hundred of the dead were locals, though they hardly made it into the headlines.

In order to understand the coverage of the bombings by the *Straits Times* (ST), it is necessary to read the newspaper's coverage of the previous arrests in Singapore of groups of men allegedly involved in terrorism-related activities. The ST's portrayal of the Bali attacks and other bombings in Indonesia is in line with its portrayal of the Jemaah Islamiyah network linked to al-Qaeda.

### 3.1 Coverage of the 2002 Bali Bombings: *Straits Times*

The ST politicized the Bali bombings and its coverage demonstrated a strong reaction, as if the attacks had affected Singapore's interests. In the pages of the ST, the newspaper and Singapore officials demonstrated a distinctive way of 'speaking' to Indonesia, using headlines that delivered messages and editorials that demanded

actions. It is against this background that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the connection between violence and violence, and the victims.

### **3.1.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Straits Times***

The *ST*’s conceptualization of terrorism focused on the security threat and the danger to religious harmony and foreign investors in Singapore’s economy (Choong, W., *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.6; Jansen, P., *ST*, 18 October 2002, p. A4; Pereira, B., *ST*, 20 October 2002, p.32; ‘Tightened security in S-E Asia’, *ST*, 21 October 2002, p. A1; Nirmala, M., *ST*, 21 October 2002, p. H2; Lee, J., *ST*, 21 October 2002, p. H2; Pereira, B., *ST*, 21 October 2002, p. A2; ‘Bashir may be arrested but ‘Hambali still directing JI ops’, *ST*, 23 October 2002, p.A6; Simon, M., *ST*, 26 October 2002, p.H17; Asmarani, D., *ST*, 28 October 2002, p.A6).

#### **3.1.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The *ST* published an extensive list of names of alleged terrorist suspects. At the top of the list were the names of the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir along with Hambali; the latter was reported to be the connection between the Jemaah Islamiyah network and al-Qaeda. The newspaper reported extensively on both. There was a variety of op-ed and commentary pieces depicting terrorism and describing the ‘evil’ in both men. Terrorists in general were portrayed through a string of labels such as ‘anarchists’, ‘Muslim radicals’, ‘Islamists’, ‘hardline Muslims’ and ‘Muslim extremists’. Government officials, experts and journalists all used such labels. (‘Bali loses innocence’, *ST*, 14 October 2002, p.12; Go, R. *ST*, 14 October 2002, p.12;

Rekhi, S., *ST*, 14 October 2002, p.7; 'PM condemns 'dastardly acts' at S'pore's doorstep', *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.1; Chew, L.K., *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.12; Gunaratna, R., *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.7).

### **3.1.1.2 Roots of Violence**

There was no single, established reason for the bombing but various possible causes. The *ST* reported on security agencies' rivalries in Indonesia; Indonesia's weak intelligence system ('Security of nation under threat', *ST*, 14 October 2002, p.6; 'Bali loses innocence', *ST*, 14 October 2002, p.12); poor public security precautions; the theory that the blast was due to Australia's support of 'the war on terror' (Rekhi, S., *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.7); and Indonesia's failure to heed international warnings (Go, R., *ST*, 17 October 2002, p.1; Pereira, B., *ST*, 17 October 2002, p. A5; Quek, A., *ST*, 23 October 2002, p.1). However, the *ST* singled out the anniversary of the attack on the US warship Cole in Yemen in 2000 (Go, R., *ST*, 14 October 2002, p.1). The Cole was attacked during a refuelling stop by two Yemeni who piloted a boat filled with about 500 pounds of explosives.

### **3.1.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The *ST*'s stories reported on the bombings as related to religion. It noted that the bombers were Muslims, and its stories covered a broad range of aspects of radical Islam, including the boarding schools associated with cleric Abu Bakar Bashir and described as a breeding ground for terrorists. The newspaper also published stories portraying aspects of racial intolerance, stressing the need to eliminate discrimination (En-Lai, Y., *ST*, 19 October 2002, p. A6; Simon, M., *ST*, 26 October 2002, p. H17;

Asmarani, D., *ST*, 28 October 2002, p. A6.). The reporting of Australian police raids of homes of Indonesian Muslims brought to the surface discrimination against Muslims in Australia ('Aussie cops raid homes of terror suspects', *ST*, 31 October 2002, p. A4), and the view that Islamic schools are a breeding ground for radicalism ('Education aid to be used to fight radicalism', *ST*, 31 October 2002, p.4). Given such reporting, Muslims who had nothing to do with the bombing had only one way to react to the violence, namely, to feel guilt by association ('Statement against terror not a defensive move', *ST*, 13 October 2002; En-Lai, Y., *ST*, 19 October 2002, p. A6; Yusof, H., *ST*, 20 October 2002, p.30).

#### **3.1.1.4 The Victims**

The *ST* reported on Singapore as doing a great job in bringing aid to the victims in Bali by running caption headlines such as 'A helping hand' (*ST*, 16 October 2002, p.1); it also portrayed Singapore as a medical hub in the region through headlines such as 'Victims to be flown to S'pore for treatment' (Mulchand, A., *ST*, 14 October 2002, p.4) and 'Victims arrive swathed in bandages' (*ST*, 15 October 2002, p.4). The *ST* sought to produce the humanitarian face of Singapore, a society that was not entirely materialistic: 'S'pore doctors treating Balinese' (En-Lai, Y., *ST*, 16 October 2002, p. A2), 'Spore doctors put aside paying clients to aid blast victims' (Tan, T. *ST*, 20 October 2002, p.14), and Singaporeans portrayed as the 'good Samaritans' in 'S'poreans collect cash and supplies for Bali victims' (En-Lai, Y., *ST*, 21 October 2002, p.A5), and 'S'poreans hailed for helping out' (*ST*, 25 October 2002, p. A7). The emphasis of the coverage of the victims was on foreigners. The newspaper also focused on Singapore's cricket and rugby players, who were in Bali for a sports

tournament and found themselves in the discos on the night of the bombings. Asian footballers were featured in the pages of the newspaper alongside stories about survivors comforting themselves. The newspaper touched briefly on the “second-rate medical treatment” that Indonesian victims received (Asmarani, D., *ST*, 18 October 2002, p. A1).

### **3.1.2 Insight**

The *ST*’s coverage of the Bali bombings was centred on the discourse of foreign terrorism, its threat to Singapore, and persistent calls on Indonesia to implement stern laws to deal with terrorists. The coverage was developed around official accounts and the reproduction of official statements. The newspaper quoted former Prime Minister Goh Chock Tong saying, “how South-east [sic] Asia can lick terrorism.” (Teo, L., *ST*, 21 October 2002, p.1). On the domestic front, this was to be done by promoting the Code on Religious Harmony, “a pledge affirming that groups will practice their respective religions bearing in mind Singapore’s secular and multi-religious context” (ibid); for foreign consumption (addressing readers outside Singapore), the *ST* reported on the need for the region to rally together against terrorism.

Under the headline ‘Plea to get rid of racial stereotypes’ (Lee, J., *ST*, 21 October 2002, p. H2), race discrimination was reported as “still a major concern despite the government having addressed these issues repeatedly in the past”. The newspaper reported on the official line that Muslims have to be friendly and non-Muslims had to be kind to Muslims.

In the article ‘Religious code goes beyond keeping peace’ (Chia, S.A, & Arshad, A. & A. Yeo, A, *ST*, 16 October 2002, p. H2), quoting sociologist Tan Ern Ser, the



newspaper printed, “the guidelines are not new, but it was [sic] critical to articulate these principles now as recent events indicate that the source of religious conflict can come from elsewhere, making it a lot more difficult to control”. The manager of Al-Falah mosque, Yahya Hashim, was quoted as saying, “this code comes at a very crucial time when Islam is being slammed worldwide.”

The *ST* localized the issue with stories saying Singapore was coping with the terror threat. Grassroots and community leaders meeting with Rear Admiral Teo Chee Hean were assured that “Singapore is fighting terrorism in various fronts” and “this will give confidence to investors that we are not shutting our eyes and hoping the problem will go away” (Nirmala, M., *ST*, 21 October 2002, p. H2). The coverage reported that “Singaporeans should not become over-anxious” – nevertheless, security had increased in various places, including public car parks and shopping centres, creating a climate of fear and apprehension. In the meeting between community leaders and the military official, there were calls to set up “activities to promote inter-racial understanding, social cohesion in the wake of the JI arrests”. In my reading of these events, I realize that if there is a need for groups to set up activities to promote inter-racial understanding, this ironically signals that such understanding does not exist and that social cohesion is fragile. Therefore, the problem does not seem to be one of terrorism but one within society.

In discussing ways of fighting terrorism, the newspaper published stories reflecting officials’ views on security fears and social cohesion. There was a perception that racial differences were enveloped in the discourse of terrorism. This was evident in stories such as ‘It is ‘yes, but’ for Malay/Muslims today’ (Simon, M., *ST*, 26 October 2002, p. H17). The official suggestion to Muslim leaders on “how the community can be insulated from the influence of extremists” also reflected that

ethnicity was an issue ('PM condemns 'dastardly act' at S'pore's doorstep', *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.1). The newspaper touched on the issue of race in Bali with stories such as 'Bali's Muslims say they too are victims' (En-Lai, Y., *ST*, 19 October 2002, p. A6). The issue of race in this context could be interpreted as Balinese versus non-Balinese or Hindus versus non Hindus; however, the story did not make it clear.

The *ST* reported on "a big show of solidarity in recent times, 123 Malay Muslim organizations signed a joint statement saying Islam does not permit violence against innocent people" ('Statement against terror not a defensive move'[sic] (*ST*, 13 October 2002). This story exposed some weakness in *ST*'s approach. It did not clarify whether Islam permits violence against people who were not innocent, or discuss the attitude of Islam to violence in any but the most simple and trite terms. It also did not resolve the contradiction between linking the issues of terrorism and religion on the one hand, and the repeated insistence of officials and editorials in other editions of the *ST* that terrorism had nothing to do with religion. Ultimately, it became clear that the *ST* was eager to approach terrorism in the context of religion.

One of the worst categorization made by officials in Indonesia and reinforced in the *ST*'s reporting was the case of 10 Pakistani clerics who were arrested in a police raid in connection with the bombings. The *JP* reported that, "The Pakistanis gave lectures on social and religious matters in various places but never informed the police about their activities" ('Police question two suspects over blast', *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.1). The *ST*, however, reported that the Pakistanis were arrested "for preaching radical Islamic doctrines in Bali mosques" (Go, R., *ST*, 16 October 2002, p.1). The *ST* quoted an unidentified source as saying, "the Pakistanis looked rather suspicious, they dressed like Osama bin Laden, so we thought since there are a lot of western tourists here and because of the tensions, it is better that they are not seen too

much” (Asmarani, D., *ST*, 16 October 2002, p. A4). The categorization indicated that the arrests occurred because of the men’s clothing and because of the presence of Westerners; therefore suggesting the arrests were influenced by stereotypes. Similarly, in the story ‘Fears over identity breeding religious intolerance’ the journalist writing about the Islamic fundamentalist movement and its influence on the Muslim community in Singapore said, “as more and more Muslims adopt orthodox ways of dress and behaviour, the community will grow apart from the other racial and religious groups here” [Singapore] (Lim, L., *ST*, 19 October 2002, p. H19).

Just two days before the Bali bombings, Singapore’s then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, while addressing senior newspapers editors from ASEAN, emphasized the need for Asean members to exercise greater political will to deal with the rise of Islamic extremism, for the sake of security and to preserve investor confidence (‘Muslim fringe on march in Asean region, says PM Goh’, *ST*, 12 October 2002, p. A13). He described the “rise of Islamic extremism” and the need to “root out Al-Qaeda cells without alienating the moderate Muslim communities”. The solution suggested to the editors was to address the aspirations of the population through economic development; Goh said “he hoped to convince Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia that the Free Trade Agreement (FTAs) which Singapore is pursuing with the US would not undermine Asean” [sic]. This discourse of terrorism and the need to address economic development in countries with large Muslim population was not given much space by the *ST*; only after the bombings, when terrorism had become a pressing issue for Singapore and its economy, did it devote much attention to the theories espoused by Goh (Kin, K.W., *ST*, 18 October 2002, p. 3; Jansen, P., *ST*, 18 October 2002, p. A4; Kin, K.W., *ST*, 19 October 2002, p. A7).

The newspaper reproduced the assertion that ‘terror’ was shifting to Southeast Asia (Gunaratna, R. *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.7). In the story ‘Anti-Iraq moves a trigger for Bali blast’ (Raman, B., *ST*, 16 October 2002, p.16) the author, from the Institute for Topical Studies in India, identified “Indonesia as a major hub of Southeast Asia-based Islamic terrorist groups with two motivations: a pan Islamic state and anti-Christian”. The writer, B. Raman, without elaboration, implicated religion and ethnicity in the bombing and the concept of terrorism. The writer identified “security trouble spots such as Aceh, Maluku, Papua Sampit, Poso and West Timor in Indonesia” and lumped together all the different groups around Indonesia as “Islamic terrorist”. Such remarks encourage distrust and risk misunderstanding. In addition to the misconception, the newspaper published a story by writers based in the United States on ‘Wealthy Saudis identified as Al-Qaeda backers’ (*The Washington Post*, *ST*, 19 October 2002, p.10). In fact, this story was similar to another article filled by the *New York Times* and published by the *ST* on the previous day (‘Saudi groups filling Al-Qaeda’s coffers’, *ST*, 18 October 2002, p.12). Other stories dealt with the status of women in Saudi Arabia (Kristof, N., *ST*, 28 October 2002, p.14).

Terrorism was linked to the hostage drama in Moscow (*Associated Press*, ‘Rebels’ message eerily similar to Osama’s’, *ST*, 26 October 2002, p.8), along with stories about European leaders’ views on “the threats of Islamic fundamentalism”; the newspaper then linked these issues to the Malay and Muslim community at home (Simon, M., *ST*, 26 October 2002, p. H17). The broad range of issues extended to combat piracy in high seas (*Agence France Presse*, ‘Radical plans to combat piracy on high seas’, *ST*, 24 October 2002, p. A7). Stories mixed up Muslim radicals who attacked nightspots in Indonesia with terrorists, and religious radicals with terrorists.

The *ST* portrayed Indonesia as a “sanctuary for terror operatives” (‘Bali loses innocence’, *ST*, 14 October 2002, p.12), adding that “S’pore offered information to the Indonesian security authorities about certain anarchists, like Abu Bakar Bashir”. Then the paper asked, “will Indonesia act now – live up to its duty of handling the menace?” The story was accompanied by a piece entitled ‘Blasts show need for crackdown’, written by a staff journalist, Robert Go, who not only wrote the news analysis but apparently was also promoting his book entitled ‘Terror Blasts in Bali’; there was a picture of the book inserted in the story (Go, R. *ST*, 14 October 2002, p.12).

Most of the analysis pieces tended to preach a set of moral actions to Indonesia, including the suggestion that Indonesia create a code of religious harmony. The newspaper promoted the perception that ‘our moderate Muslims were good, decent, respectable and doing a good job’, while their Indonesian counterparts were bad, represented a threat and were linked to Jemaah Islamiyah al-Qaeda and Bashir (‘Bali and its after-shocks’ [sic], *ST*, 15 October 2002, p12; Hoong, C.L., *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.12; “Coping with the terror threat in S’pore”, *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.13).

In order to reinforce the view that al-Qaeda was behind the Bali bombings, the newspaper published an interview with “a London-based Muslim cleric suspected of having ties to the network. Abu Hamza Al-Masri said he believed al-Qaeda was involved, and warned there would be more attacks like this because of American arrogance” (Go, R., *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.1). The newspaper also printed warnings by Singapore intelligence to Indonesia (‘Bashir may be arrested but Hambali still directing JI ops’[sic], *ST*, 23 October 2002, p. A6). In general, opinions expressed in opinionated [op-ed] and commentary pieces reflect those of individual authors. This is to promote balance and discussion. However, often newspapers run op-ed pieces that

are in line with their editorial line. The *ST* not only used writers from other parts of the world but also op-ed and commentaries written by the newspaper's staff such as the feature editor Chua Lee Hoong and the chief regional correspondent Lee Kim Chew, both in the same publication date (15 October 2002, p.12); the staff writer Helmi Yusof (20 October 2002, p.30); Lydia Lim (19 October 2002, p. H19); and Robert Go (14 October 2002, p.12).

*ST* journalists typically added their own inferences to the story, for example, in the headline 'Mega seeks special power to fight terror' (Go, R., *ST*, 16 October 2002, p.1); the initial paragraphs were a straight account of the situation, but the third paragraph switched to quoting 'unidentified sources', appealing for the introduction of a Security Act in Indonesia, similar to the laws of Singapore and Malaysia. The journalist, Robert Go, provided his own judgment in stating, "Megawati clearly sees the need to equip herself [sic] with similar authority as her government moves more seriously to dismantle any terrorist network here".

The same approach could be seen in the story 'KL detains five JI men – one with Osama link' (Pereira, B., *ST*, 17 October 2002, p.1); the first paragraph was simply informative, but midway through the story the author interwove information linking the Bali bombings and JI. In some other cases it was not clear who made the connection – the writer or the authorities – mainly because of the use of phrases such as "the *Straits Times* understands"(ibid).

In a report headed 'Apec awaits Megawati's moves on terror' (Chew, L.K., *ST*, 26 October 2002, p.4), the article started by suggesting Megawati was under pressure to act: "the world is watching to see what action she will take against Islamic militants, particularly the cleric Abu Bakar Bashir" and "Ms. Megawati's reluctance to crack

down on them for fear of alienating the Muslim vote has been a source of frustration in Washington”. No source for these assertions was given in the story. In many cases, the *ST* appeared not to reflect the principle of non-interference that exists among ASEAN- Association of Southeast Asia Nations (Go, R., *ST*, 21 October, p. A4).

The *ST* was insistent in calling on Indonesia to get tougher with terrorism. Stories describing official views stressed that Indonesia has to seriously address terrorism because of apprehension in the investment and tourism sectors in the region (Kin, K.W., *ST*, 18 October 2002, p.3; Go, R., *ST*, 20 October 2002, p.15), and at times made explicit demands: ‘Jakarta told: Act now and act decisively’ (Quek, A., *ST*, 23 October 2002, p.1), and ‘After Bali, will Indonesia act?’ (Desker, B., *ST*, 31 October 2002, p.14). The *ST* used editorials to censure the Indonesian administration, saying Megawati “must act now” and passing on judgment on Indonesia’s leadership skills (‘Mega should go all out’, *ST*, 17 October 2002, p.16.); it identified “her choice of weapon to fight security threat” as “a presidential decree that will permit detention without trial. A way must be found to convince the doubters why an emergency decree is necessary”. In this particular example, the editorial was accompanied by two other op-ed stories on a single page, both making similar points (Hafidz, T., *ST*, 17 October 2002, p.16; Witoelar, W., *ST*, 17 October 2002, p.16).

The second story titled ‘but Al-Qaeda not the only group in town’ written by Wimar Witoelar, former spokesman for Abdurrahman Wahid in 2000-2001, took a refreshing approach to the Bali issue. It contained the following points: (1) various world leaders blamed Al-Qaeda even before the investigation into the Bali bombings started; (2) Indonesia had experienced decades of terrorism involving more victims than the Bali attack, but the earlier incidents never really became the subject of global headlines; (3) murderous campaigns in Aceh, Lampung and Tanjung Priok never

made the headlines; (4) East Timor was widely reported only because of Australian involvement; (5) the Suharto regime was based on state terrorism for 30 years; (6) in 1970, Suharto required the military and Muslim extremists to work together to combat communist danger; (7) this led to the establishment of JI, now mentioned as the local arm of al-Qaeda; (8) military hardliners plus radical Islamist militants worked together on and off for years in special operations; (9) US President Bush made al-Qaeda a world brand, a global franchise of terror in some ways similar to McDonald's; (10) Megawati's government was soft and ineffectual; (11) a convicted criminal headed Indonesia's parliament, and military figures were involved in corruption and human rights abuse; (12) Megawati was praised and urged to grasp the opportunity to act against terrorism. The op-ed piece demonstrated a revitalizing approach to the Bali issue, including detailed and sometimes little known historical background.

The *ST* reproduced Bashir as an issue. In 'Radical Bashir's arrest by police looks imminent' (Go, R., *ST*, 18 October 2002, p.3), the story was developed from allegations made by foreign governments' representatives, who implicated Bashir in terrorism. The arrest of Bashir made the headlines, with Jakarta signing stricter new laws (Go, R., & En-Lai, Y., *ST*, 20 October 2002, p.1; Asmarani, D., *ST*, 29 October 2002, p.1).

The newspaper dedicated space to Australia's response to the bombings and its offer of expertise and money to Indonesia to fight terrorism (*Associated Press*, 'Canberra pours more money into security after Bali blasts', *ST*, 24 October 2002, p. A7); later, the newspaper emphasized police raids on houses of Indonesian Muslims in Australia (*Associated Press*, 'Attacks on Muslims on the rise in Sydney', *ST*, 29 October 2002, p. A6). When reporting on Singaporeans injured in the Bali blasts, the



newspaper produced a positive approach, with heroes smiling through their tears; but when describing the attacks, it used gruesome details. The newspaper made extensive use of ‘villain’ and ‘hero’ approaches, including, for example, in the many stories loaded with sorrow and anger towards Indonesia (‘Shock and disbelief at attack so close to home’, *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.3; Asmarani, D., *ST*, 15 October 2002, p.5; En-Lai, Y., *ST*, 21 October 2002, p. A5).

Appeals to emotion dominated the *ST*’s coverage of human-interest stories about the problems the authorities had in identifying the victims and also the Singaporean doctors who went to Bali to help local burns victims. In the article ‘S’pore doctors treating Balinese’ (En-Lai, Y. *ST*, 16 October 2002, p. A2), an implicit comparison was drawn between the quality of hospital wards in Indonesia and Singapore hospitals of the 1970s. In this particular story it appeared that the reporter was there to give an account of Singaporean doctors operating in “horrible and dreadful conditions” while at the same time demonstrating the good attitude of Gleneagles doctors. The *ST* wrote that the “Parkway group, which runs Gleneagles, has offered to fly five of the most serious burn cases to Singapore”. In other human stories patients were quoted as saying, “I am happy my son is receiving good medical care here” and “truly grateful to the hospital staff and the people of Singapore for helping us” (Vijayan, K.C., & Soh, N., *ST*, 16 October 2002, p. A2) Such remarks support the government’s campaign to turn Singapore in a regional medical hub. The *ST* printed gruesome photos and eye-catching captions.

The *ST*’s reporting contained some religious references, for example in its editorial ‘Bali and its after-shocks’ [sic] (*ST*, 15 October 2002, p.12); and stories contained phrases such as “hell on earth” (‘Holiday haven became hell on earth’, (*ST*, 14 October 2002, p.2); “prayers for souls, search for bodies” (Asmarani, D., *ST*, 14

October 2002, p.3); “Tears and prayers flow as devastation sinks in” (En-Lai, Y. *ST*, 21 October 2002, p. A3.); “Praying for peace” (*ST*, 24 October 2002, p. A7). The coverage had one illustration representing a bomber wearing an Arab headscarf (Loh, J., *ST*, 16 October 2002, p.16).

The editors of the newspaper, whether consciously or not, framed the Bali bombings coverage within the issues of global terrorism and religion. The stories were loaded with political messages related to patriotism, values and norms, and economic benefits. The approach could be seen not just in a single article or in a group of articles; it was embodied in a style of communication that pushed the reader towards the *ST*'s interpretation of events through techniques such as juxtaposing stories, adding suggestive headlines and section headings, and anchoring captions with photographs. These techniques overlapped and reinforced each other. The *ST* appeared to have sent journalists to Indonesia to cover the incident. The newspaper also used material extensively from the newswire services.

### **3.2 Coverage of the 2002 Bali Bombings: *Jakarta Post***

The Bali bombings occurred at the height of the US ‘war on terror’ and amid persistent denials by Indonesian authorities that terrorists were operating in the country. The bombings were the most significant act of violence against foreign tourists in Indonesia.

### **3.2.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Jakarta Post***

In the early stage of its coverage, the *JP* did not present a clear indication of what concept of terrorism it would use. Nevertheless, it assumed the bombings were an act of terrorism ('National tragedy', *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.6). It treated the violence as an imminent threat to the country's economy, with particular focus on tourism (Wulandari, F., *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.13; Moestafa, B. K., *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.1; Harsanto, D. *JP*, 15 October 2002, p.8; Suryana, A., *JP*, 15 October 2002, p.13; 'Stay home, Mrs. President', *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.6; Simamora, A.P., *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.13; Witular, R.A., *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.14). As the consequences of the bombings started to become apparent, the *JP*'s concept of terrorism began to be shaped by the international discourse on the 'war on terror'.

#### **3.2.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The *JP*'s images of terrorists were of Muslim radicals and religious extremists. This perception was based on official sources of information, such as government representatives, police and intelligence officers. While it reflected the business sector's view that militant groups could be responsible for acts of violence (Junaidi, A., *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.8), "Muslim hard-liners" soon became the source of concern for the authorities, (Nafik, M., & Kurniawan H., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.2; 'Hard-line groups told to emulate Laskar Jihad's move to disband', *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.2; 'Police detain FPI chairman', *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.2; Kurniawan, Moch. N., *JP*, 21 October 2002, p.4; 'VP denies govt interference in the arrest of Ba'asyir', *JP*, 22 October 2002, p.2). These images had evolved to identify one single group as suspect terrorists, i.e., the Jemaah Islamiyah organization (JI), (Harsanto, D. *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.1). Even though the newspaper reproduced an official quote saying,

“investigators had yet to find any evidence to link the blasts to the military, foreigners or Muslim radicals” (Siboro T. & Suryana A. *JP*, 22 October 2002, p.1; ‘Police release sketches of Bali bomb suspects’, *JP*, 31 October 2002, p.1.). As the coverage stretched into weeks, the newspaper began to refer to JI members as the suspects as a matter of course, reflecting the view of the international community (Unidjaja, F.D., & Harsanto, D., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.4; Unidjaja, F. D., *JP*, 25 October 2002, p.1; Muninggar, S. Saraswati, *JP*, 26 October 2002, p.2). Within weeks, the newspaper was referring to the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir and al-Qaeda as involved in the Bali bombings.

The early signs of international pressure on Indonesia to act against ‘radical groups’ started to appear in the press days after the bombings, which prompted Indonesian officials finally to admit publicly “that leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a suspected international terrorist organization, were Indonesian citizens... operating in neighboring Singapore and Malaysia but not in Indonesia” (Unidjaja, F. & Harsanto, D. *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.4; Unidjaja, F.D., *JP*, 29 October 2002, p.4). However, the *JP* failed to ask some basic questions, such as, what was the connection of the Bali bombings to Singapore and Malaysia? Who or what was behind the bombings? And were there other reasons behind the bombings?

It appears that social grievances were not considered relevant, despite some concerns raised by academics about social problems in Indonesia (‘Bali tragedy the last wake-up call for govt’, *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.3; ‘Megawati is the key to rebuilding devastated Bali’, *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.3; ‘The future of our nation is at stake- Syafii’, *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.3). When the bombings occurred, groups of men had been attacking nightspots and entertainment centres in the capital Jakarta for the past three years. The most recent of those incidents took place days before the

Bali bombings, when more than 400 members of a group called Islam Defenders Front (FPI) attacked a discotheque and two billiard centres (Harsanto, D., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.2). For years, members of FPI had played what the newspaper described as an “alleged role in provoking violence and acts of vandalism” (‘Police detain FPI chairman’, *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.2) with some level of impunity. The newspaper could have tried to explore the reasons why the authorities only turned their attention to FPI after the Bali bombings.

Similarly, the *JP* showed lack of journalistic interest in exploring the motivation behind the decision by members of the hard-line group Laskar Jihad to disband itself after the Bali bombings (Wahyuni, S., & Pinontoan, O. *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.1). Laskar Jihad was involved in social and religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Maluku islands during the three years of the sectarian conflict. Instead, the newspaper published interviews with Muslim scholars hailing the decision of Laskar Jihad and at the same time urging other “hard-line organizations to follow suit or have the authorities disperse them” (‘Police detain FPI chairman’, *JP*, October 18, 2002, p.2). In a single sentence at the end of a story the newspaper casually dropped the information that “Laskar Jihad has been accused of links with Jamaah Islamiyah who is believed to have links with international terrorist group al-Qaeda” (Juniartha, I W, & Wijaksana, D., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.1). The newspaper briefly noted that many “fundamentalist groups” had resurfaced in Indonesia following the downfall of the strongman Suharto in 1998, with Laskar Jihad and Islam Defenders Front being the most prominent ones. In the newspaper’s view, both groups have persistently attempted to impose Sharyah law on Indonesia, and this “has sometimes turned violent” (Nafik, M., *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.2).

At this stage, Indonesia was not only being pressed internationally to admit the existence of terrorist cells on its soil, it was also being pressured by the US and Australian governments to arrest the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir<sup>14</sup> (Unidjaja, F.D., & Harsanto, D., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.4). Both governments identified Bashir as the leader of JI. The *JP* failed to provide detailed information on why Australia and the US wanted the arrest of Bashir (Bayuni, E.M., *JP*, 21 October 2002, p.3); some background information would have helped readers understand the inclusion of the religious leader among the suspects of the bombings. Instead, the *JP*'s coverage switched from the bombings to problems of governance, the economic consequences and the involvement of JI, to name a few of the issues that are associated with the events of 12 October 2002.

### **3.2.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The assumption behind the *JP*'s coverage of the Bali bombings was that violence was linked to anarchy, because of a lack of law enforcement and the central government's weak leadership of the country ('National tragedy', *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.6), in addition to the government's insufficiently proactive approach towards terrorism ('Nation unites in condemning bombing', *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.1). The *JP* made a series of criticisms of the government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri, attacking her leadership skills and "the lack of vision of a leader of a nation of more than 200 million people" (Nafik, M., *JP*, 29 October 2002, p.2).

As foreign governments put pressure on Indonesia to admit to the existence of a terrorism network in the country, the newspaper took the lead in insisting that others

---

<sup>14</sup> I will adhere to the different spellings of Abu Bakar Bashir in direct quotations.

were right, Indonesia was wrong ('National tragedy', *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.6). The *JP* then focused on two issues, namely, criticism of Megawati's governance and the economic damages caused by the bombings (Moestafa, B.K, *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.1; Suryana, A., *JP*, 15 October 2002, p.13; 'Stay home, Mrs. President', *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.6; Simamora, A.P., *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.13; Witular, R. A., *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.14).

The *JP* described the weak response of Indonesian authorities to the threat of terrorism as "most deplorable" ('National tragedy', *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.6), "whereas most other countries in the region were taking steps necessary to counter the terrorism threat". Newspaper staff writers and guest writers reported critically on Megawati (Bandoro, B., *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.6; Purba, K., *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.2; Nafik, M., *JP*, 29 October 2002, p.2; Unidjaja, F.D., *JP*, 29 October 2002, p.4).

The *JP* linked terrorist violence to the militancy of radical groups, a weak government and a lack of law enforcement, and described serious implications for the economy and the tourism industry. But the newspaper did not carefully explore the reasons for the lack of law enforcement. Instead, it insisted the government had failed to solve the problem of terrorism because of its inefficiency.

### **3.2.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The *JP* made the connection between the bombings and religion by interviewing religious scholars and leaders of religious organizations as well as having people in the religious milieu to contribute as guest writers (Mu'ti, A., *JP*, 21 October 2002, p.7; Winoto, S., *JP*, 23 October 2002, p.2). This created the perception that religion was linked to violence, an attitude that was reinforced by government and police

officers describing the bombers as ‘radical Muslim’ and ‘Muslim hardliners’ (Wulandari, F., *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.13; Nafik, M., & Kurniawan, H., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.2).

The perception that violence was linked to Islam, specifically, to radical Islam was also passed on to readers with stories quoting authorities in the United States and Singapore whose government leaders were quoted as appealing to Indonesian authorities “to crack down on Muslim radicals” (Nafik, M., & Kurniawan, H., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.2; Mu’ti, A., *JP*, 21 October 2002, p.6; ‘VP denies govt interference in the arrest of Ba’asyir’, *JP*, 22 October 2002, p.2; *JP*, Winoto, S., *JP*, 23 October 2002, p.2). The *JP* did not try to distinguish in its reporting between Islamic fundamentalists belonging to Islamic movements with social motivations and those belonging to Islamic movements with political agendas.

#### **3.2.1.4 The Victims**

The *JP*’s focus was on the foreign victims, especially on Australians, who accounted for the largest number of fatalities. Indonesian victims did not get much attention (Juniartha, I. W., *JP*, 15 October 2002, p.19; Widiadana, R. A., & Juniartha, I W., *JP*, 15 October 2002, p.1; Widiadana, R. A., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.3; ‘Mourners continue to flock to blast site’, *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.3). But reporting on the victims was not a priority. Instead, the newspaper slanted its reporting of the tragedy to press the government to catch the culprits as soon as possible, in order to prevent consequences for the tourism industry, which is Indonesia’s second-largest non-oil-and-gas foreign exchange earner (Wulandari, F., *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.13; Wijaksana, D., *JP*, 19 October 2002, p.14).



### 3.2.2 Insight

The *JP*'s coverage of the Bali bombings was different from its coverage of other bombings in the country. Firstly, the Bali attacks were considered an act of international terrorism from the moment that initial information started to flow to the media. Secondly, the bombings occurred at the height of the 'war on terror', despite persistent denials by Indonesian authorities that the country was a 'hotbed' for terrorism (Juniartha, I W., & Widiadana, R.A., *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.1). Thus the Bali bombings came as much needed proof that the country was facing a terrorism epidemic. The newspaper did not raise questions when world leaders fingered *Ji* members even before the investigations had started (Witoelar, W., *JP*, 22 October 2002, p.7; Unidjaja, F.D., *JP*, 23 October 2002, p.1). Once jailed, the suspect bombers acknowledged they were members of *Ji*; however, the *JP* failed to raise questions about the circumstances of their apparent confessions.

The newspaper was slow in grasping the importance and foreseeable consequences of the bombings. Once it realized the impact of the blasts and the large number of victims, the *JP* devoted a large amount of space to stories related to the incident and pondering the negative economic consequences. The *JP* was keen to make the international community aware that the government was weak and by doing so, it was also putting pressure on the Indonesian authorities to accept international views on the existence of terrorism and the involvement of *Ji* in the bombings. It saw urgent action as paramount in restoring the confidence of investors and the business community in the Indonesian government (Suryana, A., *JP*, 15 October 2002, p.13; Simamora, A.P., *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.13).

The newspaper established that the Bali bombings were the result of an intelligence failure due to internal conflicts, such as the rivalry between the police, the military, intelligence officers and government officials (Muninggar, S. Saraswati, *JP*, 15 October 2002, p.3; Kurniawan, M.N., *JP*, 15 October 2002, p.4; ‘Intelligence failure’, *JP*, 15 October 2002, p.6). This line of reporting took precedence, despite initial speculation of various kinds, for example, that the culprits came from terrorist groups outside Indonesia, and of involvement of the Indonesian military, and even of members of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The newspaper opted to follow the suggested official line in not pursuing the possibilities that parts of the Indonesian military or former military personnel were connected to the bombings (Juniartha, I W., & Wijaksana, D., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.2; Wijaksana, D. & Siboro, T., *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.1). Readers therefore had their ability to assess the situation independently removed, first by the authorities and then by the newspaper.

Considering the historical involvement of the Indonesian military in the nation-building process, its poor record on human rights and the past close cooperation between the Australian and Indonesian militaries during the Suharto regime, the fact that Australia and Indonesia formed a joint team to probe the Bali bombings should also have been reported with a great deal of background information (*Associated Press*, ‘Deadly bombings could aid Australia- RI ties: Analysts’, *JP*, 15 October 2002, p.10) Instead, the *JP* saw as more relevant the fact that Australia, as the nation with the largest number of fatalities in the bombings and a total trade with Indonesia valued at up to US\$ 3.87 billion per year, had the right to contribute to investigations from an early stage (Unidjaja, F.D., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.1). The newspaper justified Australia’s involvement in an editorial as follows: “Australia, of course, because of the large number of its citizens that were killed or injured in that

horrendous event, felt compelled to send in its own police team to satisfy its domestic demand for information and clarification” (‘Police work in Bali’, *JP*, 19 October 2002, p.6). Other countries cooperating with the investigations were Great Britain, Japan, the United States and Germany. Days later others countries such as New Zealand and Sweden also joined the investigation team. Nevertheless, the newspaper did not offer insights on the relationships between these countries and Indonesia or discuss trade ties between them or their level of participation in the ‘war on terrorism’ (Wijaksana, D., *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.3; Christie, M., *JP*, 19 October 2002, p.3).

The *JP* portrayed the view that the future of the nation was at stake as a consequence of the Bali bombings (Purba, K., *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.6). That was positive, considering the US’s insistence that involvement in the ‘war on terror’ should determine whether a “nation is with us or against us”<sup>15</sup>. But the newspaper failed to discuss seriously why the future of the nation only entered the risk zone after the Bali bombings and not previously when a wave of violence hit the country following Suharto’s fall (Maarif, S., 18 *JP*, October 2002, p.3). However, one possible reason was given by the newspaper: “very few people believe that Indonesia can effectively act to fight terrorism because many of the leaders... act like parents trying to hide the fact that their children are chronic drug addicts despite what their friends and neighbors know” (Purba, K., *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.6).

Thus, while Indonesians were killing their own people during the Suharto era - when some half million people were murdered during the Suharto takeover, (Nordholt, 2002:43), the invasion of East Timor in 1975, and the fighting in Maluku between Christians and Muslims which killed between 4,000 and 10,000 people (Colombijn & Lindblad, 2002:2)- and afterwards, those events were apparently of less

magnitude than the deaths of two hundred foreigners in Bali (Rais, A., *JP*, 24 October 2002, p.3). Therefore international investigators were welcomed to do the work that Indonesians were not capable of doing ('Downer pledges aid for Bali blast probe', *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.1; Kelley, M., *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.3; Hopkins, A. *JP*, 16 October 2002, p.12; Unidjaja, F.D., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.1; Wijaksana, D., *JP*, 19 October 2002, p.4).

The *JP* reported but failed to question allegations made by Singapore's *ST* that "the money to buy the explosives for the Bali bombings was transferred from Osama bin Laden to the Jemaah Islamiyah organization, which Ba'asyir chairs" (Siboro, T. & Suryana, A., *JP*, 22 October 2002, p.1). The *JP* was already reporting on Abu Bakar Bashir as the leader of the alleged terrorist group *JI*. The *JP* did not question the fact that details of the story published by the *ST* were based on information provided by Indonesian intelligence. The simple question to be asked was: How was it possible that a Singapore newspaper had access to detailed information of Indonesian intelligence while Indonesian journalists did not get the same 'first hand' kind of treatment? (Reuters, 'Saudi 'gave money' to *JI* for explosives, expert say', *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.3; Harsanto, D., *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.1; Siboro, T., & Suryana, A., *JP*, 22 October 2002, p.1).

The *JP*'s Bali bombing coverage had a modest level of photo illustrations, for example, in comparison with the *ST*. Most of the information for the *JP*'s stories came from police and government officials, scholars, religious leaders and eye-witnesses.

---

<sup>15</sup> U.S. President George W. Bush's remarks on 6 November 2001. CNN.com./U.S.

### **3.3 Coverage of the Bali Bombings: *New Straits Times***

The *NST*'s coverage of the Bali bombings was wide-ranging compared with its coverage of the other bombings studied in this project. The coverage shifted from a focus on Bali to national security, the arrest of Kumpulan Militant Malaysia (KMM) members, Indonesia's handling of terrorism and the possible causes of the bombings. It also addressed the negative effect of the attacks on the tourism industry.

#### **3.3.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *New Straits Times***

The *NST* portrayed terrorism as a threat to racial harmony, intended "to pit Muslims against the predominantly Hindus or to undermine the presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri, who is a moderate" ('Prevention better than cure', *NST*, 15 October 2002, p.10).

##### **3.3.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The *NST* referred to 'Muslim terrorists' in its editorial 'Prevention better than cure' (*NST*, 15 October 2002, p.10); various stories carried out categorizations such as, 'Islamic militants' (Akmar, S., *NST*, 19 October 2002, p. 2), 'Islamic terrorists' (Akmar, S. *NST*, 26 October 2002, p.2), other stories described members of Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda as terrorists, while the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir was reported as spiritual leader of JI (Emmanuel, T., & J. Joheng, *NST*, 17 October 2002, p.1). The *NST* equated members of the KMM, who were described as religious fanatics and murderers, with terrorists ('Studies in contrasts', *NST*, 18 October 2002, p.10; Kaur, H., *NST*, 19 October 2002, p.1).

#### **3.3.1.2 Roots of Violence**

A possible reason for the bombing presented by Malaysian officials and reflected by the newspaper was domestic Indonesian social conditions, given social and race discrimination by the entertainment industry in Bali, which gave preference to Western clients to the detriment of locals. In its midweek editorial the newspaper said, “the Sari club did not welcome locals, and charged them Rp 50,000 for entry while foreigners got in free” (Rashid, R., *NST*, 16 October 2002, p.10).

#### **3.3.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

One of the connections between religion and violence was the description of the bombers as Muslims. Another generic correlation to religion was made through the observation that Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim nation, an undisputed fact. In addition, there was one story, which reproduced a quote saying, “the weekend bombing in Bali should not be linked with any Muslim organisations.” (“Nik Aziz: Don’t link it to Muslims’, *NST*, 17 October 2002, p.6).

#### **3.3.1.4 The Victims**

The *NST* published many photos of the injured and the destruction in the Kuta area, but did not elaborate on the victims. With photo-illustrations entitled ‘World’ (*NST*, 14 October 2002, p. B21), and ‘World in pictures’, (*NST*, 15 October 2002, p. B23), the newspaper therefore, in a superficial way, did acknowledge the victims in its reporting.

### 3.3.2 Insight

The *NST*'s reporting immediately after the bombing was informative and concise. The suggestion that the bombings were an act of terrorism came three days after the initial reporting and particularly after Washington issued a worldwide terrorism alert. The reporting, reflecting international concerns, mentioned the attacks had heightened fears of "Indonesia becoming a heaven for terrorists" ('Bali blasts jolt Jakarta into facing reality of terrorism', *NST*, 15 October 2002, p. B22; 'Test of Megawati's leadership', *NST*, 16 October 2002, p. B21).

In its editorial 'Prevention better than cure' (*NST*, 15 October 2002, p.10), the newspaper fingered Al-Qaeda as responsible for the attacks and referred to the bombers as "Muslim terrorists" while at the same time condemning Indonesia for not going after "religious fanatics". The editorial addressed the issue of Muslims and Hindus in Bali and pressed for the arrest of suspected terrorists, "even if concrete evidence is lacking". The editorial also warned against oversimplification in pinning the blame on al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.

However, in the same edition, the newspaper reproduced official concerns that the attack "may have a domestic connection" (Sharmini, P., *NST*, 15 October 2002, p.4), and the police should investigate first before linking the bombing with international terrorists ('Isis: Bombings will affect investments', *NST*, 15 October 2002, p.4; 'Syed Hamid: Let's not point fingers until probe is completed', *NST*, 16 October 2002, p.4).

At the same time the newspaper provided stories on the arrest of KMM members in which the militants were reported as part of al-Qaeda and JI (Emmanuel, T., &

Joheng, J., *NST*, 17 October 2002, p.1). The later stories stressed the issue of national security, with police saying weapons and maps were seized from those detained.

In the story ‘Why did the bombers pick on the Sari Club?’ it touched on the issue of social-ethnic discrimination as an insult to the local community in a situation where foreign tourists could do anything and were abusing the culture in Indonesia and Bali, declaring this “an only white foreigner club, an insult to the local community” (Rashid, R. *NST*, 16 October 2002, p.10). However, the *NST* changed from “discrimination in the entertainment industry in Bali” to the discourse on terrorism, including challenges to Indonesia’s stance on “Islamic fanaticism ragged carpet of National Unity and territorial integrity”. The newspaper went on to criticise Indonesia for “not heeding repeated warnings” (‘No more excuses’, *NST*, 17 October 2002, p.10).

Following the Malaysian government’s official line, the newspaper reported on terrorism as an issue (‘US, Britain urged to discuss problem with others’, *NST*, 15 October 2002, p.4). It was not clear when the newspaper changed from the idea that the Bali bombings were an internal act of vengeance to the idea that they were an instance of international terrorism.

The *NST* ran stories portraying Malaysia as a safe place where foreign tourists had nothing to fear (Mohamad, A. & Waheed, S., *NST*, 15 October 2002, p.1; Kaur, H., *NST*, 19 October 2002, p.1), while portraying Indonesia negatively as disruptive (Akmar, S., *NST*, 19 October 2002, p.4; Sayuthi, S., *NST*, 19 October, 2002, p.4). In its editorial ‘Studies in contrasts’ (*NST*, 18 October 2002, p.10), it said citizens and residents of Singapore and Malaysia were thankful for their leaders’ good governance. Malaysia and Singapore experienced no bombing because of decisive



actions by their governments, i.e., the arrest of KMM members and, in Singapore, JI members ('Najib – We can handle terrorism threat', *NST*, 22 October 2002, p.4).

The newspaper reproduced police views that there was no link between the KMM arrests and the Bali bombings. At the same time, still quoting the police, the newspaper published stories on the arrest of 68 people as "suspected of militancy" under the Internal Security Act since May 2001 (Emmanuel, T. & Joheng, J., *NST*, 17 October 2002, p.1; 'No more excuses', *NST*, 17 October 2002, p.10; Kaur H., *NST*, 19 October 2002, p.1).

The *NST* quoted the former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad as saying, "the terrorism issue was not being handled properly" and "too much emphasis was being given to security and defence and not enough attention to the causes of terrorism" ('Terrorism issue not being handled properly', *NST*, 18 October 2002, p.2). But there was no clear indication of what the causes of terrorism were. The *NST* reproduced the positive assertion that Malaysia can handle the terrorism threat ('Najib – We can handle terrorism threat', *NST*, 22 October 2002, p.4). However, Malaysia stepped up security ('Police tightening security at foreign-owned places', 16 October 2002, p.15; 'Security alert stepped up after Bali bombing', *NST*, 17 October 2002, p.6; 'Dr. Ling advises local port, airport managements to tighten security', *NST*, 21 October 2002, p.4), which appeared to contradict its officials' view that the explosions could have been an act of vengeance for tourists abusing the religious culture of Bali.

The *NST* ran stories providing the view that after Suharto's fall, President Habibie dismantled controls imposed by his predecessor, giving Muslim movements' new freedom. This partly reflected the fact that the US and its allies wanted democratic reforms in Indonesia and less state control, but that after 9/11, the US wanted Jakarta

to be firm with Islamic groups (Akmar, S., *NST*, 19 October 2002, p.2; Noor, F., *NST*, 19 October 2002, p.11).

The discourse on terrorism became the main topic for the *NST*. It reported on the threat to national security along with the need for preventative measures to track down KMM members, and the army's calls for the public to be more security conscious ('ISA to give absolute powers to the Executive on national security matters', *NST*, 20 October 2002, p.2; 'Army wants public to be more security conscious', *NST*, 20 October 2002, p.7; 'Be more vigilant, Sarawak folk advised', *NST*, 20 October 2002, p.7; 'Be alert at all times, advises MB', *NST*, 21 October 2002, p.4). The newspaper ran stories linking the Bali bombings to the instability in the south of Thailand, reproducing statements by Thai police officials that the south was known as a terrorist route for al-Qaeda. The *NST* reported on the conspiracy theory that the CIA was involved in the blasts in Bali ('Conspiracy theories abound after bombings in Bali', *NST*, 16 October 2002, p. B23).

In its editorial 'Sleeping giant awakened' (*NST*, 21 October 2002, p.10), the *NST* said that Indonesia was the weakest link in the regional anti-terror campaign. It dealt with the arrest of Abu Bakar Bashir and also with Washington's "infuriating habit of linking the Al-Qaeda with every Indonesian in a skull cap and jubah" (ibid).

The editorial 'Sleeping giant awakened' said the West should rebuild confidence in the region in order to return it to political stability, and that economic growth was the only long-term cure for "the disease of terrorism". The editorial did not explain why the West had responsibility for rebuilding confidence in the region and why the region itself did not assume this responsibility. The *NST*'s discourse on terrorism also included stories from elsewhere on the acts of militants in the Philippines and the

violence in the Indonesian islands of Maluku. Editorials, especially in places where the government influences the press, such as Singapore and Malaysia, reveal their political and social agendas.

The newspaper presented contradictory stances towards the bombing: one was critical of Indonesia and within the international frame of global terrorism, and the other was the appeal by Malaysian officials for authorities to investigate before jumping to the conclusion that international terrorists were involved in the blasts ('Prevention better than cure', *NST*, 15 October 2002, p.10; Sharmini, P., *NST*, 15 October 2002, p.4). Whereas former PM Mahathir Mohamad said, "Bali is one of the many unfortunate incidents engineered by angry and frustrated people in retaliation and revenge" (Mohamad. A., & Waheed S., *NST*, 15 October 2002, p.1). Despite repeating allegations that the Indonesian Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir's was involved with terrorism, the newspaper gave space to the cleric to put his views across (*Agence France Presse*, 'Abubakar blames US for Sari Club blast', *NST*, 14 October 2002, p. B21). Abu Bakar Bashir blamed the US for the blasts in the nightclubs. Noordin Sophies, chairman of International Studies Malaysia, presented his views on the consequences of the blasts. Both stories produced a conciliatory tone with suggestions to "look for the causes of terrorism", and talk about "cooperation" and not jumping to conclusions that international terrorists were involved. The approach was in contrast to the editorial 'Prevention better than cure', which at the time of the bombing took a harsh tone towards Indonesia (*NST*, 15 October 2002, p.10).

The newspaper dedicated space to official concern about tourism ('Sabah hopes Bali blast won't hit its tourism', *NST*, 18 October 2002, p.14), saying Australians tended to go to Bali whereas Japanese and European tourists went to Malaysia.

Nevertheless, the *NST* missed the opportunity to refer to the kidnapping of foreign tourists in April 2000 from a resort in Sipadan Island in Malaysia by the Abu Sayyaf group. At the time of the kidnappings, the culprits were called ‘bandits’, ‘pirates’ or ‘rebels’ rather than terrorists (Bingksan, J., Emmanuel, T., Bangkuai, J., Kaur, J. Andres, L., Singh, S., *NST*, 25 April 2000, p.1).

Within one week of the bombings, the *NST* had already left the Bali attacks far behind and turned its full attention to terrorism in general and to official reactions to foreign allegations that Malaysia was a site for terrorist activity (Kaur, H., *NST*, 19 October 2002, p.1; ‘Call to stop labelling of countries as terrorist bases’, *NST*, 19 October 2002, p.4). The *NST* quoted Malaysian officials as rejecting this label for the country (‘Foreign investors know better, says Mustafa’, *NST*, 21 October 2002, p.4).

The *NST* also reproduced the official views that Malaysia did not expect investors to be scared away by unsubstantiated reports that terrorist groups were active on its soil, in an allusion to a story published in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. The editor of the now defunct Hong Kong-based magazine subsequently apologized (Sayuthi, S., *NST*, 19 October 2002, p.4)

The newspaper printed reactions to allegations by a Singapore based terrorism expert, Rohan Gunaratna, who claimed in a United Nations report that the Malaysian political party Barisan Nasional had links to al-Qaeda (‘BN, Opposition leaders condemn report’, *NST*, 19 October 2002, p.6). The *NST* also published reactions from opposition leaders condemning the United Nations report (Bangkuai, J. *NST*, 20 October 2002, p.2). Despite giving negative coverage to the Singaporean expert in “meat for some, poison to others” (Akmar, S., *NST*, 20 October 2002, p.8), the fact that the newspaper allowed the expert and members of the political opposition to

explain their positions indicated a more open approach of coverage, in contrast to the *ST*.

The opinions of the public were not present in the coverage, only the views of officials and sources that reinforced the status quo. Nevertheless, the *NST* reproduced different opinions expressed by government officials in the same article regarding the bombings in Bali. For example, the Minister of Defence Najib Tun Razak was quoted as saying, “the attacks prove that the region is facing threats from terrorists”, whereas Foreign Minister Syed Hamid was quoted as saying, “the Bali bombing was an isolated incident not linked to Malaysia” (Sharmini, P., *NST*, 15 October 2002, p.4).

The *NST* reflected official condemnation of the Western media’s use of the phrase ‘Muslim terrorists’, even while it paraphrased Western media. The newspaper itself referred to ‘Muslim terrorists’ in its editorial ‘Prevention better than cure’ (*NST*, 15 October 2002, p.10), and in another editorial two days later equated terrorism with ‘Islamic fanaticism’ (‘No more excuses’, *NST*, 17 October 2002, p.10).

The *NST*’s Bali bombing stories were mostly distributed on inside pages, which did not create a sense of crisis. The ordering and duration of the stories reflected the importance that the newsmakers attributed to them. The *NST* thus downplayed the importance of the Bali bombings after the initial reporting. In general, the *NST*’s editorials were harsher towards Indonesia for not going after religious fanatics while at the same time it reproduced a softer stance from officials saying the Bali incident should not link to Muslims (‘Nik Aziz - Don’t link it to Muslims’, *NST*, 17 October 2002, p.6).

### **3.4 Coverage of the 2002 Bali Bombings: *Tempo***

*Tempo* published two issues on the Bali bombings; the second publication was a special edition (15-21 October 2002; 22-28 October 2002). The reporting was emotional with grisly details on bodies found on the tops of trees and roofs. The line of the coverage was one of criticism. It blamed the lack of cooperation between intelligence agencies; it accused the central government of reacting slowly to the attacks; and it portrayed the police as “slow” and “sloppy” (Zulkifli, A., & Fibri, R, & Hakim, J. & Sunudyantoro & Koko, A., *Tempo* 22-28 October 2002, p.30). The reporting challenged the government’s resolve to fight terrorism.

#### **3.4.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Tempo***

*Tempo* reported on the act of violence as a threat to national security and a “larger-than-life threat” (Ismartono, Y., *Tempo*, 15-21October 2002, p.16). The weekly magazine printed information on the recent history of violence in Indonesia.

##### **3.4.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

While US President George W. Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard were straightforward in their blaming of JI, Bashir and al-Qaeda, the magazine said the perpetrators were not yet known (‘911 for Australia’, *Tempo*, 22-28 October 2002, p.32).

#### **3.4.1.2 Roots of Violence**

In its ‘No Armageddon’ story, *Tempo* suggested that social problems in Bali constituted one possible reason for the attack. It mentioned the grievances of the local community against tourists and the alleged exploitation by the tourism industry of temples and religious symbols (Setia, P., *Tempo*, 22-28 October 2002, p.44). But it also presented the perspective that “the international media were convinced that the bombing was the work of Al-Qaeda” and that “the defence minister endorsed the claim that the bombings were the work of the terrorist network” (Zulkifli, A., & et al., *Tempo* 22-28 October 2002, p.30).

#### **3.4.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The linking of violence and religion was observed in remarks made by then US Secretary of States Colin Powell, who identified the ‘terrorists’ as “Muslim-based” (‘911 for Australia’, *Tempo*, 22-28 October 2002, p.33). Australian Prime Minister John Howard blamed religious sentiment for the tragedy (p.32). The magazine carried a headline with the religious connotation, ‘Resurrection from the ashes’, describing how local people in the handicraft business are dependent on tourism in Bali (*Tempo*, 22-28 October 2002, p.38). The magazine did not present any ‘local connection’ between Islam and violence in the reporting of this incident.

#### **3.4.1.4 The Victims**

*Tempo’s* coverage presented foreigners and Indonesians as heroes. The reportage included love stories and accounts by eyewitnesses and people injured in the blasts. It focused on foreigner victims, particularly Australian, and registered the fact that

unidentified victims may have been local motorcycle taxi-drivers, child beggars and prostitutes; these people drew little attention in the media.

### **3.4.2 Insight**

The stories presented in both issues (15-21 October & 22-28 October, 2002) were loaded with dramatic appeal: “a sense of anger, sadness and pain” (22-28 October 2002, p.6). There were gruesome accounts by the writers describing body parts spread on trees and on top of houses. Despite presenting a detailed narrative of horror, the photos used as illustration were less grisly or shocking than those in other publications.

The overall reason given for the attacks described in the two editions was a “lack of cooperation within Indonesian intelligence agencies”. Despite initial reporting on the various possible causes of the bombings and who might be the perpetrators, the magazine gave space to the claims of the international media that the bombings were the work of al-Qaeda. Officials dismissed early speculations that a former army officer expert in explosives released from the military could have been involved in the bombings by saying that there was “pressure from the top not to spend time interviewing military staff” and ‘It would complicate matters’ (*Tempo*, 22-28 October 2002, p.30).

One of the most valuable aspects of the coverage was that it touched on social problems in the area of Kuta on Bali where the nightclubs were located, “an area popular with motorcycle taxi-drivers, child beggars and prostitutes who loitered nearby”( *Tempo*, 22-28 October 2002, p.6). The magazine described a series of situations in Bali that could have contributed to the local community’s grievances



against tourists. This issue was also raised by the *New Straits Times* (Sharmini, P., *NST*, 15 October 2002, p.4; Rashid, R., *NST*, 16 October 2002, p.10), which described the tourism industry exploiting the Hindu religion by turning temples into tourist spots. But *Tempo* generally portrayed Bali positively as “popular with foreign tourists and known as the place where the day never ends” (*Tempo*, 22-28 October 2002, p.6).

The magazine carried stories based on accounts of eyewitnesses, victims and police officials; these stories had emotional appeal, such as a description of a “brave British man” and a love story involving an Indonesian couple (Fibri, R., *Tempo*, 22-28 October 2002, p.38). *Tempo* also provided readers with tourism data “before and after the bombings”, discussing the economic impact of the blasts on the local community and the consequences for the country’s economy (pp.38, 39).

The magazine reported that an American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) team was the first to arrive to probe the sites. It did not raise the issue of whether the team was already based in some place in Indonesia or in the region, or how it was possible for the team to be first considering the distance between Indonesia and the US. Nevertheless, the coverage noted that Indonesia succumbed to Australian and US pressure to allow their respective national experts to participate in the investigation of the bombings. Probably due to Bali proximity to major Australian cities, Australians make up the largest number of visitors to the island. As such, Australia was portrayed as if the bombings had been in its backyard. Thus the reporting was in line with an article by the *Jakarta Post* that said,

“Many people in Australia, including the media, saw the bombing as targeting Australians. And many people also feel that Bali, or the Kuta Beach resort where the bombs exploded, was Australians as kangaroos, or Fosters Lager” (Bayuni, E.M., *JP*, 23 October 2002, p.3).

*Tempo* followed the international and *JP* line of criticism of President Megawati and the government's slowness to react to the attacks. The magazine also endorsed foreign government pressure on Indonesia while registering those governments' offers of military training and money to act against terrorism.

*Tempo* appealed to the Indonesian government not to jeopardize the international community's trust, and urged the "police to work seriously in tracking the perpetrators – not leave the results hanging in the air like the bombing cases in Jakarta" (*Tempo*, 22-28 October 2002, p.11). *Tempo* reported on different opinions about the measures to counter terrorism, with discussion on the pros and cons of new regulations, while emphasizing that anti-terrorism laws did not guarantee success ('Indonesia Issues Antiterrorism Regulations', *Tempo*, 22-28 October 2002, p.36).

The magazine reported on the presence of medical teams from Taiwan, Japan, Australia and the Philippines helping the victims in Bali. It published views of opponents and proponents of counter-terrorism laws from the perspectives of human rights groups and religious groups. It mentioned *Time* magazine's allegation about Abu Bakar Bashir's involvement with terrorism, while providing stories about Bashir and the disbandment of the radical group Laskar Jihad. *Tempo* published the opinions expressed by the leaders of Australia and the United States saying that JI and Bashir were responsible for the attacks and that terrorism is an old problem in Indonesia ('911 for Australia', *Tempo* 22-28 October 2002, p.32); this information was followed by the disclosure that the US had offered US\$50 million to Indonesia to combat terrorism (p33).

The magazine did not sensationalize its headlines or stories as there were no gruesome photo illustrations, but there were detailed and grisly accounts of the

bombings and their victims. Its coverage was closer to that of the *ST* in terms of providing shocking details than the other newspapers, *JP* and *NST*.

### **3.5 Comparative Analysis**

It is reasonable to argue that the *ST* promoted fear and anxiety by producing stories on tightening security in Singapore, and by saying in reference to Bashir and terrorism that if one “lops off a head, another will grow” (Long, S., *ST*, 20 October 2002, p.29). With extensive use of rhetoric, the *ST* reported that there were many people ready to carry out terrorism in the region.

The *ST*'s coverage of the Bali bombings was localized to address Singapore's domestic concerns about religion, race and economic development. The *ST* not only analyzed the situation but it also recommended solutions, exercising public diplomacy through a form of journalism that often became confrontational, particularly when reporting on the internal affairs of Indonesia (Go, R. *ST*, 20 October 2002, p.15; Go, R., *ST*, 22 October 2002, p.1).

The *ST*'s straight accounts of events were frequently followed by other stories giving the views of officials, experts and the representatives of institutions in Singapore on the ills in Indonesian society. *ST* presented radical Islam as the reason for terrorism.

The *JP* was slow to appreciate the immediate consequences of the bombings, probably because the explosions happened in the late hours of a Saturday and blasts were rather frequent in various parts of the country. Nevertheless, once *JP* realized the impact of the violence, it provided full coverage.

The *JP*'s reporting stressed the failure of Indonesian intelligence agencies, urged the quick arrest of the perpetrators and pressed the Indonesian government to accept international views on the existence of terrorism in the country, as well as the involvement of *JI* in the bombings. Its initial reporting, however, saw 'radical groups' and 'Muslim hard-liners' as the source of concern for the authorities ('National tragedy', *JP*, 14 October 2002, p.6; Nafik M., & Kurniawan H., *JP*, 17 October 2002, p.2; Harsanto D., *JP*, 18 October 2002, p.1; Kurniawan, Moch. N., *JP*, 21 October 2002, p.4)

As the coverage continued, the *JP* developed two main themes: criticism of the government of President Megawati, and the economic consequences of the bombings. In its coverage, the *JP* failed to address various aspects, such as the conditions of taxi drivers, street beggars and prostitutes in Kuta in addition to the tourism industry's exploitation of religious sites and symbols. These were serious omissions, especially considering that given its geographic location, the newspaper was in a good position to present a broad-ranging view of the bombings instead of following the tendency of the international media and foreign governments.

The *NST*'s coverage portrayed Malaysia as a safe country and insisted that the government can handle the terrorism threat ('Najib – We can handle terrorism threat', *NST*, 22 October 2002, p.4), while stressing that the police would take action against anyone who represented a threat to national security. It appeared that the *NST*'s emphasis changed over time from exploitation of the entertainment industry in Bali (Rashid, R., *NST*, 16 October 2002, p.10) to a broad discourse on national security ('Dr. Ling advises local port, airport managements to tighten security', *NST*, 21 October 2002, p.4), including the threat to racial harmony ('Be alert at all times, advises MB', *NST*, 21 October 2002, p.4). The bombings in Bali were also linked to

the need to combat criminal acts in parts of Malaysia ('Police tightening security at foreign-owned places', *NST*, 16 October 2002, p.15).

Only three days into the coverage, the incidents in Bali slipped to the inside pages and the *NST* started to focus on terrorism, tourism, investment and threats to Malaysian national security, particularly from members of KMM. The newspaper reflected foreign officials' criticism of Indonesia as the weakest link in the fight against terror, and praised good governance and the use of the Internal Security Act in Malaysia and Singapore. It was not clear what caused this shift in tone, from discussing social exploitation and the possibility that the bombings were an act of local vengeance to a broad discourse on terrorism and warnings that "soft-peddling the terrorism threat in the name of democratic reform and civil liberties would be folly" ('Prevention better than cure', *NST*, 15 October 2002, p.10).

While Malaysian officials were urging the international community to address the root causes of terrorism the Malaysian government was stepping up internal security and empowering the executive to deal with any threat to racial harmony and national security. The *NST* appears to have ignored this.

The *NST* spread its stories around various sections of the newspaper, thus avoiding the sense that there was a crisis.

As a weekly magazine with more time to elaborate on its coverage, *Tempo* provided plenty of information about the recent history of violence in Indonesia in its special edition. *Tempo* was critical of Megawati and attributed the violence to 'fundamentalism'. It focused on the impact of the blasts on the country's economy and reproduced different views on counterterrorism laws and the effect on human rights and religious groups. The magazine reproduced different analyses of the

possible perpetrators and the causes of the blasts. Despite addressing the possible involvement of *JI* in the bombings, the magazine did not produce a discourse on religion. It directly addressed various topics that the *JP* ignored, such as the exploitation by the tourism industry of religious sites and symbols in Bali, and took into account other victims such as the beggars, prostitutes and taxi drivers ignored by the *JP*.

The *ST* coverage of the Bali bombings was the most connected to the official line of interpretation of the facts. The *NST*, normally considered a government mouthpiece, demonstrated to have some independence between the official line of interpretation of the facts and its editorial. In addition, the newspaper reproduced different views from sources within the government.

In contrast, the *JP* was keen to stress the weakness of the government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri and the failure of Indonesia's intelligence agency. The newspaper appears to have followed the international interpretation of the facts. *Tempo* magazine, with time to work on the coverage, produced detailed information and gave the stories a local understanding of the situation.

## Chapter Four: Marriott Hotel Bombing

The JW Marriott Hotel bombing occurred in 5 August 2003. It happened nine months after the Bali bombings (12 October 2002) and two days before a court in Jakarta was due to deliver its verdict on the first three dozen suspects on trial for bombing the Bali nightclubs. In the Marriott Hotel bombing 11 people were killed and 150 injured. Initial reports counted 14 people dead, a number reduced to 12 and then 11 in the following days.

### 4.1 Coverage of the Marriott Hotel Bombing: *Straits Times*

The *Straits Times* (ST) reported on the Marriott Hotel bombing as the result of violence and revenge in Indonesia. The headline “14 dead in JI terror strike” already attributed blame. Official sources of information and the newspaper described the hotel as a prime target for terrorism because foreigners and Americans used the place. The initial reporting described the explosion as caused by a car bomb and JI ‘operatives’ allegedly claimed responsibility (Pereira, D., *ST*, 6 August 2003, p.1).

The revenge theory alleged in the stories was based on a message by a JI operative telling the *ST* that, “this is a message for her [Megawati] and all our enemies that, if they execute any of our Muslim brothers, we will continue this campaign of terror in Indonesia and the region” (Pereira, D. *ST*, 6 August 2003, p.1; Pereira, D., *ST*, 10 August 2003, p.15).

The *ST* then interviewed experts who validate the assumption that JI members who escaped a police dragnet could be behind the attack (Rekhi, S., *ST*, 6 August

2003, p.6). While in its initial account the newspaper quoted a JI ‘operative’ as saying the attack was a warning to Megawati, it elsewhere expressed less certainty, saying it “appears to be a classic JI operation” (Pereira, D., *ST*, 6 August 2003, p.4). It is against this background that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the connection between violence and religion, and the victims.

#### **4.1.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Straits Times***

The newspaper assumed that the bombing was an act of terrorism, specifically of revenge, and a warning to the Indonesian government and to the United States over its ‘war against terror’.

##### **4.1.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The *ST* gave the terrorists’ names and background, such as Indonesian Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir (alleged leader of JI in Southeast Asia; in prison at the time of the attack), Hambali (alleged mastermind of al Qaeda’s campaign of bombings in Southeast Asia), Azahari and Noordin (alleged Malaysian bomb experts); the extensive list of names included those of Zulkarmen and Dul Matin, who were characterized as al-Qaeda and JI ‘operatives’.

The newspaper used labels such as ‘Muslim extremists’, ‘radicals’, ‘Islamic extremists’, ‘Islamic radicals’, ‘bombers’ and ‘Afghan alumni’ (Pereira, D., *ST*, 8 August 2003, p.1; Pereira, D., *ST*, 10 August 2003, p.15; ‘To fight terror’, *ST*, 11 August 2003, p.12). The *ST* introduced a new categorization, ‘foreign infidels, to refer to people assumed to have been the target of the attack (Asmarani, D., *ST*, 9 August 2003, p. A1).



The identification of terrorists was mainly done through official sources of information within the Indonesian police and intelligence, while Australian officials identified JI as synonymous with terrorism (*Associated Press & Agence France Presse*, World Condemns Attack', *ST*, 6 August 2003, p.8).

#### **4.1.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The stories gave the impression that the bombing at the entrance of the Marriott Hotel was a reaction to the trial of the Bali bombers and the cleric Bashir. This supposition was based on information released by Indonesian police, who cited Amrozi's 'disclosure' during the confession. Amrozi was one of the three dozens people on trial for the Bali bombings.

The newspaper described the motive for the attack as establishing a Pan-Islamic state in the region, while Australian scholars said "JI's aim was to destabilize President Megawati Sukarnoputri's government" and "the attack on the hotel is clearly aimed at hitting the economy" (Rekhi, S., *ST*, 6 August 2003,p.6). Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer was quoted as saying, "more attacks in Indonesia might be imminent" (Pereira, D., *ST*, 7 August 2003, p.1). Since the Bali bombings Australian Federal Police had been working with Indonesia in the fight against terrorism. The *ST* reported on a JI 'operative' who "called the *ST*'s office in Jakarta" to claim responsibility for the attack (Pereira, D., *ST*, 7 August 2003, p. A1).

#### 4.1.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion

Although the attack was linked to JI, the emphasis was put on the cleric Abu Bakar Bashir as belonging to a “hardline Muslim group” (*Agence France Presse*, ‘Hardline Muslim group retains Bashir as leader’, *ST*, 13 August 2003, p. A6) and “the spiritual leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah [sic] terrorist network.” (Pereira, D., *ST*, 8 August 2003, p.1). The attack was linked to religion through the story ‘Radicals losing moral ground with moderate Muslim groups’ [sic] (Pereira, D. *ST*, 8 August 2003, p. A3).

The connection with religion was also made through photographs of the alleged Bali bombers and prisoners Amrozi and Samudra, and a story in which Samudra allegedly said, he “I am happy, especially if the perpetrators were Muslims” (*Associated Press*, *ST*, 7 August 2003, p. A4; ‘Praise from Aussie Press’, *ST*, 9 August 2003, p. A6).

The *ST* linked religion and violence in its editorial ‘To fight terror’ saying, “Muslim extremists do not only target people and hurt fellow Muslims in the process, but they also try to sow the seeds of distrust between Muslims and others in South-east Asia. Religious harmony must be protected from those who are out to destroy a fundamental strength of Asean” (To fight terror, *ST*, 11 August 2003, p.12). In another article, ‘S’poreans know blast not linked to religion, the newspaper reproduced the views of a government official saying the terrorist act in Indonesia had nothing to do with any religion. The *ST* quoted the official saying, “the community must also do its part to counter the JI’s violent and extremist ideology, which is deeply entrenched among its members” (Osman, A., *ST*, 8 August 2003, p. A5).

In the *ST*’s story ‘Abdullah vows zero tolerance for extremist groups’, the Malaysian official Abdullah Ahmad Badawi promised to “clamp down hard on

terrorism and extremism while promoting Islam as a religion of peace” (Osman, S., *ST*, 9 August 2003, p. A17). The *ST* also produced an op-ed story on whether Islam is compatible with modernity (Latif, A. *ST*, 19 August 2003, p.15).

#### **4.1.1.4 The Victims**

The *ST* newspaper gave extensive coverage to Singaporeans who suffered injuries (Mulchand, A, *ST*, 7 August 2003, p.1). The Indonesian survivors were mentioned, but the focus was on those who were flown for medical treatment to Singapore; four Singaporeans and four foreigners who suffered up to 33 per cent burns were treated at Singapore General Hospital (Hooi, A. & Vijayan, K.C., *ST*, 7 August 2003, pg. A3; Hooi, A. *ST*, 8 August 2003, p. A3). The local angle included a story of how a Singaporean couple was “living with terror” in Jakarta (Asmarani, D., *ST*, 10 August 2003, p.3).

#### **4.1.2 Insight**

In its editorial ‘Lessons of the blast’, the *ST* treated at face value the allegation that Abu Bakar Bashir was the “ideological head” of JI (*ST*, 7 August 2003, p.16). It also speculated on the speed of recruitment to JI and on how “dangerously driven are these people?” (ibid) in a reference to the alleged people associated with Bashir (*Agence France Presse*, ‘Suspect attended Bashir’s school’, *ST*, 11 August 2003, p.A5; Pereira, D., *ST*, 11 August 2003, p.1). The newspaper reported on the wisdom of eye-for-an eye retribution in the case of the Islamic militants facing trial and possibly execution.

The *ST* referred to a telephone call received by the *ST*'s Indonesia bureau chief Derwin Pereira hours after the Marriott Hotel bombing, apparently from a JI source, warning that the group would wage a “campaign of terror in Indonesia and in the region” if “Muslim brothers were executed”. In the first person account, the journalist disclosed how he convinced a “long-standing and well-placed informant in Indonesia”, and how he pressed the “informant to link me up with this elusive JI source to call me”, to talk about key leadership changes in JI and plans for new attacks in Indonesia and the region (Pereira, D., *ST*, 7 August 2003, p. A1). The journalist appears to be exercising a type of investigative journalism, which goes beyond the role of a correspondent in a foreign country.

The Marriott Hotel bombing coverage then turned to public diplomacy with the newspaper in its editorial column asking, “what more could be done to anticipate and thwart these hits?” In the editorial ‘Lessons of the blast’ the newspaper provided the answer by stating, “Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore have to find new ways to raise the quality of intelligence gathering and sharing”. The *ST* also suggested that the “infiltration of terrorist cells is a new operational demand for which the right personnel have to be found” (‘Lessons of the blast’, *ST*, 7 August 2003, p.16).

The reporting was interlaced with warnings issued by Australian and American government officials on new attacks in Indonesia. Indonesian officials, in response to international pressure, also cited the possibility of new attacks. But the *ST* prejudged Indonesian initiatives saying, “security stepped up, but authorities not yet ready to introduce detention without trial for terrorism suspects” (Pereira, D., *ST*, 7 August 2003, p.1). Here there is an assumption that detention is the correct response to terrorism.

The *ST* repeated its call for tough laws in Indonesia to deal with the threats of terrorism. The newspaper reproduced the view expressed by Indonesian Coordinating Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who said a presidential decree would permit detention if national security was at risk and “the lives of innocent persons are worth more than the price of human rights”. In an editorial, the newspaper agreed, saying, “Indonesia can proceed with a clear conscience, despite its post-Suharto liberalising instincts. This is war” (Pereira, D., *ST*, 7 August 2003, p.1; ‘Lessons of the blast’, *ST*, 7 August 2003, p.16).

As with the coverage of the Bali bombings, the newspaper in an attempt to transfer values and practices across borders, it said that the “Internal Security Act (ISA) used in Singapore and Malaysia allows indefinite detention of suspects deemed a threat to national security” (Pereira, D., *ST*, 12 August 2003, p.1). However, the writer, Derwin Pereira, reported on his own prejudgment saying, “Indonesia might not be ready as yet for an ISA equivalent. What could be accomplished at this stage would be adding teeth to existing laws” (Pereira, D., *ST*, 19 August 2003, p. A1). The journalist is not only adding his views to the story, he is also assuming that Indonesia is not ready to have stiff laws to deal with allegedly suspect terrorists while suggesting what should be done.

In its editorial ‘To fight terror’ (*ST*, 11 August 2003, p.12), the *ST* reinforced the view that the answer to terrorism was to combine prevention with punishment. Then it said, “Given terrorism’s reach, prevention is a truly international effort”. It appeared that the *ST* had a campaign not only to transfer values and norms across borders, but also to interfere in another country’s policy formulation.

The *ST* admitted that Indonesia's neighbours had a direct stake in the Indonesian anti-terror campaign, saying, "Singapore and Malaysia will welcome any tightening of its security structure that would disrupt terrorists plots and recruitments" [sic]. The editorial 'A law for the times' warned, "There should be safeguards written into the statute. The military and the police need to show the law will not be used to silence government critics and activists" ('A law for the times', *ST*, 13, August 2003, p.16). It is ironic that the *ST* produced this view, since the ISA is widely used in Singapore for various reasons, including political ones, which Amnesty International would not have condoned.

In a morbid story, 'More Grief on Sunday?', the newspaper predicted that more people would die in possible attacks during Indonesia's Independence Day celebrations. The reporting suggested a list of possible targets. Citing anonymous Indonesian police sources, the *ST* speculated, "the strike might [sic] come not just from the Jemaah Islamiah, but also from the Free Aceh Movement". The Australian government was also quoted as warning that "Aug 17 could be the day of another terrorist attack" (Asmarani, D., *ST*, 12 August 2003, p. A1). Despite the fact that one cannot report on what has not happened yet, but, subsequently, there were more stories on possible further attacks and the threat of terrorists remaining high (Go, R., *ST*, 14 August 2003, p. A3).

The article was followed by an extensive number of stories on 'terror in Indonesia', filled with details on a special cell of JI that was responsible for the Marriott attack, including the alleged suicide bomber Asmar Latin Sani.

In relating the blast in Jakarta to the Singapore context, the newspaper published a story 'Calm or resigned to threat of terror?' reproducing the views of people in the

business and tourism sectors. The *ST* interviewed 50 people in Singapore who “felt the explosion would either have no impact or only a marginal impact on the economy here”. Singaporeans “felt the chances of a similar attack happening here were remote due to its [Singapore’s] tight security measures.” (Wong, K., *ST*, 7 August 2003, p. A2).

In contrast, the story ‘Can this happen in Singapore?’ answered the question in its title by explaining that Singapore was a major target, not only because of its links with the United States but also because of its success against JI. It said, “Singapore remains a potential terrorism target not least because of its close links with the United States, but also because of its success against Al-Qaeda’s Jemaah Islamiah (JI) network here” (Nirmala, M., & Teo, L. *ST*, 7 August 2003, p.3). It appears the story was making reference to the arrest of a group of men suspected of terrorism activities.

The *ST* localised the Marriott Hotel bombing turning to national pride and patriotism with the “nation puts Sars, terror and economic gloom behind it and celebrates” (Tan, W., *ST*, 10 August 2003, p.1). The newspaper created an exaggerated sense of alertness with a focus on security measures taken for the National Day parade. It stressed the high level of security in Singapore and the public and government leaders’ resolve that life goes on with or without terrorism. The newspaper reported on increased security measures at a public housing development in Toa Payoh Central, and on alerts in malls, hotels and institutions such as the American Chamber of Commerce and international schools.

The Marriott Hotel blast was also addressed in the context of religion and race in Singapore. The *ST* reported, “Singaporeans know the blast is not linked to religion” (Osman, A., *ST*, 8 August 2003, p. A5). It added that the attack should not turn a

spotlight on the Malay/Muslim community, while Singaporeans should not be alarmed that a study by the National Institute of Education had found there was a low level of interracial mixing in neighbourhood primary schools. But the *ST* examined the Malay community in articles such as ‘Emerging role of religion in Malaysian politics’ and discussed the “Arabisation” [sic] of Malay culture”, saying, “is perhaps not surprising, given that more [sic] 100,000 Malaysian Muslims have in recent years studied at Middle Eastern and Pakistani religious schools” (Devan, J., *ST*, 8 August 2003, p.24).

The Marriott Hotel bombing gave rise to a variety of stories on subjects such as threats to Singapore, Bashir, and the need for strong law in Indonesia, the Jemaah Islamiyah special cell, and the capture of Hambali in Thailand. The newspaper reported extensively on Singaporeans injured in the blast and on Indonesian victims brought to Singapore for medical treatment. The latter reporting was in line with Singapore’s plan to become a regional medical hub, as pointed out in chapter five.

The newspaper also carried emotional accounts by Singaporean and Indonesian survivors and eyewitnesses. The newspaper produced the title ‘we miss his laughter’ in a story about how a Singaporean enjoyed cooking and “now is in an intensive care unit in Singapore’ (Hooi, A., *ST*, 9 August 2003, p. A2). Indonesian casualties were absent from the stories, except in the case of a few photographs published.

#### **4.2 Coverage of the Marriott Hotel Bombing: *Jakarta Post***

The bombing in the centre of Jakarta in August 2003 was Indonesia’s second largest attack against an international target. It happened less than a year after the Bali bombings in October 2002, and occurred in the middle of trials of suspects linked to



those explosions. Indonesian officials linked the bombing to the Jemaah Islamiyah group immediately after the blast while the *JP* blamed the government for “its laid-back attitude towards the threat of terrorism” (‘Terrorists strike again’, *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.6).

#### **4.2.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Jakarta Post***

In the coverage of the hotel bombing, the *JP* conceived of terrorism as a threat to national stability and to security, whereas the Bali bombing had only been thought of as a threat to the economy. The idea of terrorism was expanded to produce a sense of national and patriotic involvement among the public.

Terrorism was also conceptualised as inspired in the Osama bin Laden’s brand of Islam; to a large extent this relied on labelling provided by the story ‘Al-Qaeda brand of terror wins Asian recruits: Experts’, written by Jane Macartney from Reuters news agencies (Macartney, J., *JP*, 9 August 2003, p.3). The *JP* used Western newswires extensively to cover the incident, in addition to its staff writers. Editors argued that since the *JP* subscribes to these wire services, why not use their stories? It is against this background that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the connection between religion and violence, and the victims.

##### **4.2.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The images of terrorists became more specific with names of suspects provided by police sources appearing in the pages of the *JP* (Siboro, T., *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.2;

Hakim, Z., & Ntoma, R. KD. *JP*, 10 August 2003, p.1; Harsanto, D., & Unidjaja, F.D., *JP*, 11 August 2003, p.1; 'Asmar graduated from Ngruki school', *JP*, 11 August 2003, p.2; Harsanto, D., *JP*, 13 August 2003, p.1; 'Police complete preliminary reconstruction of Marriott blast', *JP*, August 14, 2003, p.2; Harsanto, D., *JP*, 15 August 2003, p.1; Harsanto, D., *JP*, 16 August 2003, p.2).

The concept of terrorists had evolved from an abstract concept to a group of people to individual faces, e.g., Hambali, Asmar, Azahari, Sani, Tohir and so forth. Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono also expanded the perception of terrorists by citing the "it [the bombing] could have been perpetrated by JI or Acehese separatists, or other parties, including communists" (Siboro, T., *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.2).

Government and police officers quickly linked the bombers to JI and later to the Bali bombings (Harsanto, D., & Siboro, T., *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.1; Siboro, T., *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.2; Siboro, T., *JP*, 8 August 2003, p.3), although at first the Coordinator Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhono, was careful to call the bombers 'perpetrators' (1Govt condemns blast as calls mount for immediate action', *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.3), making the point that it was not clear yet who was responsible for the Marriott Hotel blast.

The *JP* was also careful in attributing the responsibility of the bombing. In its story 'Indonesia gets world support in blast aftermath', the newspaper reported on the bombers as 'perpetrators' (*JP*, 7 August 2003, p.3). The newspaper also used 'perpetrators' in its editorial ('Terrorists strike again', *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.6), but reproduced stories from agencies saying "new warnings from U.S. authorities that Islamic extremists were planning new attacks in the region" ('RI, Australia plan

counterterrorism summit- Downer', *JP*, 11 August 2003, p.3); the newspaper also reproduced one article from the newspaper *The New York Times*, where terrorists were called 'criminals' ('We must fight rampant crimes', *JP*, 11 August 2003, p.6). However, as the coverage stretched into weeks, the newspaper became less careful about assigning blame.

Once police and government officials determined that JI was behind the blast (Harsanto, D., *JP*, 15 August 2003, p.1), and the police began to arrest people alleged to be related to JI (Hakim, Z, & Ntoma, R. KD., *JP*, 10 August 2003, p.1; Harsanto, D., & Unidjaja, F.D., *JP*, 11 August 2003, p.1), the newspaper did not question whether people arrested in the sweep could be innocent, as some later proved to be. In the same way, it did not challenge the idea that JI was responsible for the Marriott Hotel bombing, instead accepting this as fact.

#### **4.2.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The newspaper not only blamed Megawati's administration for the attack – "another failure of the government's intelligence", "the government is at fault for its laid-back attitude towards terrorism", "government has been caught napping" ('Terrorists strike again', *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.6) – but also lashed out against her personally in the story 'Megawati breaks Marriott silence, kind of' (*JP*, 9 August 2003, p.1). In its editorial 'Only a panic reaction' the *JP* said, "the impact of Tuesday's terrorist bombing should not be exaggerated. But complacency and a laid-back attitude, expecting that things would automatically become normal again, is not well advised either" ('Only a panic reaction', *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.6).

The newspaper also published stories based on interviews with analysts and legislators criticising the government for not doing enough to fight terror (Taufiqurrahman, M. & Suryana, A., *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.3). The story 'Making Jakarta a home for the wary', the *JP* reproduced further criticism: "the central problem is not the intelligence agencies, but the government. It's the government that has been caught napping and let these things happen" (Susanti, I, *JP*, 10 August 2003, p.1).

The newspaper cited Indonesian authorities' concern that the bombing might be related to the trials of the Bali bombing suspects and their spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir as a way to intimidate the court ahead of the verdict (Siboro, T., *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.2; Unidjaja, F.D., & Gunawan, A., *JP*, 10 August 2003, p.1).

The blaming game for the failure to prevent the bombing took centre stage in the stories, with officials blaming the police, the intelligence agencies or security officers (Muninggar, S.S., *JP*, 9 August 2003, p.2; 'Opposition grows to government-proposed draconian security law', *JP*, 13 August 2003, p.1; 'Govt may revise terror law', *JP*, 14 August 2003, p.1). The newspaper lashed out at the lack of good governance and lack of coordination among the various agencies ('A 'pansus' on Marriott?', *JP*, 12 August 2003, p.2).

#### **4.2.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

One piece of evidence that the bombing was linked to religion was that the suspects, according to official sources, belonged to JI. Another connection of violence with faith came from the Australian Prime Minister John Howard who said, "terrorism is

as much an enemy of Islam as it is of other religions” (Longmore, M., *JP*, 11 August 2003, p.3).

The newspaper also reproduced allusions to “bin Laden’s brand of Islam” and “schooled in Muslim madrassas” (Macartney, J., *JP*, 9 August 2003, p.3). A Sydney-dated story from news agencies said, “Islamic extremists were planning new attacks in the region” (‘RI, Australia plan counterterrorism summit: Downer’, *JP*, 11 August 2003, p.3). The *JP* reported on religious leaders’ objections to the use of the term “Muslim terrorists” by foreign media and their displeasure with the “increasing attempts to equate Islam with terror following the attack on the JW Marriott Hotel” (Kurniawan, M., *JP*, 16 August 2003, p.4).

Both experts and politicians guided readers to the assumption that there was a link between violence and religion. The assumptions were ‘built in’ rather than directly stated (Simonov, V., *JP*, 9 August 2003, p.7; ‘The Jakarta bombing’, *JP*, 11 August 2003, p.6; Kurniawan, M. N., *JP*, 15 August 2003, p.2).

#### **4.2.1.4 The Victims**

The *JP* had many stories on the victims, who were mostly taxi drivers and security guards working at or around the hotel. Eyewitnesses’ accounts were made into narratives, together with the views of relatives of the victims, stating their distrust of the police and that the Suharto period was better (‘Bringing terrorists to court is waste of time’, *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.8).

The human stories did not reach the level of sensationalism or melodrama, but they were enough to reveal the suffering of ordinary Indonesians caught in the

violence. There was only one foreigner among the fatalities in the bombing; the newspaper reported on this fact without sensationalizing it. Nevertheless, the newspaper could have provided a better service by addressing issues such as the fact that the Indonesian government would pay for local victims' hospital expenses ('My poor boy! He had three children', *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.1; 'Compensation for terror victims', *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.4). It appeared that neither the relatives of the victims nor the hospitals' administrators were aware of the government's initiative.

#### **4.2.2 Insight**

Many controversial topics appeared in the pages of the newspaper but for reasons that remained unclear were not pursued. A number of possible causes of the violence appeared in various stories: to challenge the government; to strike against Western interests as the Marriott Hotel is an avenue for political and social events held by Australians and the Americans in Jakarta; to strike a blow against US interests; religious fanaticism; social and political grievances among young Muslims; and social and economic inequalities. But the newspaper chose to maintain the line that the attack mainly happened because of lack of coordination among the government agencies in the fight against terrorism and the ineptitude of the government.

The explosion was the fifth bombing to rock the capital in 2003 but the only one to have wide repercussions since it was the first bomb to claim lives since the Bali bombings (Taufiqurrahman, M., & Suryana, A., *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.3). The *JP* reproduced the opinion of Ivy Susanti that "terrorist bombings have become the fashion in Indonesia in the post Soeharto era" (Susanti, I., *JP*, 10 August 2003, p.1).

At least 21 bombs blasts had rocked the country since January 1998, which killed 21 people and injured more than 250 (Taufiqurrahman, M., & Suryana, A. *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.3), excluding the Bali bombings. Despite the chain of blasts, rebuilding confidence of the international community became a major public issue with the Marriott Hotel explosion ('Terrorists strike again', *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.6; 'Only a panic reaction', *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.6). The way to build the confidence was to quickly arrest the perpetrators ('Indonesia gets world support in blast aftermath', *JP*, 7 August 7, 2003, p.3).

The newspaper reproduced and did not challenge the official line that the suspects in the Marriott Hotel bombing were linked to the Bali blasts ('Most Marriott suspects linked to Bali blast, other bombings', *JP*, 19 August 2003, p.1). Its reporting based on information from anonymous police source had the function of consolidating the international view of terrorism in Indonesia.

Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono started calling upon the population to participate in the fight against terrorism, "public must help police hunt down the perpetrators and pass on information to the security authorities" ('Govt condemns blast as calls mount for immediate action', *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.3). The *JP* reproduced the [then] minister's request for "the public to cooperate with the police to maintain security" (Taufiqurrahman, M., & Harsono, D., *JP*, 14 August 2003, p.1). A former general who served during the Suharto era, the minister argued that human rights became less important in the fight against terrorism, "The government will impose these restrictions as we are determined to prevent the deaths of more victims. Their lives are worth more than the price of human rights" ('Terrorists strike again', *JP*, 6 August

2003, p.1). One year later, in 2004, Yudhoyono became the first popularly elected president of the Republic of Indonesia.

Foreign governments helped turn the Marriott Hotel bombing into a case of international terrorism by announcing new threats in Indonesia, issuing travel warnings and cancelling social functions. In doing so, the US and Australian governments demonstrated a lack of confidence in Indonesia even though they were collaborating with Indonesian police in the investigations of the Marriott Hotel and the Bali bombings (Longmore, M., *JP*, 11 August 2003, p.3; Taufiqurrahman, M. & Muninggar, S.S., *JP*, 12 August 2003, p.2; ‘Australian military to renew ties with Indonesia’s Kopassus’, *JP*, 12 August 2003, p.3.; *Agence France Presse*, ‘Another terror attack certain, Australia spy chief warns’, *JP*, 13 August 2003, p.11; Taufiqurrahman, M., & Harsanto, D., *JP*, 14 August 2003, p.1; Unidjaja, F.D., *JP*, 15 August 2003, p.3).

The Indonesian Head of the Anti-Terror desk at the Office of the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Insp. Gen. Ansjaad Mbai, said, “we [the government] do not mean to create panic, but the people have to realize that their families or friends, or even themselves, could become the victims of these acts of terror” (Siboro, T., *JP*, 8 August 2003, p.3).

The newspaper published stories quoting a variety of people who endorsed and reaffirmed such warnings. This technique created anxiety, fear and uncertainty among the population but strengthened the authorities’ (military, police, intelligence) efforts to pass a “draconian law to pre-empt terrorist strikes” (Kurniawan, H., & Unidjaja, F.D., *JP*, 12 August 2003, p.1; Taufiqurrahman, M., & Harsanto, D., *JP*, 14 August 2003, p.1).



Amid the criticism of poor coordination between security agencies and their failure to prevent the Marriott Hotel bombing, the government announced it would give more power to TNI, the Indonesian military, to thwart further attacks and to detect and find possible terror threats that needed an immediate response ('Govt may revise terror law', *JP*, 14 August 2003, p.1; Muninggar, S., S., *JP*, 15 August 2003, p.1). The government was bringing back the military to the pre-reform era. The newspaper did raise some concerns about this, saying

"it is disturbing to learn that many senior government officials are now calling for the introduction of draconian legislation similar to Malaysia's or Singapore's Internal Security Act as a way of dealing with the threat of terrorism. Has it not occurred to them that the problem is not so much the lack of legislation, but more the incompetence, probably uncoordinated, work of our many intelligence agencies?" ('A 'pansus' on Marriott?', *JP*, 12 August 2003, p.6).

The Marriott Hotel bombing coverage was combined with stories on the trials of the Bali bombers, the arrest in Thailand of the "terrorism mastermind Hambali" ('Top JI operative captured in Thailand', *JP*, 16 August 2003, p.1; Unidjaja, F. D., *JP*, 17 August 2003, p.1), and links between the Marriott Hotel bombers and the Bali suspects ('Most Marriott suspects linked to Bali blast, other bombings', *JP*, 19 August 2003, p.1). The *JP* reported on *Dow Jones* quoting the *Los Angeles Times* as saying, "Indonesian police officials had issued warnings to at least seven US companies because their names were found in papers uncovered during a raid on the house of suspected JI members in Semarang, Central Java ('Govt to boost security in vital projects', *JP*, 14 August 2003, p.13). The *JP* mentioned the information as part of a story but failed to question why Indonesian police apparently provided first-hand information to international media and not to local media.

Another example involved the *ST*, which reported that JI had claimed responsibility for the Marriott Hotel bombing (Harsanto, D., *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.1). The *Jakarta Post* did not bother to question how the Singaporean daily obtained the information or to verify the information published by the *ST*. Except for the mention of the National Police detective's chief Inspector Gen. Erwin Mapasseng saying he [the inspector] was surprised to learn about the report carried out by Singaporean daily, the *JP* ignored the issue.

The same kind of attitude was shown when the Australian government announced it would renew co-operation with the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) to help fight terrorism ('Australian military to renew ties with Indonesia's Kopassus', *JP*, 12 August 2003, p.3). The *JP*'s reporting of the announcement was based on stories from foreign news agency that barely mentioned the close ties between the Australian and Indonesian armed forces during the 1990s under Suharto's authoritarian regime. Nor did the *JP* take the opportunity to discuss the close ties between the Indonesian military and radical groups in the past.

The *JP* reported on the impact of the Marriott Hotel bombing on the economy but did not make an issue of it. In fact, economic analysts were reported claiming the impact of the bombing was expected to be limited ('Only a panic reaction', *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.6; Perdana, A.A., *JP*, 8 August 2003, p.3; Wijaksana, D., *JP*, 11 August 2003, p.1; Wijaksana, D., *JP*, 12 August 2003, p.3).

The *JP* relied mostly on information provided by politicians, police, Indonesian and Australian government officials, international specialists and foreign news agencies. It also included eyewitnesses and relatives' accounts in the stories related to

the victims. Although the bombing occurred in Jakarta, where the newspaper is located, the *JP* also used stories related to the bombing from international news agencies (e.g. ‘Indonesia gets world support in blast aftermath’, *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.3; ‘Bali verdict raises fears of new attacks’, *JP*, 8 August 2003, p.11; Macartney, J., *JP*, 9 August 2003, p.3; ‘RI, Australia plan counterterrorism summit: Downer’, *JP*, 11 August 2003:3; ‘Australian military to renew ties with Indonesia’s Kopassus’, *JP*, 12 August 2003, p.3).

#### **4.3 Coverage of the Marriott Hotel Bombing: *New Straits Times***

The *NST*’s initial coverage of the bombing at the Marriott Hotel assumed as an established fact that al-Qaeda was responsible for the attack. At the same time, reproducing Indonesian official views, the blast was linked to the Bali bombings and to JI. The *NST*’s reporting portrayed the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir as the spiritual leader of JI (‘US authorities tracking Hambali since 1995’, *NST*, 16 August 2003, p.4), and ‘Hambali, the terrorist mastermind’ as the ‘second-in-command’ linking al-Qaeda and JI (‘Hambali caught in Thailand’, *NST*, 16 August 2003, p.1).

##### **4.3.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *New Straits Times***

The newspaper reported on the concept of terrorism as a threat to security represented by Islamic militants. Former Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, now the Prime Minister, was reported as saying “terrorism would not be terrorism if it did not have a political motive” (‘Abdullah – Address political dimension of terrorism’, *NST*, 8 August 2003, p.4). It is against this background that the four main

subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, connection between violence and religion, and the victims.

#### **4.3.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The *NST* reproduced the views of Indonesian officials’ claim that the group *JI* was responsible for the Marriott Hotel bombing. A few names were mentioned such as Asmar Latin Sani, Sartono Siliwangi, Muhamad Raiz, Abu Bakar Bashir, Azahari Hussin, and Hambali as the alleged suspects in the bombing and the masterminds of the attack. The newspaper reproduced the labels such as ‘radical Islamists’ (‘The beating heart of global terror’, *NST*, 9 August 2003, p.10), and ‘Islamic militants’ (Ahmad, A., *NST*, 13 August 2003, p.10).

#### **4.3.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The *NST* took a global view to indicate what is the motivation for the violence. In its editorial ‘Jakarta jolt’, it said, “no punitive measure will really be able to stop acts of terrorism by militants unless the roots of the problem which foster their mindless messianic zeal are addressed” (‘Jakarta jolt’, *NST*, 7 August 2003, p.12). Throughout the reporting, the need for a political solution to the roots of terrorism was repeated (Ahmad, A., *NST*, 13 August 2003, p.10).

The *NST* reported on the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and American support of Israel as another cause for international terrorism (‘The beating heart of global terror’, *NST*, 9 August 2003, p.10). The newspaper did not report on any

particular reason for the Marriott bombing but mentioned that the Jemaah Islamiyah group's ambition is to create a Pan-Islamic state in the region.

#### **4.3.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The *NST* described the bombers as Muslims but at the same time recorded the observation made by Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi that, "terrorist activities by Islamic groups have nothing to do with Islam" ('Abdullah – Address political dimension of terrorism', *NST*, 8 August 2003, p.4). In its editorial 'Difficult passage', the newspaper reported on the American visa policies saying, "its basic premises is that everyone from Muslim countries is a potential terrorist" ('Difficult passage', *NST*, 6 August 2003, p.10).

#### **4.3.1.4 The Victims**

Except for a few stories noting that fewer than five Malaysians were injured in the blast while attending a course in the hotel, the newspaper did not report substantially on the victims (Joheng, J., *NST*, 6 August 2003, p.1; 'Only three Malaysians injured, says embassy', *NST*, 7 August 2003, p.2; David, A., *NST*, 8 August 2003, p.2).

#### **4.3.2 Insight**

The *NST*'s articles emphasized the need to address the roots of terrorism. However, the perspective on the roots of the violence was based on international issues, such as the Palestinian case, the Iraq invasion and the war in Afghanistan. The newspaper reproduced the official views that punitive and military measures alone cannot solve

the problem of terrorism. While the *NST* reproduced official views on the benefits of social control and the use of the Internal Security Act (ISA) in order to fight any threat to the country ('No adverse impact on economy, says PM', *NST*, 8 August 2003, p.2; 'Najib: Situation here well under control', *NST*, 10 August 2003, p.4), the newspaper failed to address the extensive use of the Internal Security Act as a punitive measure in Malaysia in a number of circumstances.

The newspaper reported on the increase of security operations and surveillance in the country to ensure that "incidents like Jakarta bomb blast did [sic] not occur in Malaysia" ('No adverse impact on economy, says PM', *NST*, 8 August 2003, p.2). The *NST* reproduced the official views on the need for increased sharing of intelligence in order to prevent crime and protect public safety, though the officials insisted that Malaysia is safe, because it has "a great track record in handling terror threats" ('Najib: Situation here well under control', *NST*, 10 August 2003, p.4).

The government's concern about the possibility of terrorism affecting the tourist industry was one of the highlights of the coverage (Ganesan, V., *NST*, 6 August 2003, p.6; 'Concerned tourism industry players meet to discuss impact of bombing', *NST*, 7 August 2003, p.2). In order to guarantee the tourist and investors confidence the newspaper reported on the increased security in ports and residential areas popular with foreigners ('Musa: Police and army on full alert following attack', *NST*, 7 August 2003, p.2; Joheng, J., *NST*, 10 August 2003, p.2). The *NST*'s reporting showed how authorities were blending measures to fight terrorism with police actions to prevent crime, such as "rounds in housing areas in order to determine ways to monitor crime activities" (Joheng, J., *NST*, 10 August 2003, p.2).

The newspaper dedicated space to stories reporting on the “atmosphere of insecurity” in certain sections of Jakarta, particularly the hospitality areas such as McDonald’s, hotels and shopping malls mostly used by the expatriate community (‘Life will never be the same for Jakarta after Marriott bombing’, *NST*, 10 August 2003, p.8). Superficially, the newspaper reported on the possibility of Indonesia considering the introduction of preventative detention laws to combat terrorism.

While speculating on the possibility of more terrorist strikes in Indonesia, the *NST* revealed but did not elaborate on the fact that Australian forensic experts arrived at the Marriott Hotel scene of the attack before Indonesian authorities (‘Indonesia bracing for more attacks’, *NST*, August 10, 2003, p.8).

The coverage of the Marriott Hotel bombing took a new turn with the arrest of Hambali, in Thailand. The *NST* provided detailed information on Hambali and reported on him as the ‘de facto’ leader of JI and an al-Qaeda representative in Southeast Asia (‘Hambali caught in Thailand’, *NST*, 16 August 2003, p.1; ‘US authorities tracking Hambali since 1995’, *NST*, 16 August 2003, p.4). The newspaper published detailed stories from wire services about the “clandestine operation in Thailand which saw him being whisked out from the country by the American agents to an undisclosed location” (‘Hambali caught in Thailand’, *NST*, 16 August 2003, p.1).

The *NST*’s reporting resembled that of the *ST* and the *JP* in reproducing officials’ calls to tighten security, collect better information, share intelligence and take tough action against alleged suspects, as well as governments’ travel warnings.

The *NST* did not use of a glossy style of communication to address the issue of terrorism as opposed to *ST*. The newspaper, however, repeated words and statements by the Malaysian authorities a few times. For example,

“terrorism is not a scourge that is easily wiped out. We can make life very difficult for terrorist elements, we can scatter them, we can cut of one head here and one tentacle there. But often the beast survives”. The statement was published in the editorial “Terrorism’s political motive” (*NST*, 8 August 2003, p.10); the remark was repeated word by word by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in the story “Answer terror with courage” (Ahmad, A. *NST*, 13 August 2003, p.10).

Officials were the main source of information and details of the bombing itself were emphasized less than stories that politicized the attacks within the context of international terrorism.

#### **4.4 Coverage of Marriott Hotel Bombing: *Tempo***

*Tempo* magazine reported on the Marriott Hotel bombing with the assumption that JI was responsible for the explosion. In its Opinion page the magazine addressed the view that the law should be applied to all people without exception including those involved in terrorism. The focus of the article was that repressive measures lead radical groups to become stronger and more violent (‘August 5, 2003’, *Tempo*, 12-19 August 2003, p.9).

The magazine published an interview with the foreign minister of Malaysia, Syed Hamid Albar, who declared, “terrorists cannot stir in Malaysia” since “we are always monitoring” and “ because we use preventive law”, in reference to the use of the Internal Security Act (ISA), (*Tempo*, 12-19 August 2003, p.42). *Tempo* had stories on



the trial of the “most infamous Bali bombing suspect Amrozi” (p.44). The reporting on the Marriott Hotel bombing extended to the capture of Hambali in the story “Dead end for Hambali.”

#### **4.4.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Tempo***

There was no clear conceptualization of terrorism in the coverage, but *Tempo* stated the radical groups must be viewed in the same way as “the flu; it can never be completely wiped out, but we must take steps to prevent the threat of becoming too great” (*Tempo*, 12-19 August 2003, p.9). It is against this background that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, connection between violence and religion, and the victims.

##### **4.4.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The images portrayed by the magazine were of members of JI, of Hambali and of Free Aceh Movement fighters, exploring the possibility that the latter were involved in the bombing. *Tempo*’s reporting revealed a list of names such as Mustofa, Ali Gufron, Abu Farouk, Suyono and so forth as suspected terrorists linked to the JI network. Asmar Latin Sani was described as the suicide bomber from a JI wing.

##### **4.4.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The bombing was described as a warning to President Megawati and Indonesian police, and as a consequence as a power struggle between competing Indonesian security agencies. *Tempo* reported, “On Tuesday last week, Singapore newspaper *The*

*Straits Times* received a call from a man claiming to speak for Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). He said the blast was a 'bloody warning' to President Megawati and the Indonesian police" ('A Bloody Warning to Megawati', *Tempo* 12-19 August 2003, p.18).

Exploring another possible cause for the violence *Tempo* cited an unidentified source, "A political analyst who requested anonymity said the Marriott bombing was only part of a power struggle in Indonesia, linking the blast to the annual session of the People's Consultative Assembly then in progress" (*Tempo*, 12-10 August 2003, p.18).

#### **4.4.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

*Tempo's* reporting on the Marriott Hotel bombing did not make any association between violence and religion. The few stances the magazine made reference to religion was in the article on Hambali. The magazine stated, "Malaysia police would not issue an arrest warrant for Hambali, as [he] Hambali was regarded as a religious figure there" ('Dead End for Hambali', *Tempo*, 12-19 August 2003, p.77).

Another connection with religion in the same story said,

"The Malaysian Police subsequently changed their position and Mahathir's government started taking a tough stance against the group known as the Malaysian Mujahidin Assembly. Many Islamic activists were arrested, charged with plotting subversive activities" ('Dead End for Hambali', *Tempo*, 12-19 August 2003, p.77).

#### **4.4.1.4 The Victims**

The magazine published various stories based on eyewitness accounts. The stories reported how Miss Indonesia 2002, Angeline Sondakh, had been modelling in front of the hotel, but finished her work before the blast; and gave the account of the Lebanese ambassador to Indonesia, who had been waiting for his lunch when the blast occurred. The story was based on people who escaped unscathed the bombing death. The injured did not appear in the reportage.

#### **4.4.2 Insight**

The coverage of the bombing appeared to be condensed from the daily newspapers. The difference was in *Tempo*'s opinion page, where the magazine lamented the death of innocent victims while at the same time making an appeal for “consistently applying the law to all people without exception including those involved in terrorism”. It also made the point that no nation had succeeded in completely eradicating terrorism, but nations have been capable of reducing the threats.

*Tempo* discussed the bombing as part of a chain of topics; for example, leaders of JI prepared explosives to bomb the Marriott Hotel, how a ‘JI suicide brigade’ fit into the group, and the relations between alleged bombers and accomplices. The magazine quoted Indonesian officials as identifying Asmar Latin Sani as the suspect suicide bomber. It did not link the bomber to any religion or faith.

The coverage touched but did not go deeply into the bombing as “a bloody warning to Megawati”. It noted that the *ST* had reportedly received a call from a man claiming to speak for JI and describing the attack as a warning to Megawati and the Indonesian police. The magazine suggested that besides JI, the Free Aceh Movement

“is another organization said to be involved in the recent rash of bombing attacks in Jakarta” (‘A Bloody Warning to Megawati’, 12-19 August 2003, p.18).

The magazine published lengthy stories on Hambali and the Bali bombing suspect, Amrozi. *Tempo* published the article ‘An ISA for Indonesia?’ with the Minister of Defence, Matori Abdu Djalil calling on the government to enact an Internal Security Act (ISA). In the same story the Minister of Justice & Human Rights, Yusrill Ihza Mahendra was quoted as saying, “we will not imitate Singapore and Malaysia”.

*Tempo*’s coverage of the Marriott Hotel bombing was rich with photo illustrations, sketches and comparative data about the Bali and the Marriott Hotel bombings. The reporting included grisly descriptions of the victims and details of a head claimed to belong to the suspected suicide bomber. It also had illustrations of the bombing site with maps of the area affected, and a list of the bomb explosions that had occurred in Indonesia in 2003. The magazine gave a gruesome description of the devastation caused by the bombing, and reported the possible existence of a coded text message about bombers “getting married” (p.17).

#### **4.5 Comparative Analysis**

The coverage of the Marriott Hotel bombing tilted towards the politicization of the event within the discourse on the Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda groups. As a consequence, the bombing was linked to the attacks against the nightclubs in Bali in the previous year and was described within the context of the global fight against terrorism. The newspapers *ST*, *JP* and *NST* and the news magazine *Tempo* quoted official sources as saying JI was behind the violence in Jakarta and in Bali.

Nevertheless, each newspaper presented different perspectives on the reasons for the bombing. The *ST* followed the explanation that the attack was part of JI's drive to create a Pan-Islamic state. It also repeated the explanation given by Australian officials that the bombing was to destabilize Megawati's administration (Rekhi, S., *ST*, 6 August 2003, p.6).

Meanwhile, the *JP* blamed the government's inability to fight terrorism and the lack of cooperation between Indonesian agencies ('Terrorists strike again', *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.6; Taufiqurrahman, M. & Suryana, A., *JP*, 6 August 2003, p.3; 'Only a panic reaction', *JP*, 7 August 2003, p.6). The newspaper was very critical of the government of President Megawati, and a determined defender of the need to build international confidence.

The *NST* produced the view that the cause of the attack was based on the failure to address the roots of terrorism, including the Afghanistan war, the Iraq war and the Palestinian problem ('Jakarta jolt', *NST*, 7 August 2003, p.12; 'The beating heart of global terror', *NST*, 9 August 2003, p.10; Ahmad. A., *NST*, 13 August 2003, p.10). However, the newspaper also focused on the importance of social control as a deterrent to terrorism.

In giving the advice that prevention combined with punishment were the answer to terrorism, the *ST* appeared to export values across Singapore's border ('To fight terror', *ST*, 11 August 2003, p.12). The *ST* was the only newspaper to publish interviews with 'well-placed' sources within JI, who discussed the changes in the group's leadership and new plans of attacks (Pereira, D., *ST*, 7 August 2003, p. A1).

The *ST* published extensive stories that kept readers on the alert against terrorist attacks and fostered an atmosphere of fear and anxiety. As in its previous coverage on

the Bali bombings, the newspaper subtly used the discourse on the victims brought to Singapore for medical treatment as a booster for the country's drive to become a regional medical centre.

Within the discourse of global 'war on terror' all the publications produced stories on the arrest of Hambali, the man who officials alleged to be the link in Southeast Asia between JI and al-Qaeda. There were stories on the reaction of Hambali's mother to the arrest and the possible involvement of Hambali's wife in terrorist activities (Quek, A., *ST*, 16 August 2003, p.1; Asmarani, D., *ST*, 22 August 2003, p. A4; *Associated Press*, 'The perfect family man', *ST*, 22 August 2003, p. A4; 'Nightmare thwarted', *NST*, 13 August 2003, p.10; 'Hambali caught in Thailand', *NST*, 16 August 2003, p.1; 'Top JI operative captured in Thailand', *JP*, 16 August 2003, p.1; 'Hambali's wife detained under new ISA', *NST*, 19 August 2003, p.7; 'They only knew Hambali as a religious teacher', *NST*, 21 August 2003, p.4; Unidjaja, F. D., *JP*, 17 August 2003, p.1; Unidjaja, F.D., & Kurniawan, M.N., *JP*, 19 August 2003, p.1; 'Malaysia detains terror suspect Hambali's wife under new law', *JP*, 19 August 2003, p.2).

There was no glossy style of communication observed in the *JP* and *NST* as there was in the *ST*, which predicted how many people would die in Indonesia during Indonesia Independence Day celebrations (Asmarani, D., *ST*, 12 August 2002, p. A1). Statements made in one of the *NST*'s editorial pieces were also used as part of the prime minister's speech ('Terrorism's political motive', *NST*, 8 August 2003, p.10; Ahmad. A., *NST*, 13 August 2003, p.10). *Tempo* used the most gruesome details in its stories, while the *ST* used the most shocking photo illustrations.

Overall, the Marriott Hotel bombing received extensive coverage whereas the Jakarta Stock Exchange bombing in 13 September 2000, which killed 15 people and injured 37, had received less coverage. One possible explanation is that the latter bombing was not linked to international terrorism but to local causes of social frustration. Tying the Marriott Hotel incident to the current frame of international terrorism has the effect of making the event seemed more consequential and more terrifying or threatening.

## Chapter Five: The Australian Embassy Bombing

The bombing near the building of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004 occurred in a context that influenced how it was covered. Indonesia was entering a period of political euphoria with the second round of the first-ever direct election for president just days away. Secondly, the bombing happened two days before the third anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Thirdly, the case of a single particular pitiable victim of the blast – a five-year old Indonesian girl – captured the public’s imagination and became a focus of press coverage. Nine people were killed, including the girl’s mother, and 180 people were injured in the bombing.

### 5.1 Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: *Straits Times*

The *ST*’s reporting on the bombing stressed the weakness of Indonesia’s legal framework in dealing with terrorists. The reporting was used to remind the *ST*’s readers that the “threat is ever-present in our own backyard” and “Singaporeans should be vigilant and look out for suspicious people or objects” (Jacob, P., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p. H17). The *ST*’s coverage also focused on the medical situation of the five-year-old child hurt in the blast, as well as the relationships of the girl’s mother with two foreign men (Chieh, L.H., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p.1).



### **5.1.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Straits Times***

The stories did not present a clear conceptualization of terrorism. However, reflecting the official point of view, the stories portrayed the violence as synonymous with terrorism, and as a “clear and present danger in South-east Asia” (‘Terrorism a ‘clear and present danger’, *ST*, 10 September 2004, p.1; Boey, D., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p.3). Terrorism was also identified as a “common threat” (Soh, N., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p. A4). It is against this background that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, connection between violence and religion, and the victims.

#### **5.1.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

Quoting government officials from Singapore, Australia and Indonesia, the *ST* reported that the terrorists were the Malaysians Azahari, Dulmatin and Bashir. The alleged terrorists were said to belong to the regional network Jemaah Islamiyah, based in Indonesia. Journalists and ‘experts’ introduced new labels such as ‘Jihadi militants’, ‘Islamist minds’, ‘jihadist terrorists’, ‘Islamic militants’, ‘jihadi Singaporean-born militant’ (Rekhi, S., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p.29; Pereira, D., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p. A1). The coverage focused on Azahari as the ‘bomb-maker’ and on Noordin. Both were identified as masterminds of the attack (Pereira, D., *ST*, 10 September 2004, p.6).

#### **5.1.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The coverage inferred that the bombing was linked to the anniversary of September 11, but the *ST* did not explore this perspective. However there were various stories

about terrorist strikes in various parts of the world since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. The coverage did not elaborate on any single, clear explanation of the bombing.

Various groups interviewed by the newspaper claimed the blast was linked to different causes. One of the causes cited was that the blast was intended to influence the outcome of the presidential election in Indonesia. Other sources claimed the bombing was to influence the election in Australia ('What now for polls?', *ST*, 10 September 2004, p.4). Another cause of the violence cited by Australian officials and reported by the *ST* was that the blast was in protest against the presence of Australian troops in Iraq. The *ST* also produced the view that the bombing was intended to damage 'Canberra-Jakarta ties' (Pereira, D., *ST*, 10 September 2004, p.6; Rekhi, S., *ST*, 10 September 2004, p.6).

The *ST*'s journalist Derwin Pereira wrote, "A Muslim radical in touch with JI leaders said, "This [bombing] is another warning to them [Australian] after Bali. Don't try and persecute Muslims in Indonesia and around the world"" (Pereira, D., *ST*, 10 September 2004, p.1).

#### **5.1.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

A number of *ST* stories were loaded with moral judgments; for example, *ST* reproduced the official stance that Islam is not a religion of violence and Islam is a forgiving religion ('Follow path of mercy, Muslims told', *ST*, 12 September 2004, p.13; 'Mercy versus despair', *ST*, 13 September 2004, p.13). The *ST* ran stories on Muslims becoming terrorists as well as stories on the roots and causes of Islamic fundamentalism (Bradley, J. & Osman, S., *ST*, 15 September 2004, p.3).

While the coverage did not forthrightly link violence to religion, it contributed to the perspective that the bombers were not only militants but also ‘jihadists’ (Rekhi, S., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p.29; Silm, B., *ST*, 15 September 2004, p.14; *Agence France Presse*, ‘Police issue sketches of top 10 suspects in Jakarta blast’, *ST*, 16 September 2004, p. A1). The Singapore *Straits Times*’ journalist Derwin Pereira wrote, “also in the terrorist network was a handful of Singaporean Muslim militants on the wanted list of the Internal Security Department (ISD)” (Pereira, D., *ST*, 10 September 2004, p.6).

The editorial ‘Attack on Indonesia’ (*ST*, 10 September 2004, p.20) made reference to a report by the International Crisis Group connecting the bombers to militant groups in Indonesia. The report added new labels such as ‘jihadist’ and “a radical fringe of a radical fringe”. The Singapore-based terrorist expert Rohan Gunaratna added ‘Islamist minds’ to the list of labels (Rekhi, S., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p.29).

#### **5.1.1.4 The Victims**

The *ST* emphasized the human suffering caused by the bombing, especially of Singaporeans and Indonesians brought to Singapore for medical treatment. The centre of attention was a five-year-old Indonesian girl wounded in the blast, as well as a policeman who would have the expense of medical treatment paid by the Australian government. The girl’s medical recovery was reported with suspense and drama, followed by press frenzy over the fact that two men claimed to be the child’s father. The coverage also dwelt on two other people brought to Singapore hospitals (Xueying, L., *ST*, 12 September, p.14; Tan, J., *ST*, 14 September 2004, p. A6; Tan, J.,

*ST*, 15 September, p. A6; Tan, J., *ST*, 16 September 2004, p. A6). The *ST* reported on the scenes of horror and that “the dead are all Indonesians” (Go, R., *ST*, 10 September 2004, p.2).

### **5.1.2 Insight**

Even though the bombing happened in Jakarta, the *ST* paid much attention to the reactions of Australian officials who linked the bombing to JI and to the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir. The Australians reacted as if the attack had been against their nation; legally it was, as an embassy constitutes a kind of extra-territorial enclave. The Australians official repeated warnings about new attacks in Indonesia. Citing Singaporean and Australian officials, the newspaper reported on the weakness of law in Indonesia; Australian officials took the lead in providing information to the media. The *ST* largely provided an Australian discourse on the bombing rather than an Indonesian one. The approach can be seen as a way to accentuate the fact that Indonesian authorities are not doing enough to protect the international community in Indonesia.

One of the clearest perspectives of the coverage was that JI was responsible for the explosion, even though officials had not yet conclusively established that fact and were only assuming it. Among sources quoted by the *ST* was “a Muslim radical in touch with JI leaders”; he was quoted as saying that the JI network had been targeting the Australian Embassy for the last two months (Pereira, D., *ST*, 10 September 2004, p.1). The *ST* reported on claims made by the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer that Indonesian police received a SMS warning [‘short message system’, also referred to as ‘text message’] about 45 minutes before the attack (Asmarani, D., *ST*,

11 September 2004, p.1). The *ST* reported on the content of the SMS message “Release Abu Bakar Bashir or else Western embassies would be bombed” (Osman, S., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p. A2).

The newspaper presented the alleged bombing masterminds, Azahari Hussin and Noordin Mohammad, as responsible for the blast even though Indonesian police had only declared Azahari a suspect. The newspaper reproduced official views that the bombers were “newly recruited suicide bombers” and that “10 suicide bombers remained at large and ready for new attacks” (*Agence France Presse*, ‘Police issue sketches of top 10 suspects in Jakarta blast’, *ST*, 16 September 2004, p. A1).

The *ST* framed its reporting as a “reminder that the threat of terrorism still lurks and is ever-present even in our own backyard and that the Jakarta bombing serves as a wake-up call”. As in previous bombings, the newspaper reinforced officials’ calls for “Singaporeans to be extra vigilant and to look out for suspicious people or objects” (Jacob, P., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p. H17); it warned that “one cannot take for granted that such an explosion will not occur anywhere- even in Singapore” (Soh, N., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p. A4). The newspaper reported on the positive aspect of community policing system in Singapore to help fighting against terrorism (Nadarajan, B., *ST*, 17 September 2004, p. H5).

While it was clear that the *ST* reflected and reproduced official views, the newspaper carried conflicting messages such as, “be vigilant” but “be calm”, and “live normal life” but “report on suspicious people and objects”. A commentary piece discussed the “need for mental alertness and resilience to fight the terror battle”; it compared the situation with the “battle against Sars” and referred to a “20-year-old total defence concept unveiled in 1984”, urging people to “ensure enough basic food

supplies at home, to undertake basic fire fight lessons, to know where to look for information” (Boey. D., *ST*, 14 September 2004, p.15).

The *ST* continually repeated near-identical statements by Singaporean government and military officials. For example, the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said, “terrorism is a clear and present danger in South-east Asia” (‘Terrorism a ‘clear and present danger’, *ST*, 10 September 2004, p.1). The Singapore’s chief of defence, Lieutenant-General Ng Yat Chung, made the same statement, namely, that “The horrific bombing in Jakarta yesterday is yet another grim reminder that terrorism is a clear and present danger in this region” (Boey, D., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p.3). The *ST* acted as a vehicle for the government and military to create a state of mind in the population about terrorism and its danger that is called ‘siege mentality’. The bombing was also linked to the Chechnya conflict as an example of the dangers of terrorism (Rekhi, S., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p.29).

As in the coverage of the Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings, the *ST* dedicated extensive reporting to the blast, and used interpretative and sensational headlines such as “Heart of capital like a war zone with bodies and mangled cars”, “stop killing the poor” (Go, R., *ST*, 10 September 2004, p.2). It made emotional appeals by publishing stories portraying Indonesians’ “anger at the bombers” and “anger at the police” followed by emotional human interest stories and accounts of Indonesians’ reactions to the bombing (Osman, S., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p. A3; *Agence France Presse*, ‘Anger at the police’, *ST*, 11 September 2004, p. A3).

Regarding the connection between violence and religion, the *ST* reproduced the opinion of the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources, and the Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, Yacoob Ibrahim, saying, “there are 2 groups of

Muslims, those who bring mercy to mankind, and those who bring destruction and despair” (‘Mercy versus despair’, *ST*, 13 September 2004, p.13). However, other stories, such as ‘Islamic groups cautious over bombing blame’ (Osman, S., *ST*, 13 September 2004, p. A6), and ‘Indonesian Muslim purists don’t engage in terror’ (*Agence France Presse*, *ST*, 14 September 2004, p. A6), projected different perceptions about violence and religion. This story reported on a document written by the International Crisis Group as saying, “religion plays just a small part in the rise of terror in Indonesia” (ibid).

The Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng was quoted as saying, “the [terrorism] threat came from a few individuals: ‘It has very much to do with extremists who espouse certain extremist, radical ideas about religion, not by any particular group” (Soh, N., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p. A4).

In framing the issue of violence and religion, the *ST* ran some stories saying Islam did not represent violence. But this view was undermined by a story titled ‘Muslims turn on terror in name of Islam’ (Bradley, J., & Osman, S., *ST*, 15 September 2004, p.3), which presented an amalgamation of views from experts in many different parts of the world speaking about religion and condemning terrorism by Muslims.

Terrorism was also linked to religion by another story, ‘Countering terror with an amnesty: Why it makes sense’ (Silm, B., *ST*, 15 September 2004, p.14). The story was about Saudi Arabia’s initiative to give amnesty to ‘jihadist terrorists’. It said that, “the concept and practice of amnesty is a crucial component of Islam. Muslims are encouraged to forgive their enemies. Indeed, they are rewarded for such behaviour.” In saying “Muslims to put their houses in order”, the story entangled the term ‘jihadist’ with terrorism and al-Qaeda and Iraq. The approach was repeated in the op-

ed piece “Militants hurting the Muslims they claim to fight for” (Hassan, M.H., *ST*, 17 September 2004, p.22).

The article ‘Two Jemaah Islamiah detainees released’ reported that two JI men “who were not deeply involved in terrorism-related acts but focused more on education activities” have responded well to counselling. It said, “Both had undergone counselling, including religious counselling under ISD’s supervision” (Nirmala, M., *ST*, 16 September 2004, p.3).

The *ST* printed on its front page a story about a ‘JI plot to attack Mega’ (Pereira, D., *ST*, 12 September 2004, p.1). It said the alleged attack was foiled two months earlier. The practice of playing up old news has the potential to mislead readers, particularly if the age of the news is not stressed in the story. The article also referred to a foiled attack against an Australian-funded school. The story neither made clear when the latter occurred nor provided details on the school.

With combined information from *Reuters*, *Associated Press* and *Agence France Press*, the *ST* reported the discovery of “documents written in Arabic that were thrown down a well just before the raid, police said”. By paraphrasing the police, the *ST* connected the home owner, his wife and a third person under the label of suspected terrorism; it then reported, “the other three men suspected of having links with the JI terrorist network fled the house before the police could catch them” (‘Three suspects in Jakarta suicide bombing detained, *ST*, 17 September 2004, p.3). The story assumed that those who fled were members of JI, even though this had not been rigorously established. It also suggested that a swearing-in ceremony for suicide bombers had taken place in the house. Eventually, the people arrested in this incident were released due to lack of evidence of their involvement in terrorism, but the *ST* did



not report on this. The lack of concern to repair the public representations of innocent suspects was also observed in the *JP* and the *NST*.

In the sixth day of its coverage of the bombing, the *ST* turned its attention to stories related to security and the presidential election in Indonesia; most follow-up stories directly related to the bombing were relegated to the inside pages. But the drama of the little girl continued to dominate the main pages.

The coverage of the five-year-old Indonesian girl hurt in the explosion appeared to be a public relations initiative. The information was framed as to promote the Singaporean medical team's excellent abilities and success. It appeared as the *ST* used the story to portray Singapore as a regional medical hub. The ugly side of the coverage –seen in the story 'Manny's dad: My wife never cheated on me' - was the speculation and assumptions about the relationship between the girl's dead mother and two men, the dispute between the men over fatherhood of the girl, and the dispute between the Australian and the Italian families over who would look after the girl after she left the hospital (Xueying, Li, *ST*, 19 September 2004, p.14).

## **5.2 Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: *Jakarta Post***

Coverage of the bombing near the Australian Embassy in Jakarta 13 months after the Marriott Hotel attack displayed two aspects. It received a shorter period of coverage in comparison to the reportage of the Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings because Indonesia was drowned by electoral enthusiasm. There were just 11 days left before the first popular election for the country's president. It was an historical event in the democratization process after decades of authoritarian rule. Secondly, the stories appeared to be less politically loaded, even though it was a period of electoral

campaigning in Indonesia and Australia, and some candidates apparently wanted to exploit the issue. The blast was primarily considered an act of violence within the realms of international terrorism, “it happened two days before the anniversary of September 11” (‘Blast rocks Jakarta’, *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.5). The *Jakarta Post* wrote it was the third bomb attack in the capital in 2004 (‘Carnage in Jakarta’, *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.1).

### **5.2.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Jakarta Post***

In its editorial ‘No panic reaction’, the *JP* expressed its opinion that terrorism brings increased concern about security and safety affairs as the enemy number one against investors and tourism in Indonesia” (‘No panic reaction’, *JP*, 14 September 2004, p.6). This perception was very much in line with the newspaper’s coverage of the Bali and the Marriott Hotel bombings, which stressed the need for confidence-building in order to keep the country’s economic recovery on track. The *JP* reproduced the views that the government has to demonstrate to the international community that it was serious in dealing with the threat of terrorism (Amri, P.D., *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.6).

In fact, the economy performed better than expected after the Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings, apparently because the market had already digested risks such as terrorism (Wijaksana, D., *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.3; Wijaksana, D., *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.13; Hotland, T., *JP*, 14 September 2004, p.13; ‘Rupiah to stabilize, stocks to soar further, say analysts’, *JP*, 14 September 2004, p.13). It is against this background that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of

terrorism' are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the connection between violence and religion, and the victims.

#### **5.2.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

Just hours after the bombing, the Indonesian police were naming suspects. The *JP* reproduced the official interpretation that the bombing had similarities to the Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings (Khalik, A., & Siboro, T., *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.2). The police claimed that Azahari and Noordin “the two Malaysian-born fugitives” were the mastermind behind the blast. This piece of information was treated at face-value (Khalik, A., & Siboro, T., *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.2; ‘Fighting an uneven battle’, *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.6; Setiogi, S. P., & Muninggar, S.S., *JP*, 12 September 2004, p.1; Khalik, A., & Nugroho, I. D., *JP*, 16 September 2004, p1.).

Citing police information based on confessions by prisoners, the *JP* reported, “at least 10 newly suicide bombers – recruited by Malaysian fugitive bomb experts Azahari and Noordin- remained at large” (Setiogi, S. P. , & Muninggar, S., S., *JP*, 12 September 2004, p.1; Unidjaja, F.D., & Khalik, A., *JP*, 14 September 2004, p.1; Khalik, A., & Nugroho, I.D., *JP*, 16 September 2004, p.1). The *JP* did not question whether there was alternative evidence or explanations for the bombing.

A series of names of suspected terrorists appeared in the stories. Some names were followed by characterization such as “they arrested Saifuddin alias Abu Fida, a Muslim cleric believed to be a new recruit” (Khalik, A. & Siboro, T., *JP*, 10 September, 2004, p.2). In other cases, only the name or nickname was used, e.g., “National Police chief of detectives Comr. Gen. Suyitno Landung Sudjono identified

the three bombing suspects as Akbar, Kobra and Sudadi” (Khalik, A., *JP*, 15 September 2004, p.1).

The police claimed a number of the victims were responsible for the blast, only to admit later that the blast was carried out by a “lone suicide bomber” (Khalik, A., *JP*, 20 September 2004, p.2). Police said funding of the attack came from outside the country, from the same source that paid for the Marriott Hotel blast (‘Source of embassy bomb funding same as Marriott: Police’, *JP*, 21 September 2004, p.5).

#### **5.2.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The impression given by the coverage was that the bombing occurred partly because of poor coordination among Indonesian intelligence and security agencies (‘The ties that bind’, *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.6; Hari, K., *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.2; ‘Intelligence failure?’, *JP*, 16 September 2004, p.6), as well as the weak functioning of the anti-terror centre established in September 2003 (Harsanto, D., *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.8). So while the police blamed Azahari, Noordin and other people alleged to be suspects linked to *Ji*, the newspaper to a large degree blamed Indonesian government agencies.

#### **5.2.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The bombing apparently had no relation to religion except by the coincidence that the bombers were Muslims and the assumption by the Indonesian authorities and foreign governments that the perpetrators were members of *Ji*. Nonetheless, the *JP* ran stories quoting religious leaders as condemning the attack, with many saying, “the latest

terror attack would further tarnish the predominantly Muslim country's image" ('Religious leaders condemn bombing, call for unity', *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.3). The religious leaders warned against the linking the bombing with any religion.

The *JP* also ran a story in which religious scholars urged moderate Muslims to play a role in helping prevent radicalism spreading further in the country ('Muslims told to curb radicalism', *JP*, 16 September 2004, p.4). Thus even though the blast was not necessarily connected to religion, the stories provided readers with the understanding that the act of violence tarnished the image of Muslims, and that radicalism could be one of the causes of terrorism.

#### **5.2.1.4 The Victims**

More than 180 people were injured in the blast near the Australian Embassy, but only the case of the five-year-old girl received intensive, continued coverage. Other human-interest stories also made it into the *JP*, but not with the same prominence. The stories about the little girl ranged from her medical condition, transfer to hospital in Singapore and the death of her mother in the blast, to the dispute over who was her father, the relationship of the girl's mother to the two men, the nationality and citizenship of the girl, and possible reasons why mother and daughter were at the gate of the embassy at the time of the bombing (Mariani, E., *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.1; Aurora, L., & Fidrus, M., *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.1; Fidrus, M., *JP*, 12 September 2004, p.1; Ng, Ansley, *JP*, 14 September 2004, p.2; '5-year-old blast victim wakes up crying', *JP*, 15 September 2004, p.2).

Other injured people were flown to Singapore, as reported by the *Straits Times* (Tan, J., *ST*, 16 September 2004, p. A6), but did not make it onto the *JP*'s front pages.

In fact, they were sometimes just named in the last paragraph of a story (Khalik, A., *JP*, 20 September 2004, p.2). A number of human-interest stories based on accounts from eyewitnesses and relatives of the victims made it onto the *JP*'s inside pages (Khalik, A., *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.2; Hudiono, U., *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.2; Aurora, L., *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.2; Aurora, L., *JP*, 15 September 2004, p.2).

The most tragic aspect involving victims was the case of some families of people who had died in the blast having their loved ones characterized as suspected terrorists, only to have police admit later that they were victims of the explosion. For days the police claimed, and the media reported, that the body parts of three people belonged to suspected terrorists ('Footage shows suicide car: Police', *JP*, 11 September 2004, p. 1; Siboro, T., & Setiogi, S. P., *JP*, 15 September 2004, p.2). This kind of presumption was not particular to the families of the three victims. Dozens of people were rounded up only to be released due to lack of evidence. Some of the names of the alleged suspects were provided by the police and published by the media ('Police arrest eight over embassy bombing', *JP*, 17 September 2004, p.1; 'Police inch closer to Azahari's inner circle', *JP*, 18 September 2004, p.1; Setiogi, S. P., *JP*, 19 September 2004, p.1; Khalik, A., *JP*, 20 September 2004, p.2). This approach creates stigmatization. Thus the *JP* failed to see its role in creating disillusioned and disgruntled people. The newspaper could have addressed the cases more attentively, not merely reporting what the police said but recognizing that incorrect naming of suspects could damage people's lives and ultimately be a dynamic in the recruitment process of terrorist volunteers.

### 5.2.2 Insight

One interesting aspect of the *JP*'s coverage was that in the initial reporting, the blast was said to be near the Australian Embassy, implying it was not necessarily directed against the embassy. Only days later was it reported that the blast specifically targeted the embassy. The building across from the Australian Embassy, the Plaza 89, which houses the Jakarta offices of mining firm PT Freeport Indonesia as well as the Greek Embassy, suffered a lot of damage.

The *JP*'s initial stories described the event as a “bombing”, while the Australian authorities described it as “terrorism”. This distinction was not maintained in *JP*'s editorial, which referred to the bomb attack as “terrorism” (‘Fighting an uneven battle’, *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.6).

The Australian authorities reacted quickly to the bombing. Within hours of the blast the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, was visiting the site and giving a press conference. A string of Australian officials including Prime Minister John Howard and forensic and police teams flew to Jakarta to inspect the damage and help to probe the attack. None of the 14 people killed was Australian. President Megawati immediately travelled back to Indonesia from Brunei, where she was attending a royal wedding ceremony.

The perception from the coverage was that the Australians took the lead in addressing the bombing (‘Carnage in Jakarta’, *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.1). The Prime Minister provided the media with strong, dramatic statements, such as

“the Australian and the Indonesian governments will hunt down terrorists until we catch every single one of them and the more they attack us the more determined

we are to find them and to hunt them down” (‘Blast victims fund set up’, *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.1).

The Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said, “you would have to conclude that it was directed towards Australia” (‘Australians shaken, but go on despite bombing’, *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.2). Australia was also in a period of electoral campaigning. The Prime Minister John Howard was re-elected in October 2004.

The occurrence of the bombing days prior to the election in Indonesia helped to heighten the anxiety, with official alerts about “more possible attacks” (Setiogi, S.P., & Muninggar, S.S., *JP*, 12 September 2004, p.1; Khalik, A., *JP*, 16 September 2004, p.4; ‘Police inch closer to Azahari’s inner circle’, *JP*, 18 September 2004, p.1; ‘Police brace for terrorist activity ahead of presidential polls’, *JP*, 19 September 2004, p.2). As in the previous bombings (Bali and Marriott Hotel), security was reinforced in most parts of the country and the exploitation of fear entered the discourse of the political campaign.

The bombing prompted the Indonesian President to call upon the population “to stay united in fighting terrorism”, to remain calm but alert and, “please watch over your own neighborhood and inform the authorities should you find something suspicious” (‘Mega appeals for calm’, *JP*, 10 September 2004, p.1; Unidjaja, F. D., & Khalik A., *JP*, 14 September 2004, p.1). The governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, followed up the appeal with call on “chiefs of neighborhood and community units to monitor visitors and new residents” (Harsanto, D., *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.8; Nurbianto, B., *JP*, 14 September 2004, p.8). The approach was commonly used by the Suharto regime. This kind of official appeal tends to encourage certain types of social



behaviour in which the public participates in the policing of society (Purba, K., *JP*, 14 September 2004, p.6; 'Spying on neighbors?', *JP*, 18 September 2004, p.6). It also provides some encouragement to citizens to accept pre-emptive policies taken by the government (Muhibat, S.F., *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.6).

One aspect worthy of note was that the *JP* chose not to challenge the allegations by the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Prime Minister John Howard that Indonesian police had received an instant telephone message warning about an attack in Jakarta 45 minutes before the blast occurred (Unidjaja, F.D., & Siboro, T., *JP*, September 11, 2004,p.3). The *JP* did not treat this claim with nearly as much scepticism as it treated the contentions of some Indonesian officials. In this respect it behaved similarly to the *ST*, which treated the reported message as an established fact: "an SMS sent 45 minutes before the blast – it proved to be no empty threat" (Asmarani, D., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p.1). The Indonesian police consistently denied the existence of the message. The *Jakarta Post* website reproduced the story from *Reuters* about the existence of the message; the newspaper print edition did not ran the article (*Reuters*, 'Jakarta had warning of Western embassy attack: Downer', The Jakarta Post.com, 10 September 2004).

When Australian officials backed away from the claim that was made immediately after the blasts neither the *JP* nor the *ST* reported this with the same emphasis seen when they criticized Indonesian agencies. The Sydney datelined story 'Australia backs away from SMS claim over Jakarta bombing' from Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), was published on the *JP*'s website on September 13, 2004, but it did not appear in the print edition.

However, the *New Straits Times* dedicated one-third of a page to the SMS issue in a story filled by the *Agence France Presse* ('Aussie PM under fire again', *NST*, 14 September 2004, p.27). Since the allegation had been made by senior officials and thus further tainted the image of Indonesian police, the *Jakarta Post* should have taken pains to clarify the issue. It appeared that the *JP* reported on the relations between Australia and Indonesia with some care, probably because the bad economic consequences to Indonesia as a result of Australians leaving the country and the newspaper did not want to lose training and travel opportunities provided by the Australian government and other organizations ('Blast victims fund set up', *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.1; 'The ties that bind', *JP*, 11 September 2004, p.6).

Regarding the economy, as in its coverage of the two Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings, the *JP* called for urgency to quickly solve the bombing and catch the masterminds ('No panic reaction', *JP*, 14 September 2004, p.6) in order to boost investors' and tourists' confidence in the country. However, it appeared that economic issues were not the focus of the coverage. One reason could be the positive reaction from the stock market and business sector as reported by the *Associated Press* ('Megawati hails business sector as markets weather bomb blast', *The Jakarta Post.com*, 12 September 2004).

### **5.3 Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: *New Straits Times***

The initial accounts of the Australian Embassy bombing by *NST* were 'straight news'. But as the number of victims increased and the authorities in Indonesia started pointing towards the suspects, the stories became increasingly political. Australian Prime Minister John Howard visited Indonesia in the aftermath of the blast while

Indonesian President Megawati returned from a wedding in Brunei to attend to the attack. Both used the blast to boost their political campaigns. The same happened with the main Indonesian opposition candidate for the presidency, the retired general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who visited the injured in the hospitals. Both Megawati and Yudhoyono addressed the bombing by putting security at the top of their political agenda with appeals for tough laws to combat terrorism (*Associated Press*, 'Megawati fumbles during TV debate', *NST*, 16 September 2004, p.7).

### **5.3.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *New Straits Times***

The conceptualization of terrorism the *NST* presented was one of Islamic extremism. Reflecting government officials, the newspaper used the word 'terrorism' to refer to the bombing and reproduced the immediate views of Australian and Indonesian officials in blaming JI. It is against this background that the four main subcategories of 'conceptualization of terrorism' are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the connection between violence and religion, and the victims.

#### **5.3.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The images of terrorists were based on Azahari and Noordin, on "religious militants" and 'religious extremists'. The reporting reflected the fact that Indonesian officials identified the Malaysian Azahari as the suspect in carrying out the attack (Chew, A., *NST*, 10 September 2004, p.1). The *NST* reproduced a claim made by the Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid that "the two were members of a deviant Islamic group which was misusing religion" ('Which one is the real Azahari?', *NST*, 17 September 2004, p.4).

#### **5.3.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The *NST* reproduced the view that the main cause of the bombing was Australia's general election. The Indonesian election campaign received less attention as a reason for the bombing (Neild, Barry, *NST*, 13 September 2004, p.19). Like the *ST*, the *NST* gave considerable space to Australian authorities' reactions to the bombing, blaming it on *JI* while linking the attack to the election campaign in Australia where, according to the stories, security had been a key issue.

#### **5.3.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The *NST* emphasized in an editorial the positive aspects of coercive measures against the threat of 'religious extremists', in an allusion to the Malaysian government's unapologetic record in the use of the Internal Security Act ('Tracking the deadly bombers', *NST*, 15 September 2004, p.18). The editorial distinguished between "religious militants" and "terrorists" but lumped them together and equated them with communists, while at the same time portraying positively the harsh approach of the government in the fight against communists.

The connection between violence and religion was most strikingly expressed by the Indonesian police chief D'ai Bachtiar that, "the bombers do not understand their religion" ('Police looking for second van with explosives', *NST*, 16 September 2004, p.4). The Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid was quoted as saying, "the two [Azahari and Noordin] were members of a deviant Islamic group which was misusing religion" ('Which one is the real Azahari?', *NST*, 17 September 2004, p.4).

#### **5.3.1.4 The Victims**

The *NST* devoted space to the five-year-old child's plight while paying little attention to the Indonesian heroes who had carried out their duties despite injuries. As in the case of the *ST*, the spotlight was on the girl injured in the blast (*Associated Press*, 'Girl hurt in bombing flown to Singapore', *NST*, 11 September 2004, p.6), particularly the drama over the dispute about the child's custody between her biological father and the partner of the girl's mother. The *NST* combined a story from the *Associated Press* and the Malaysia's official news agency, *Bernama* that, 'DNA test proves Australian is biological father' (*NST*, 15 September 2004, p.4). Stories also dealt with the "triangle relationship" of the mother, exploiting the tragic situation as salacious entertainment (*Reuters*, 'Doctors say Manny may be partially paralysed', *NST*, 14 September 2004, p.28; *Associated Press*, 'Manny progressing after recovering from coma', *NST*, 16 September 2004, p.29). The other 180 injured were mostly absent from the coverage.

#### **5.3.2 Insight**

At the time of the bombing, the *NST* was changing its style from broadsheet to tabloid format. In the first days of the change, which coincided with the bombing, the publisher issued two versions of the paper: one tabloid and one in broadsheet. It appeared that some stories related to the bombing found in the broadsheet did not make into the tabloid edition, for example: 'National Security supersedes individual rights', *NST*, 10 September 2004, p.8; 'Malaysian fugitive bomber main suspect',

*NST*, 10 September 2004, p.18; ‘Police looking for second van with explosives’, *NST*, 16 September 2004, p.4. I have analysed the tabloid because the broadsheet was quickly disappearing from the stands in parts of Kuala Lumpur, where I had someone collecting the newspapers for me.

In the reporting Australian officials blamed JI straight after the attack, whereas Indonesian officials took a few hours before pointing at JI and the two Malaysians at large, Azahari and Noordin. The *NST* quoted Australian officials describing their “premonition” of a “second attack” and speculation about a second van loaded with explosives (‘Police looking for second van with explosives’, *NST*, 16 September 2004, p.4).

The *NST* did not bother to address, or preferred to ignore, the perceptible dispute over which government officials were in charge of the situation. Indonesia’s President was largely absent from the stories. The reporting concentrated on government officials from Australia saying their country was the target of the bombing, whereas Indonesian officials at the scene of the blast reportedly said the attack should not be portrayed as an attack on any one country. International news agencies *Reuters* and *Agence France Presse* reported on the Indonesian officials’ interpretation, whereas none of the publications studied made reference to the observation (‘Not an attack on one country: Indonesia.’, 9 September 2004, Sidney Morning Herald.com.au).

The *NST* was the only newspaper to emphasise the controversy over Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s remarks about an SMS (‘short message system’, often referred to as ‘text message’), warning the Indonesian police had received 45 minutes before the blast (*Agence France Presse*, ‘Aussie PM under fire again’, *NST*, 14 September 2004, p.27). Neither the *JP* nor the *ST* took pains to report on the false

claim, even though the Australian Prime Minister later clarified that he was just repeating information provided by a top police officer, who ultimately admitted that the message never existed (ibid).

Like the *ST*, the *NST* repeated officials' allegations that terrorists had failed in attempts to kill Megawati on two occasions in the past. The difference is that the *NST* made it clear that the information came from the Australian ambassador to Indonesia. However, the *NST* did not elaborate or preferred to ignore the reason why an Australian official was giving the information to journalists and not to the Indonesian police or government officials, or why the information was only being released now when the failed plots had occurred months earlier (*Agence France Presse*, 'Several plots to kill Megawati', *NST*, 13 September 2004, p.28).

The *NST* reported on the arrest of seven people suspected of involvement with Azahari and the bombing, and who were later released for lack of evidence. Nevertheless, the newspaper did not comment on the fact that the names of people identified by the police were released to the media and consequently publicly stigmatized. The same stance was seen in the *ST* and the *JP*'s reporting ('Three suspects in Jakarta suicide bombing detained', *ST*, 17 September 2004, p.3; 'Police arrest eight over embassy bombing', *JP*, 17 September 2004, p.1; Setiogi, S.P., *JP*, 19 September 2004, p.1; Chew, A., *NST*, 11 September 2004, p.6; Chew, A., *NST*, 14 September 2004, p.29).

The *NST* reproduced favourable rhetoric of US officials in Kuala Lumpur in the story 'Malaysia is now an excellent role model in war on terror' (Pollard, R., *NST*, 11 September 2004, p.20; 'US Praises PM's leadership', *NST*, 12 September 2004, p.4).

The newspaper did not raise questions about the use of the ISA against political opponents who had been jailed and labelled as terrorists since January 2002.

In its news production, the *NST* did not sensationalize the stories or use a slick style of communication, but it used many of the same wire service stories as the other two newspapers. This resulted in a kind of ‘standardization’ of the information and official remarks. To a much lesser extent in comparison to the Bali and the Marriott Hotel bombings’ coverage, the *NST* used its own correspondents in Jakarta in the initial leading stories. The newspaper also ran a few stories from the official Malaysian news agency Bernama. In overall, the *NST*’s reporting was irrelevant; but on the other hand it indicates the newspapers in the region are heading towards the use of journalists with knowledge of the local culture and the use of ‘standardized’ information provided by global players. An increasing number of journalists with knowledge of the local culture are joining the wire services. Nevertheless, the wire services (global players) tend to prevail in news coverage.

#### **5.4 Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: *Tempo***

The bombing ‘at the perimeter’ of the Australian Embassy in September 2004 did not receive extensive coverage in *Tempo*, perhaps because the 2004 Presidential election was just days away. Nevertheless, a photo illustration of the 5 year-old girl injured in the blast made the cover of the magazine’s special issue. *Tempo*’s stories took at face value a claimed connection between the Bali bombings in 2002, the Marriott Hotel explosion in 2003 and, the Australian Embassy bombing. The coverage of the Australian Embassy bombing was published in the special edition of *Tempo* dedicated to the 2004 presidential election (September 14-20).



#### **5.4.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Tempo***

The idea of terrorism was equated with ‘carnage’. The reportage spoke of “limbs and other human remains hurled almost fifty meters from the center of the explosion”, “a hand lay in the street in front of Graha Binakarsa, two blocks from the embassy. Human intestines landed in the building’s front lot” (‘Carnage at Kuningan’, *Tempo*, 14-20 September 2004, p.12).

##### **5.4.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

Azahari was the centre of the reporting. *Tempo*’s stories used mostly terms such as the “bomb dokter” and the “bomb maker” to refer to Azahari, who at this stage was portrayed as responsible for the blast. *Tempo* did not speculate on other names as possible suspects in the bombing.

##### **5.4.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The motivation behind the bombing was said to be that “the perpetrators of the explosion wanted to humiliate Indonesian security officials” (p.14). *Tempo* noted that at the time of the blast, the national police chief was with members of the law commission of the House of Representatives, briefing them on security for the second round of the presidential election.

#### **5.4.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The reporting did not make any connection between the alleged perpetrators' religion and the violence, or between the bombing and religion. As in the reporting on the Bali and Marriott bombings religious conviction was not as an issue. However, the magazine used religion as faith to report on the victims and their relatives.

#### **5.4.1.4 The Victims**

The magazine described relatives' memories of family members who perished in the blast. Using emotional appeals, the story was about the strength and religiosity of those who survived and their families, while at the same time it portrayed the good qualities of those who died. The magazine reported on the family of the 5-year-old girl's mother, but did not seek to entertain its readership with an account of the mother's relationship with two foreign men. *Tempo* also gave attention to a security guard at the embassy who suffered injuries but helped the victims.

#### **5.4.2 Insight**

*Tempo* (14-20 September 2004) was the only one of the four publications analyzed to refer to the explosion as being 'at the perimeter of the Australian Embassy' or at the 'Kuningan'. Kuningan is the district in Jakarta where most of the embassies and international companies are located. It is considered the 'golden triangle' of businesses (p.12). The newspapers reported that the blast had been 'at the embassy' or 'against the embassy'. This differentiation was also observed in the reporting of the Bali blasts. *Tempo* preferred to refer to the attacks as having happened in 'Kuta', the specific place in Bali where the bombings occurred, whereas the newspapers mainly

used the word Bali. Probably the difference was because *Tempo* wanted to connect to local readers.

*Tempo* followed the newspapers' lead in reporting that "Dr. Azahari" was behind the Marriott Hotel and embassy bombings: "terrorists Azahari, Noordin and Dulmatin are the masterminds of the Bali, Marriott and Kuningan bombings". It did not justify its assertion. In fact, the magazine had already in its previous issue explored the connection between Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda.

The magazine also reported on the "innocent victims [who] perished as a result of the bombing", with accounts of what their families remembered about them; it appeared to be a form of posthumous homage to all affected by the incident. But the magazine gave greater focus to Azahari than the bombing itself or the victims.

The magazine's opinion page stated, "the police were painting a rosy picture of security and how they were actively hunting down terrorist ringleaders" when "everything changed on account of the horrifying explosion". In this sarcastic tone, the magazine noted, "many will immediately lay the blame on the police and the intelligence apparatus for failing to detect the bombing in time." The opinion article, "Targeting Whom?" called for "more surveillance measures: metal detectors, video monitors on every corner, bag and body searches at every entry point" (p.9), and criticized "this government's denial of terrorism given the number of terrorist leaders in Indonesia". There was no slick or sensationalist style of communication in the coverage.

## **5.5 Comparative Analysis**

The atmosphere of the presidential election in Indonesia obfuscated the coverage of the bombing, as did the Australian political campaign; Australian police and

government representatives including Prime Minister Howard quickly travelled to Indonesia and visited the scene of the blast.

Overall, the coverage in the four publications focused on Australia as the victim and Australian officials giving press conferences and information to the media. The reporting was also characterized by the excessive emphasis the four publications gave to the plight of the Indonesian girl caught in the blast and the drama involving her mother. The *ST*, *JP* and *NST* built up the story with abundant details. Nonetheless, in many cases their sources were news wire agencies. When the girl was brought to Singapore for medical treatment, the *ST* capitalized on this to reinforce the image of Singapore as a regional medical hub as promoted since 2003 by the Singapore Tourism Board.

Regarding the SMS warning of the attack the *NST* was the only publication to give emphasis to the Australian Prime Minister's disclosure that the message in fact never existed. Both the *ST* and the *JP* strongly criticized Indonesia for not heeding the warning, despite continued denials by Indonesian police that they ever received such a message.

The rhetoric of terrorism as a real threat was found in all the publications, either in quotes from the ruling elite of each country or in editorials about the need for laws to counter terrorism. The *ST* addressed the weakness of the law in Indonesia while the *NST* praised the positive aspect of coercive measures against "religious extremists" in a reference to the use of the Internal Security Act. The *JP* blamed the lack of coordination among the security agencies for the attacks. *Tempo* stuck to the view that the bombing was intended to humiliate the police and intelligence agencies. The publications all emphasized different motives for the bombing. But in the last stance,

they all structured their reporting within the international discourse of terrorism associated with Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda.

The *ST* used the reporting to give the tragedy domestic significance by reminding the population that the threat of terrorism was “in our own backyard”. The *JP* used the same rhetoric on the need “to monitor visitors and new residents”, whereas the *NST* focused on how well Malaysia was doing as a role model in the fight “against terror”. Therefore, all the publications in one way or the other emphasized the need for surveillance and social control to deal with terrorism and criminal acts, probably a reflection of corporate and government-influenced media.

One aspect clear in the three newspapers was the extensive use of news wire services. Considering the geographic proximity between Jakarta, Singapore and Malaysia, it could have been expected that local journalists would be at the scene and able to follow up the story. The tendency to give preference to international news wire services suggests that the domestic newspapers were inadequately staffed, or that their journalists were not properly trained. The newspapers may also have wanted to save money, feeling that since they were already paying for the wire services, why not make use of them. The result was that the newspapers mostly carried the same stories.

## Chapter Six: Bali Bombings in 2005 – ‘Bali 2’

The Indonesian resort island of Bali was again rocked by explosions just days before the third anniversary of the deadliest terrorist attack in the country. The three blasts, which occurred almost simultaneously, left a death toll of 23 people and more than 120 injured. The worst of the three blasts occurred at a restaurant by the beach in the Kuta in the same area and surroundings where explosions had killed more than 200 people in 2002.

The coverage of the 1st.October 2005, bombings has been included in this study as an acknowledgment of the event since the dissertation was already in its final phase. For this reason, only the research questions and the more important observations have been taken into consideration. Moreover, except for the *Straits Times*, the other newspapers and *Tempo* magazine provided only brief coverage of the event. One of the reasons for the reduced coverage could be the South Asian earthquake in Pakistan just days after the 2005 Bali bombings taking precedence; another possibility is that the majority of the victims were Indonesian nationals rather than foreign tourists. Early media reports did however indicate that 20 Australians, four Americans, eight South Koreans, three Japanese, one French and one German were included among the injured. Other possibilities not considered here could have influenced the limited coverage in comparison to the previous bombings’ reportages.

It is worth noting that between the August 2004 Australian Embassy bombing and the 2005 Bali bombings, there were other attacks in parts of Indonesia that did not receive as much national and international media attention. For example, on 13 November 2004 an explosion near a police station in the eastern part of the island of

Sulawesi killed 5 people, and on 28 May 2005 two bombs ripped through a busy market in Tentena, Central Sulawesi, killing 21 people.

### **6.1 Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: *Straits Times***

The *ST* started its front-page coverage of the bombings with straight information. The article ‘Oh No, Not again’ (Asmarani, D., *ST*, 2 October 2005, p.1), did not link the blasts in a popular outdoor eating area to any particular group. The association between the bombings and the JI group was reported in the inside pages (Rekhi, S., *ST*, 2 October 2005, p.4). Reporting from Bali, the *ST*’s journalist Salim Osman described in detail the information released by the police on how the three suicide bombers detonated their explosives (Osman, S., *ST*, 3 October 2005, p.1). The Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong met Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Bali to offer Singapore’s full support in the fight against terrorism. A six-man Singapore Armed Forces medical team flew with the Prime Minister into Bali to provide help at hospitals (Koh, L., *ST*, 4 October 2005, p.1),

#### **6.1.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Straits Times***

The *Straits Times*’s conceptualization of terrorism was essentially one of ‘jihadism’, ‘jihadist-anarchists’ and ‘Islamic extremism’. Examples were found in its editorial ‘Indonesia coping well’ (*ST*, 5 October 2005, p.20), and in its op-ed piece ‘Democracy is not enough’ (Atran, S., *ST*, 6 October 2005, p.26). Violence was also equated to terrorism as observed in one of the Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s statements that, “Terrorism is damaging the social order and slowing down the

economy” (*Associated Press*, ‘Military called on to stamp out terror’, *ST*, 6 October 2005, p.6). It is against this background that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the connection between violence and religion, and the victims.

#### **6.1.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The terrorists were described as suicide bombers, members of JI, ‘jihadists’, ‘fringe fanatics’ and ‘religious extremists’. They were variously named as Azahari, Noordin and Dulmatin, a name that popped up continuously in the *ST*’s stories during the coverage of the arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah suspects but had not been in the headlines for some time. Azahari and Noordin were reported as being the masterminds of the attacks.

#### **6.1.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The root of the violence was described as a desire to destabilize a moderate government in a Muslim country. The Australian Prime Minister John Howard said, “the militants saw President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as a threat. He is the democratic, moderate face of Islam. The terrorists know that, and they want to undermine him” (Maynard, R., *ST*, 3 October 2005, p.5).



### 6.1.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion

The connection was made through the claim by the Australian Prime Minister John Howard that the terrorists wanted to undermine President Yudhoyono's moderate face of Islam (Maynard, R., *ST*, 3 October 2005, p5); the connection was made in stories such as 'Fear and anger in Indonesia', where "Muslim leaders joined the chorus of public condemnation", and "the [religious] leaders denied that religion played a part in the attacks" (Asmarani, D. *ST*, 4 October 2005, p.9). The link was also established in a story with information provided by the *Associated Press* and *Reuters*, in which the Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla was reported as asking religious leaders to preach against suicide bombings (*Associated Press*, 'Islamic leaders urged to slam terrorism', *ST*, 8 October 2005, p.8).

Another connection between violence and religion was observed in the article 'Bali's Day of Prayer' where the writer mentioned about the "Ramadan austerities" and how the Hindu rituals and tourism are being affected by the bombings (Fong, T., *ST*, 6 October 2005, p.9); and in the op-ed story entitled 'Confronting the terrorists within' in which the Singapore's former Prime Minister, Minister Mentor (MM) Lee Kuan Yew, made suggestions on how Europe and the US should "discredit extremist ideology, which takes Quranic passages out of context, preaches hatred against non-Muslims and seeks to spread Islam through violence" (Yew, L.K., *ST*, 10 October 2005, p.20). The *ST* published commentaries calling for the Indonesian President to remove "the kid gloves" to deal with religious hardliners (McBeth, J., *ST*, 8 October 2005, p. S14). In the same edition, the *ST* reported on the increasing number of people converting to Islam in Russia (Shlapentokh, D., *ST*, 8 October 2005, p. S16).

#### **6.1.1.4 The Victims**

The reporting on the victims of the bombings had grisly photo illustrations and gruesome accounts (Ho, C.Kong, & Ng, S., *ST*, 2 October 2005, p.3; Nadarajan, B., *ST*, 3 October 2005, p.3). The newspaper followed its trend to use emotional appeal while using the reporting to boost Singapore as a regional medical centre (Srinivas, S., *ST*, 3 October 2005, p.6). A front page photo illustration of the two smiling leaders, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, visiting wounded patients at the Sanglah Hospital in Bali was published ('Get well soon', *ST*, 5 October 2005, p.1) The role of the Singapore Armed Forces medical team in Bali also entered the pages of the *Straits Times* with a photo illustration of a Singaporean military paramedic checking on a blast victim ('Joint Effort', *ST*, 5 October 2005, p.6).

#### **6.1.2 Insight**

As with the previous bombings, the *ST* portrayed its understanding that Singapore is taking precautions against possible attacks in the country (Huei, P. S., & Koh, L., *ST*, 3 October 2005, p.1), in addition to running stories speculating on the possibility of attacks in Singapore and whether or not the population is prepared (Lim, L., *ST*, 7 October 2005, p.33; Fernandez, W., *ST*, 8 October 2005, p. S13). The paper used information and illustrations extracted from Google Earth over the Internet to produce a story on how terrorists could obtain detailed information of potential targets in the country and elsewhere (Ho, C. Kong, *ST*, 9 October 2005, p.4), without placing the issue within the local context in which the taking of photos of some government buildings and certain locations in the country is banned.

In a story entitled ‘National pride hindering anti-terror war’ (Eyal, J., *ST*, 3 October 2005, p.5), the *ST* criticized Indonesia for not having taken up international efforts to improve cooperation with the Indonesian military and its security agencies to combat ‘terrorists’. However, the public disapproval was softer than it had been towards former president Megawati Sukarnoputri in its coverage of the previous attacks. In fact the reporting was more favourable with stories such as ‘PM Lee confident of Indonesian resolve’ (Koh, L., *ST*, 5 October 2005, p.6), and ‘PM gives full backing to Jakarta’ (Koh, L., *ST*, 4 October 2005, p.1).

In essence, the *ST* had not changed its reporting style or its use of resources but presented a lighter criticism of the government of President Yudhoyono, yet still combined with messages of public diplomacy. A strong government in Indonesia would guarantee social stability and maintain investors’ confidence. Singapore is reported to be the top foreign investor in Indonesia with a total investment of US\$ 2.08 billion in 84 projects, mainly in telecommunications (Osman, S., *ST*, 7 October 2005, p.8). The *JP* published that Singapore’s investment in Indonesia amount to US\$ 12.1 billion (Boedhiwardhana, W., *JP*, 4 October 2005, p.3).

The *ST* referred to extracts from a letter by JI dated November 26, 2004 “obtained from an underground extremist group in Sumatra” (‘JI operative’s letter warned of bombing this year’, *ST*, 2 October 2005, p.4). Once again, the *ST* demonstrated that in comparison to the other publications it had greater access to intelligence and information about terrorists than it printed in its pages.

## **6.2 Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: *Jakarta Post***

The bombings in Bali 2 occurred when Indonesia was in turmoil with violent protests across the country and a nationwide public transportation driver's strike because the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had increased fuel prices by an average of 126 percent. In less than one hour after the incident on a Saturday evening, President Yudhoyono held a press conference in which he condemned the blasts as terrorist attacks.

While President Yudhoyono ordered more vigilance across the country, the *JP* in its editorial "Terrorists among us" stated, "someone should be held accountable for this latest intelligence lapse", and "the President, and his security advisers, must do more to ensure that this is the last terrorist outrage in this country" ('Terrorists among us', *JP*, 3 October 2005, p.6). The editorial, however, observed that the President had cautioned the public of possible terrorist attacks in September or October, but "government officials were saying that the threat from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), blamed for most of the terrorist attacks in Indonesia in recent years, had been brought under control." Consequently, President Yudhoyono called upon the Indonesian Military (TNI) to be active in the fight against terrorism (Siboro, T., & Komandjaja, E.C., *JP*, 6 October 2005, p.1).

### **6.2.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Jakarta Post***

The *Jakarta Post* reproduced the Indonesian President's definition that "terrorism was [sic] a crime against humanity as it kills people no matter who they are or what they are". (Siboro, T, & Komandjaja, E.C., *JP*, 6 October 2005, p.1). On the other hand, the *JP* reported on terrorism as an enemy that security intelligence service can defeat ('Intelligence failure', 5 October 2005, p.6). It is against this background that the four

main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the connection between violence and religion, and the victims.

#### **6.2.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The *JP*’s reporting centred on the figures of Azahari and Noordin, the two Malaysian fugitives, JI and suicide bombers. The newspaper reproduced official views that the masterminds of the attacks were Azahari and Noordin. (‘Police hot on trail of Bali blast masterminds’, *JP*, 5 October 2005, p.2).

#### **6.2.1.2 Roots of Violence**

The violence was said to have occurred as a result of an intelligence failure. In the editorial titled ‘Terrorists among us’ the *JP* pointed to “the ineffectiveness of our intelligence institutions and our police” (*JP*, 3 October 2005, p.6).

#### **6.2.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The connection between violence and religion was made through articles on aspects of Islam and editorials. The *JP* linked the blast to religion in its editorial entitled ‘A Ramadhan of Jihad’ where it asked the question, “have Indonesia’s mainstream Muslims allowed radical elements to hijack the representation of Islam?” (‘A Ramadhan of Jihad’, *JP*, 4 October 2005, p.6). In the story ‘Islam’s leaders condemn Bali blasts’ the newspaper reproduced the opinions of Muslim leaders appealing to authorities to avoid hastily linking the attacks with Islam (‘Islam’s leaders condemn

Bali blasts', *JP*, 3 October 2005, p.4). Furthermore, the newspaper reproduced the views of sociologist Nur Syam as saying, "the country [Indonesia] will be seriously impaired by religious radicalism if moderate Muslims do not strive to balance the beliefs of hard-liners" (Nugroho, ID, *JP*, 3 October 2005, p.4).

#### **6.2.1.4 The Victims**

The newspaper did not report extensively on any particular individual as the victim. Nor did it recount any family's story on how they either survived the blasts or lost a family member. The *JP* reported on the death toll and on the many missing persons as factual news without exaggeration or emotional appeals.

#### **6.2.2 Insight**

The *Jakarta Post*'s coverage of the 2005 Bali bombings was to the point. It did touch most of the immediate concerns consequential to the bombings, such as economic aspects, tourism, and human-interest stories, without exploiting the event with emotional or sensationalist stories. The newspaper did not use gruesome photo illustration or grisly details in its reportage.

The main topic of the coverage was the reactions to the reinstallation of military territorial command and its possible consequences due to the history of human rights abuse by the Indonesian Military (TNI) during the military regime of Suharto (Rukmantara, A., *JP*, 7 October 2005, p.1; Siboro, T., *JP*, 8 October 2005, p.2; Atmanta, D., *JP*, 8 October 2005, p.3; Suryana, A., *JP*, 8 October 2005, p.2).

The President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a four-star retired army general, summoned the military to help fight terrorism days after Bali 2. The TNI's

intelligence system was widely used during the authoritarian regime of Suharto and scrapped after his fall in 1998. Under the system, non-commissioned officers known as 'Babinsa' carried out surveillance work for the government. The 'Babinsa' did not have the authority to make arrests but they acted as the government's eyes and ears at village level looking for suspicious activities. The TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto was quoted as saying he would restore the military territorial command (Siboro, T. & Komandjaja, E. C., *JP*, 6 October 2005, p.1). General Endriartono Sutarto said 37,000 non-commissioned military officers, including 1,700 in the Great Jakarta area, were ready to take part in the intelligence system called 'koter' across Indonesia ('Military officers deployed to villages', *JP*, 8 November 2005, p.1).

The *JP* reported on the different views about the possibility of the involvement of Indonesian Military's (TNI) in the fight against terrorism and the failure of Indonesian intelligence agencies to prevent terrorist attacks. According to the *Jakarta Post*,

"Indonesia has four national-level intelligence units – the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), which coordinates all intelligence operations in the country, the Military Strategic Intelligence, the Police Intelligence Unit and an intelligence unit connected to the Attorney General's Office. There are also numerous regional-level intelligence units connected with the military and the police" ('Intelligence failure', *JP*, 5 October 2005, p.6).

Throughout the coverage of the previous bombings the *JP* has been strong in expressing its views that the terrorist acts occurred due to intelligence failure. In various editorials the newspaper advocated the need for more surveillance, including community surveillance, and effective measures to combat terrorism. Now that President Yudhoyono has called on the military the newspaper raised the issue that

the country could witness a return of militarism. The newspaper pointed out that while TNI could play a decisive role in the war against terrorism, militarism might occur if the armed forces were to be allowed to resume a dominant role in domestic security and politics. In its editorial 'Stay in the barracks' it said, " True, the internal security acts in Singapore and Malaysia are effective in the short term, but at what cost to civil society?" ('Stay in the barracks', *JP*, 10 October 2005, p.6).

The TNI started to help the country's intelligence agencies in the fight against terrorism by urging the people to inform security officers about suspected terrorist activities in their neighborhoods (Siboro, T., *JP*, 4 October 2005, p.4). One of the worrying aspects of community surveillance was observed in a news story reporting on late night police inspections of residents' documents and searches inside houses in parts of Jakarta (Khalik, A., *JP*, 8 October 2005, p.1). This kind of security approach, endorsed by the newspaper, can lead to abuses either by elements of the police or by individuals pretending to belong to the police force.

### **6.3 Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: *New Straits Times***

The *New Straits Times* scarcely fulfilled its function of informing the readers about the bombings in Bali. It published short articles and most of them were from news services. The newspaper had the shortest coverage period in comparison with the three newspapers. One of the reasons could be the new format of the tabloid that is compact, besides there were other major events competing for coverage such as the spread of avian flu, the earthquake in Pakistan and issues that are of concern for the local readers, such as the case of Bank Islam suffering a big loss, political rivalry, and local crime.



### **6.3.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *New Straits Times***

The *NST* conceptualized the bombings as an act of violence by Islamic militants with a history stretching back to Indonesia's fight for independence. The newspaper stated that too much external scrutiny on how Indonesia is engaged in the global war on terror risks crimping the country's sovereignty and is weakening the resolve of its security agencies to go after the extremists ('Defeating the terror within, *NST*, 4 October 2005, p.20).

#### **6.3.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

The image of terrorists was developed around Azahari, Noordin, suicide bombers and militants. Official source of information identified Azahari and Noordin as the masterminds of the attacks. The newspaper reproduced the photo illustration of the severed head of the three suspected suicide bombers (Chew, A., *NST*, 4 October 2005, p.8). The Indonesian authorities were counting on the parents or relatives of the bombers to come forward to help police identify them. The newspaper reproduced the views of Indonesian police chief, Made Mangku Pastika, saying the bombers could belong to existing "unknown terrorists cells" (Chew, A., *NST*, 8 October 2005, p.32).

#### **6.3.1.2 Roots of Violence**

An interpretation of the cause of the violence was not clearly detectable in the *NST*'s reportage but the editorial entitled 'Defeating the terror within' said that, "it is an Indonesian problem, a homegrown problem, not an import from the wilds of Afghanistan", (*NST*, 4 October 2005, p.20). The *NST* published the op-ed 'Along with

democracy, Jakarta needs resolve' in which the author wrote, "Muslim governments must address the often frustrated aspirations of their bulging youth populations" (Atran, S., *NST*, 10 October 2005, p.19). The suicide bombers were reportedly said to be around 20 and 25 years old (Chew, A., *NST*, 8 October 2005, p.32).

#### **6.3.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The connection between violence and religion was made by pointing to the origins of Islamic militancy in Indonesia through editorials such as those entitled 'Defeating the terror within' (*NST*, 4 October 2005, p.20); the op-ed entitled 'Who pulls the strings of the bombers?' discusses how Muslims should be charitable in their actions, words and thoughts (Arifin, Z., *NST*, 5 October 2005, p.19).

#### **6.3.1.4 The Victims**

The newspaper hardly reported on any of the more than 120 injured in the blasts. There were a few photo illustrations on wounded victims being taken to the hospital and the photo of a girl who reportedly lost her mother. The newspaper published a story on how five Malaysian saved their lives (Augustin, S, & Singh, D., *NST*, 3 October 2005, p.8).

#### **6.3.2 Insight**

As in its coverage of the 2002 Bali bombings, the Marriott Hotel and the Australian embassy bombings the *NST* reflected the views of Malaysian authorities saying

“Malaysia’s security situation is under control and there are no active terrorist cells in the country” (‘Work of three suicide bombers’, *NST*, 3 October 2005, p.6). Nevertheless, Malaysia tightened border security to prevent the two terrorist suspects Azahari and Noordin from trying to return; Malaysia also increased police patrols around embassies and tourist attractions (*Associated Press*, ‘Region on alert, security stepped up’, *NST*, 4 October 2005, p.28).

While it is fair to say that the newspaper reported on the blasts in Indonesia, it is also correct to say that there was no sensationalism, no speculations, and no use of glossy style of communication. In fact the coverage was almost dry in comparison to *NST*’s own coverage of previous bombings. The reporting was mostly based on stories provided by agency news services.

#### **6.4 Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: *Tempo***

*Tempo*’s coverage resembled the material from the daily newspapers. The two pages reportage, in the edition of 4-10 October 2005, seemed to have been prepared in a rush to meet a deadline before the publication hit the streets. The magazine’s main topic was the decision President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had taken to increase the fuel price. It was against this background that *Tempo* reported on the Bali 2 bombings.

##### **6.4.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: *Tempo***

The magazine reproduced Indonesian officials calling the bombings ‘an act of terrorism’. *Tempo* also referred to the incident as a ‘tragedy’. The reporting linked the

bombing to the Darul Islam group, identified in the story as a ‘hard-line Islamic group’ (‘Another Bali tragedy’, *Tempo*, 4-10 October 2005, p.13). It is within this framework that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, connection between violence and religion, and the victims.

#### **6.4.1.1 Images of Terrorists**

*Tempo* was the only medium to state that the brain behind the latest attacks was the suspected terrorist Zulkarmen, with Noordin and Azahari functioning only as his operatives. Officials in Indonesia pointed the group JI as responsible for the bombings. Without providing further information, the magazine quoted anonymous intelligence sources implicating members of the group Darul Islam in the attacks.

#### **6.4.1.2 Roots of Violence**

In its reports, *Tempo* presumed “that as long as people like Zulkarnaen remain free, terrorism will continue”. *Tempo* referred to anonymous intelligence sources, disclosing “the existence of documents written in Arabic about recruiting volunteers to carry the bombs”. The reportage stated that “the objective of the terrorists: [is] to spread fear”.

#### **6.4.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion**

The reportage's connection between violence and religion came from 'intelligence sources' saying, "the bomb carriers were recruited from the Darul Islam group, a hard-line Islamic group whose aim is to form an Islamic state in Indonesia".

#### **6.4.1.4 The Victims**

The magazine reported on the 'scenes of hysteria and panic' with people running around 'screaming' and 'sobbing'. The reporting described the 'chaotic situation' but did not run a single paragraph on the victims. The magazine had photo illustrations, without captions, showing the general destruction where the blasts occurred and a few body bags in shelves.

#### **6.4.2 Insight**

The 4-10 October 2005 *Tempo* magazine edition was very effective in including the Bali 2 bombings in its edition released just days after the blasts. The two pages of coverage addressed the incident itself and had a story on the background of suspect terrorist Zulkarmen as the mastermind of the attacks ('Zulkarnaen: the Commander from Sragen.'). The magazine repeated official calls on the public to be more alert with regards to newcomers in their neighborhoods. It was not clear from the reporting the reason why the Darul Islam group was directly connected to the violence this time but not in the 2002 Bali bombings, the Marriott Hotel and the Australian Embassy bombings. *Tempo* used information provided by "a former JI leader who insisted on remaining nameless for security reasons".

## 6.5 Comparative Analysis

The three newspapers (*ST*, *JP* and *NST*) based their perception of terrorists on Azahari and Noordin, the same two persons who had dominated the news in the previous bombings. *Tempo* (a news magazine) was the only one of the four publications investigated in this study to quote Zulkarmen, a name that had not been in the media for years, as the brains behind the attacks, with Azahari and Noordin named as mere ‘operatives’. *Tempo* was at the same time the only medium to report on anonymous intelligence source that implicated the Darul Islam group.

The connection between violence and religion presented in the four publications was made through stories particularly in their op-ed sections and in editorials. The same approach was observed in their coverage of the earlier bombings.

The root of violence was perceived differently. The *ST* reported on it as the goal to destabilize a moderate Muslim government. The *JP* reported on it as another failure of the intelligence agencies but with a difference, namely, that the agencies worked well after the bombings but were incapable of preventing the attacks. The *JP* did not mention – or preferred not to mention – the participation of international teams working with Indonesian agencies in the hunt for terrorists in the country. The *NST* described the root of violence as being an old problem in Indonesia; that is Islamic militants fighting to create an Islamic state. *Tempo* said the terrorists wanted to spread fear among the population.

In news production, based on the journalistic routine of objectivity criteria (Cohen-Almagor, 2001; McNair, 1998), the *JP* presented a more professional kind of

journalism, which implies that despite its small circulation and its writers coming from a variety of backgrounds, the newspaper can present serious, good, straight news stories without burdening the reader with assumptions and over-generalizations. The *JP* also published a balanced set of human-interest stories without playing with its readers' feelings and the victims' suffering.

The *NST*'s coverage of the Bali 2005 bombings was not much different from its coverage of previous bombings, although its stories were shorter in length. It did not come as a surprise to observe the portrayal of Malaysia as a safe country, a news framing process in which the feeling of national belonging is given relevance (Schudson, 1995; Navasky, 2002; Neuman: 2005). As with the previous bombings, the newspaper did not publish human-interest stories. Again, the *NST* diluted the impact of the attacks by allocating the articles to respective sections, e.g. in the pages dedicated to ASEAN stories, the pages dedicated to World stories and the Prime News pages.

The *ST* had its most significant example of a good piece in its initial story on the bombings by Devi Asmarani, its Indonesia correspondent in Jakarta (Asmarani, D., *ST*, 2 October 2005.p.1). However, the story was followed by an upsetting photo illustration and an unimaginative title 'Oh no, not again'. The *ST*'s human-interest stories had less emotional appeal in comparison to its coverage of previous bombings, but the newspaper continued to use photos that could provoke strong emotional reactions. The *ST* speculated on about possible sites for terrorists' attacks in Singapore and on the population's preparedness to cope in such situations. The newspaper was using the 'chauvinistic' media patriotism frame that contributes to intensify anxiety in the population (Waisbord, 2004:389).

*Tempo* was quick in inserting coverage of the bombings in its latest issue, even if it only ran to two pages. The magazine was due to be distributed less than three days after the attacks. While in terms of publishing this was an achievement, the report was poor in content.

After the first three days of coverage of the 2005 Bali bombings the reportage evolved to other related issues. The *ST* dedicated its reportage to aspects of international terrorism whereas the *JP* focused on the possible return of TNI and the need for community surveillance; the *NST* did not present a particular topic in its reporting.

All the publications relied heavily on the authorities for information and the use of international newswire services.



## Chapter Seven: Comparison and Discussion

It has become clear to me during the course of the research that any media study on terrorism has to take into consideration the contextual coverage: the inter-related sub topics reported in the publications. These sub-topics are expected to throw light on [or cloud] the understanding of the terrorist events. That is when the framing of the news, where some aspects are emphasized more than others, provide the window that set the parameters in which citizens discuss the events (Tuchman, 1978; Entman, 1993). The broad contextual coverage the *ST*, *JP*, *NST* and *Tempo* produced has revealed that terrorist events cannot be properly understood without exploring the real or perceived grievances of groups or individuals who resort to violence to defend their causes (Nacos, 2006). The study reveals the influence of media-government relationships, in which regulations and informal techniques shape the news. Media ownership and its ties with centres of power also affect how news is reported. The study shows how news content varies over subject matter and over time (Rivers, Miller & Gandy, 1975; Curran 2002).

A comparison of the four publications investigated and a discussion constitute the first part of this chapter, while observations on aspects of news production in the framing of the media's reporting on terrorism constitute the second part.

### 7.1 Similarities in Construction of News on Terrorism

Within the macro frame of 'war on terror' the publications in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore revealed more similarities than differences in framing, particularly in addressing the various Islamic militant groups in the same breath as radicalism and

terrorism. However, within each socio-cultural system, each publication demonstrated how political and economic interests played an important part in shaping the discussion of public issues.

### **7.1.1 Definition and Labelling of ‘Terrorists’**

The main similarity in the four publications’ reporting lies in the immediate identification of JI as being responsible for the bombings. JI was linked to al-Qaeda, which was asserted as fact, a connection made automatically that was never questioned. However, there were some variations on how official sources made the link and how the newspapers and the news magazine reflected the link in their news stories. The *NST* linked KMM with JI and al-Qaeda, whereas the *JP* implicated radical Muslim groups. The *ST* linked Jemaah Islamiyah with al-Qaeda in its characterization of terrorists.

From JI to Abu Bakar Bashir and to Hambali, the four publications uncritically repeated a long list of names of suspected terrorists provided by government officials. Since the Marriott Hotel bombing the newspapers turned their focus on two Malaysian alleged bomb experts, Azahari and Noordin. The discourses on Bashir and others appeared to be a transnational agenda, with the newspapers publishing very similar stories. The limited variation in the reporting was tailored to fit each country’s interests yet, to create a general consensus of opinion (Rusciano, 2003).

Journalists did not question how the identification of the ‘terrorists’ started to appear in the press. For one, *Jane’s Intelligence Review* (December 2001) reported that al-Qaeda had plans to attack US targets in Singapore. The disclosure was made at

the same time as a UPI (United Press International) report revealed that there were cells of al-Qaeda in Singapore (UPI, 28 December 2001). This was followed by the story 'Is there an Al-Qaeda connection in Indonesia?' in the *Straits Times* (Pereira, D., *ST*, 20 January 2002), citing a *Washington Post* article that said Abu Bakar Bashir had written letters to militants in Malaysia and Indonesia to prepare for jihad against the Americans. In February 2002, *Time* magazine released information from the CIA that Hambali was connected with the hijackers of 9/11 (*Tempo*, 19-25 February 2002, p.4; Pereira, B., & Go, R. *ST*, 17 September 2002, p. A1). In addition, there was "a tip from a Singaporean that led to investigation of Al-Qaeda terrorism activities in Singapore" ('No US tip-off before ISA arrests', *ST*, 19 January 2002). It became apparent that the process of identifying suspects started with international publications. Journalists took uncritically the increasing number of names and allegations about family members and acquaintances said to be involved in the bombings. Journalists did not raise the possibility of alternative culpability for the bombings, but internalized and transmitted the information and interpretation provided by official sources. Journalists did not pursue questions of whether or not renegade elements within Indonesia's armed forces could be responsible for the Bali bombings (Chalk, 2005). Except for an Indonesian official who had speculated on the possibility of Acehese separatists' involvement in the bombings, the publications provided the readers with a 'standardization' of offenders.

Journalists failed to make analogies with the rapid identification of a villain in the case of TWA Flight 800 that crashed in the sea not far from New York in 1996. The blaming of Muslim terrorists for the TWA crash persisted for more than a year. The media linked the crash to the trial of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoall, two men seized in Pakistan and accused of involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center

bombing. However, 16 months after the crash, the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) agents admitted that there was no evidence of criminal action behind the TWA crash (IPS-Inter Press Service, 16 November 1997: Factiva).

The defining and the labelling of terrorism appeared to be a rhetorical act (Tuman, 2003), even more so when the reporting on the bombings slipped to give space to a broader political context and other sub-topic issues. Brummett suggests that “whosoever constructs can also be influenced to construct differently” (2003:25); therefore, journalists writing about a ‘reality’ are re-presenting the event. A reality, Brummett argues, is what happens, *is what is* when a blast occurs, a plane crashes. It was difficult to seize the ‘reality’ of JI arrests since it was constructed in news narratives based on something that had been said and already interpreted. There was no porthole to allow any direct observation of the arrests (reality), which happened ‘some time ago’.

With the JI arrests, stereotyping and labelling were attributed to the ‘deviants’. Spitzer (1996) pointed out that “interpretations of deviance are often ideological in their assumptions and implications”, and in capitalist society the process of deviance results from a process in “which populations are structurally generated, as well as shaped, channelled into, and manipulated” (pp.170, 173). Campbell (1995) is of the opinion that very often governments need ‘deviant’ groups or ‘myths’ to re-establish power and gain support for further control policies. Campbell (1995) observes that in contemporary mythology, race and class appear to contribute to the social order by establishing who participates and who does not (p.15). In *The Social Construction of Drug Scares*, Reinerman (1996) observes that the ‘drug scare’ of the 1960s was about the use of drugs by particular groups of people who were already perceived by the

powerful groups as some kind of threat. Van Dijk (1989:202) notes that the media contribute, often indirectly and subtly, to the building of “mental models of ethnic situations and generalize negative attitudes or prejudices that embody people’s basic opinion about particular ethnic groups” and, consequently, “the media tacitly provide the legitimization of those in power”.

### **7.1.2 Images of Terrorists**

The framing of ‘terrorists’ provided a narrow set of options in addition to a similar set of characterizations. The four publications studied as well as official sources concentrated on the alleged al-Qaeda-cum-JI terrorists and described those assumed to be responsible for the bombings as ‘Islamists’, ‘Islamic radicals’, ‘religious militants’ and ‘radical Islamic groups’. None of those named in the reporting as suspected terrorists were actually the bombers, except for the Marriott Hotel blast, in which the Indonesian authorities identified Asmar as the suicide bomber and automatically linked him with the JI group. The four publications reported on Asmar as if a verdict had already been reached. In the case of JI, Singapore authorities justified the arrests on the ground that the accused were masterminds, therefore, terrorists.

In the case of the blasts, Indonesian authorities defined the arrested alleged bombers or those suspected of involvement in the attacks as terrorists. Their confessions were obtained during interrogation. Journalists did not question under what conditions prisoners admitted to involvement in terrorist activities. The media in the three countries concerned suffer from shortsightedness towards reporting on human rights issues when judged by Western standards. Lawrence (2004) wrote that

in Indonesia “police used excessive and sometimes deadly force in arresting suspects and often used torture, in attempting to obtain information or a confession” (p.69), whereas in Malaysia, “the government acknowledged that it restricted certain political and civil rights in order to maintain social harmony and political stability” (p.93).

In the case of Singapore, Lawrence (2004) wrote,

“There were no substantiated instances of police abuse of detainees. Caning, in addition to imprisonment, was a routine punishment for numerous offences. The Government continued to rely on preventive detentions to deal with espionage, terrorism, threats to racial and religious harmony, and subversion” (p.125).

As Xiaoge (2005:21) argues, citing Hitam, 1996, Asian cultures give “greater emphasis to the rights of the community over those of the individual, and the rights of the individual are to be sacrificed for the greater good of the community”.

In the 1950s and the 1960s the transgressors in Malaysia and Singapore were defined as ‘revolutionary elements’, ‘left-wings’ and ‘communists’. Sahr (1993:159) argues that the dominant definition offered by those in leadership positions in business and government affect how specific individuals or groups are viewed in society and presented to the media. Sederberg (1989:29) notes that “terrorist is the tag we attach, too uncritically, to those who resort to terrorism” and once adopted, “the characterization implies conviction” (p.30).

The reporting on the arrests of JI members in Singapore and Malaysia was at one level exaggerated and distorted and at another level ambiguous due to the confused nature of the situation. The level of ‘deviance’ attributed to those arrested in Singapore was portrayed as high and examined to such an extent that new

government policies were introduced in Singapore ‘to improve’ race and religious relations, such as teachers of Islam having to register with the government-linked organization MUIS (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore). In addition, there were calls for reforms in the teaching of Islam, in what Cohen (1972) calls societal control. The *ST* spin on the aims of JI members arrested can be understood as the newspaper’s attempt to convey the message to the public that those with ‘bad’ ideas threaten the interest of public safety, peace and good order, and deserved to be detained (Hor, 2002).

Malaysia used the enforcement of law (Edelman, 1974) against the Malaysian Mujahideen Movement, also known as Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM). This group was reported to be a threat to the government and allegedly linked to the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party, also known as Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), which is the leading challenger of the United Malay National Organization’s (UMNO) secularist approach to governing Malaysia. The PAS has proposed the establishment of an Islamic state based on Muslim religious law. UMNO, which dominates the Barisan Nasional (National Front), formed by the three conservative, ethnically-based parties – the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) – has ruled Malaysia since the country’s independence from being a British colony in 1957. Former US ambassador Ronald Palmer wrote that, “concerned by Islamic threats to UMNO secularism, Mahathir began a wide-ranging campaign to associate PAS with Muslim extremists” (Palmer, 2004:129).

Still under the banner of the ‘global fight on terror’, Malaysia reported the need for police patrols in housing areas to curb urban crimes allegedly associated with

terrorism. Malaysia also called for reforms in the teachings of Islam in madrassahs in certain parts of the country. The *NST* did not publish information on government initiatives to control the schools, but even before the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the Malaysian government saw the growth of religious militancy in the country as a serious threat (Noor, 2004).

The teaching of Islam was not a subject of discourse in the *JP* until the Bali bombings, and radical Islam was understood in the public sphere as not being anything new. Following the first Bali attacks, the *JP* portrayed Indonesia as a moderate Muslim country that just happened to have a few culprits. The *JP* did not discuss certain historical facts, for example, that in the past the military had been the source of terrorism in the country and radical Muslim groups were used to spread violence in various parts of the archipelago (Colombijn & Lindblad, 2002) or that “mob vigilant action and religious groups purporting to uphold public morality continued to dispense street justice” (Lawrence, 2004:68).

None of the publications drew any parallel between the circumstances surrounding the arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah members and the case of the Singapore People’s Liberation Organization exposed in 1982 as planning unrest in Singapore by exploiting religious and racial issues with the objective of overthrowing the government by violent means<sup>16</sup>.

A variety of sub-topics associated with Jemaah Islamiyah were developed into discourses of religion, race, societal control, economic development, tourism and Islamic teaching, culminating in one of the most persuasive political symbols, i.e., a

---

<sup>16</sup> The information was extracted from the home page of Singapore’s Internal Security Department, Ministry of Home Affairs: [http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/isd/newsisd\\_earlyyears.html](http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/isd/newsisd_earlyyears.html)



threat to national security. Edelman (1977) observes that through the evocation of threats against the nation, people are induced to accept sacrifices and become susceptible to appeals for support. The securing of power by governments or dominant classes is helped by the role of the media (van Dijk, 1989). However, observations have shown that many of the discourses produced appear to mirror the inner problems in each society (Edelman, 1974). Newspapers externalize such problems while shaping the public's perception of threats (Cohen, 1972). For Brummett (2003:26), "perception is constructed in an active process that links 'things' to each other". The newspapers reported on the arrests within a frame that best fitted the interests of those they represent: their governments in the case of the *ST* and the *NST*, and business interests in the case of the *JP*.

The alleged terrorist bombings in Indonesia, blamed on *Jl*, lost their relevance to the discourse on terrorism in Southeast Asia within days of the blasts, except for the first Bali bombings, which occupied most of the pages of the *ST* and the *JP* and two editions of *Tempo*. The *NST* slipped the coverage of the first Bali bombings to inside pages after the third day of the coverage. The Marriott Hotel bombing lost relevance around the 10th day of reporting due to the arrest of the alleged terrorist Hambali in Thailand. The Australian Embassy bombing had a much less period of coverage probably due to the climate created by the presidential election in Indonesia and the 'soap opera' reporting of one 5-year old victim. The 2005 Bali bombings had the least period of coverage. The *ST* had the most extensive coverage of all events, perhaps because it is a large newspaper with over one hundred pages and better resources.

### **7.1.3 Roots of Violence**

Different assessments of the roots of violence reflected that there is no simple answer to the problem. Government officials and experts provided the alleged reasons for the bombings, while the publications failed to produce balanced stories about other potential root causes such as ideological differences, the bombers' alienation from those in power, social grievances, etc. It is important to make clear that government officials in Malaysia and Singapore in addition to other experts were responsible for the claims that the root of violence is to create an Islamic state enveloping various countries in the region.

#### **7.1.3.1 JI and the creation of an Islamic caliphate**

The predominant way in which the roots of violence were framed in the news was the creation of an Islamic state, especially regarding the arrests of JI members. The *ST* blamed the Indonesian government's inertia against Islamic militants. The paper also reported on the anniversaries of the attack against the US warship Cole in Yemen and of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington as the reasons for radicals to plan assaults against US targets.

In the second round of arrests, the *ST* presented the motives of violence as (i) to incite religious-ethnic conflict between Malaysia and Singapore, (ii) to create an Islamic state and (iii) attacks against Western interests.

The *JP*'s reporting touched on the possibility of militancy committed by disenchanted people due to inequality and corruption in Indonesia. In the second round of arrests, the *JP* reported on signs of a frustrated population, but did not

pursue the topic of social issues as a reason for militancy. In addition, the *JP* also reported on allegations by the Australian authorities that JI had plans to kill President Megawati.

The *NST* reported on the roots of violence as lying in a desire by some people to overthrow the Malaysian government in order to establish an Islamic state, and to undermine democracy. *Tempo* mostly repeated the causes presented by *ST*.

#### **7.1.3.2 The roots of violence in the context of the bombings**

In the case of the bombings the newspapers framed the motives of violence in a wide range of social and political issues. In every bombing the newspapers reported different sets of reasons but ultimately linking the violence to the creation of an Islamic state.

In the Bali bombings, the *ST*'s reporting ranged from condemning Indonesian intelligence as weak, pin-pointing rivalry among Indonesian agencies, accusing Indonesian authorities for not heeding international warnings on the existence of terrorists in the country, to implying the bombing was a reprisal for the Iraq invasion.

The *JP* blamed the Bali bombings on the lack of law enforcement in Indonesia and on weak government. The *NST* said the attacks could have had domestic implications, as found in racial discrimination in Bali between Muslims and Hindus and between locals and Westerners. About 92% of Bali's population of 3 million people adhere to Hinduism while 5% follow Islam (World Fact Book). Therefore, it can hardly be referred to as 'racial discrimination' or 'religious discrimination'.

*Tempo* did not produce a reason for the Bali bombings but mentioned the exploitation of Hindu temples and religious symbols by the tourist industry on the island.

In the case of the Marriott Hotel bombing, the *ST*'s reporting framed the trial of the Bali bombers in terms of their aim to establish a Pan-Islamic state. The *NST* stressed the Malaysian authorities' views that the bombing was fuelled by JI's objective to create an Islamic state in the region. The *JP* framed the Marriott Hotel bombing in terms of its alleged intent to influence the court decision in the trials of the Bali bombers; to target national and international political elites who often met at the hotel; to distract people from the annual parliamentary session; and to challenge the government. *Tempo* mostly repeated the reasons presented by the *JP* and the *ST*.

In its coverage of the Australian embassy bombing, the *ST* considered the third anniversary of the 9/11 attacks as one of the motivations for the bombing; to influence the outcome of the Indonesian presidential election as another; and to protest against the presence of Australian troops in Iraq as a third. The *JP* and *Tempo* reported that 'terrorists' wanted to humiliate Indonesian intelligence officials. The *NST*'s coverage did not produce a clear motivation.

The publications did not address why JI allegedly only started making headlines as a group of terrorists after the 9/11 events. It is well documented that for decades groups of militants had been trying to install an Islamic state (Kingsbury, 2001; Tan, 2003; Thayer, 2004). It remains to be explained why the Bali, Marriott Hotel and the Australian embassy bombings were linked to global terrorism when Indonesia has been a victim of a series of bombings and ethnic and religious violence since long before 9/11.

In the views of Zachary Abuza (2005:49), “terrorist attacks by Jemaah Islamiyah had been carried out around the region since the year 2000 but neither regional security services nor journalists nor academics ever linked the attacks to JI or terrorism”. Thus, the approach confirms the perspective embraced by Mohammad<sup>17</sup> (1999) that if violence is against foreigner targets or if there are foreigners among the victims, then it is labelled terrorism. The four publications in question did not address such issues but followed uncritically the discourse of ‘global terrorism’ offered by official sources and terrorism experts. In other words, it appeared that the root of violence was defined within the context of national interests. By comparison, one could argue that even though the London (July 2005) and Madrid bombings (March 2004) were not against foreigners, the reporting of those bombings was nevertheless framed within the ‘global war on terror’ discourse. However, the 2006 bombing at a parking garage at Madrid’s international airport was framed within the ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) discourse. The group acknowledged responsibility. ETA aims to create an independent Basque state. It was formed in 1959 in reaction to the dictator Franco’s suppression of the Basque language and culture.

#### **7.1.4 Violence and Religion**

The acts of violence were framed within the discourse of international pressure on Indonesia to arrest radical Muslim groups, the implication being that radical Islam breeds terrorists and thus the need to reform Islamic teaching. In such a context, the *ST* presented Indonesia in an ‘Orientalist’ discourse (Said, 1978) as its ‘Other’, where radicals are irrational. The *ST* repeated the idea that al-Qaeda shaped Jemaah

---

<sup>17</sup> The weaknesses or strengths of Mohammad’s argument are contestable, as a reviewer has pointed it out.

Islamiyah ideology (Chalk, 2002). In addition, the perpetrators were referred to by their religion. Some critics would argue that there is nothing wrong with calling the ‘terrorists’ Muslims. However, characterizing the perpetrator by his/her religion runs the risk of generalization (Picard, 1991).

The newspapers equated Islamic extremists with terrorists, and this equation tends to obstruct the public’s ability to distinguish between religion and the action of extremists (Esposito, 1987, 2003). This tendency confirms Thayer’s (2005:92,93) suggestion that international terrorism experts and regional security analysts pieced together all militant Islamic groups without differentiating between political terrorism and Islamic militancy, with the latter being a broad-based, diverse movement.

The connection between violence and religion was reinforced by stories on ‘good’ Muslims and ‘bad’ Muslims, ‘moderate’ Muslims and ‘radical’ Muslims. The interpretations given by the newspapers on what constitutes a bad or a good, a moderate or a radical Muslim derived from the social values dominating in each society (van Dijk, 1989). These values were reproduced in the news stories as injunctions: do not challenge the government, do not disturb the social order, do not incite racial discord, do not interrupt economic development, do not commit violence, greet your neighbour, watch over your neighbour.

The *ST* was the most active in reporting on a variety of sub-topics concerning Islam. These ranged from how Islam is not a religion of violence to aspects of forgiveness of the religion, and on how some individuals exploit the religion. By tying a positive image of Islam with what Islam is not about in its op-ed and commentary articles, the *ST* reinforced the perception of deviance among Muslims, but not among other religions in Singapore’s multi-cultural society. Therefore,

Muslims were put in the spotlight. The *ST* persistently quoted Singaporean authorities on the need for moderate Muslims to condemn these acts of violence and to speak out against radicals. In this way, the *ST* was constructing a deeper social divide by encouraging some Muslims to take a stand against other Muslims. However, one could argue that the newspaper was pointing out the need to break the equation of ‘Muslim terrorist’ in the public mind.

The *JP* did the least of the three newspapers to contextualize violence within a discourse on Islam. Nevertheless, the *JP* followed the line of official sources by identifying the perpetrators by their names and to link them to ‘JI’. In most instances, the *JP* reproduced and paraphrased the authorities’ use of religious categorizations to refer to the bombers and touched lightly on the issues of the madrassahs and the teaching of Islam. It appeared that the *JP* safeguarded one of its commercial interests (Bayuni, 1996), and opted not to emphasize a discourse on religion. One reason for this could be concerns with provoking possible assaults against the newspaper’s installations. Mob attacks against media organizations and journalists have happened in parts of Indonesia since the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998, particularly when radicals regarded the reporting as unacceptable (Koike<sup>18</sup>, 2003; Romano, 2003). Another reason, as was pointed out to the researcher in conversation with the editor Endy Bayuni, is *JP*’s recognition that madrassahs have an important role in providing education in Indonesia because of the government’s failure in this area.

The *NST* constructed the discourse of religion around the framework of radicals with political intentions in Malaysia. Despite op-ed articles defending Islam as a

---

<sup>18</sup> International Institute for Asian Studies, the Netherlands, <http://www.iias.nl/iiasn/30/index/html>

religion of peace, more often than not Malaysian authorities referred to the bombers as Muslims. The 'Other' (Said, 1978) in Malaysia's Orientalist discourse was the radical group KMM. The *NST* reflected the Malaysian authorities' concerns with the teachings of Islam in parts of the country but did not make an issue out of this matter. *Tempo* did not present a discourse on religion. One explanation could be that the magazine did not associate the acts of violence with faith.

As Sederberg (1989:29) observes, "placing terrorism in a wider web of social and political relations contributes to more muted denunciation". Risakotta<sup>19</sup> (2003) observes that the connection between religion and violence in Indonesia has become ubiquitous since the events of 11 September 2001. Risakotta considers that "violence also includes profound cultural elements that are embedded in the tradition, stories, rituals, *adat* (traditional law) that are part of the identity of the people". Thus, the association of the bombings with Islamic militancy and Islam as religion in the reporting can be understood as filling in the tapestry with a variety of sub-topics purposely linked (Ghanem, 1997). What was awkward about this was that the characterization of the bombers was mainly attributable to official sources and was found in a large number of articles on aspects of Islam. Some of the op-ed stories on Islam had no relevance to the reporting of the bombings. However, a construction that connects one topic to another serves to reinforce a particular position, in Sederberg's (1989:44) view "what we see to be the facts of a problem affects how we think about it". Yet, as Nacos (2006) pointed out, "terrorism originated with religious and pseudoreligious sects and that the adherents of the major religions, among them the

---

<sup>19</sup> International Institute for Asian Studies, the Netherlands, <http://www.ias.nl/iasn/30/index/html>



Christians, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and Sikhs, resorted to political violence in the name of God” (p.38).

## **7.2 Main Differences in News Construction of Terrorism**

The major dissimilarity between the publications appeared to lie in their conceptualization of terrorism in each of the bombings and in the arrests of JI members. Nonetheless, the ultimate concept was the threat of violence by Islamic militants.

### **7.2.1 Main Differences in the Conceptualization of Terrorism**

The overall concept of terrorism was framed within a constellation of co-related issues and sub-topics. These topics were based on historical events and nation building principles to preserve economic development (Menon, 1994) and the safeguarding of the political and ideological status quo. The newspapers reported on them as highly concrete and relevant.

This confirms Edelman’s (2001) argument that various interpretations of terrorism appear to serve the interests of those the newspapers represent. In the case of Singapore and Malaysia, both the *ST* and the *NST* are government influenced newspapers and are therefore likely to have agendas that are at least in part defined by government. By contrast, the *JP* is linked to a conglomerate of business groups and the newspaper’s and the state interests might not coincide. As part of the Kompas-Gramedia media empire, the *Jakarta Post* with its “prized readership” made up from

“affluent, educated, English-literate readership of foreign and domestic business leaders, political opinion-makers and the diplomatic community” (Sen & Hill, 2000:60), certainly interpreted the events within its group’s interests. Such influence could be the reason for *JP*’s sharp criticism of former President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s government and her inability to fight terrorism, a style of media behaviour unthinkable in the *ST* and *NST* in relation to their countries’ leaders.

#### **7.2.1.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism in the context of the JI arrests**

The news on the JI arrests was framed as plots to attack US targets in Singapore, to promote anarchy in Indonesia, and to exemplify jihad in Malaysia. In the second round of arrests, the idea of terrorism had evolved to represent a threat to Singapore’s national security and racial harmony while Indonesian authorities were in denial of the existence of terrorist cells in the country. The *JP* was calling for an investigation into Singapore’s allegations.

In Malaysia, terrorism was framed as anarchy with the aim of overthrowing the government in a reference to the KMM militant group linked to the opposition party PAS (Chalk, 2005).

#### **7.2.1.2 Conceptualization of Terrorism in the context of the Bombings**

In the case of the bombings, terrorism was interpreted as abstract threats: to national security, to racial harmony and as revenge against the arrest of alleged terrorists. The *ST* framed terrorism as a threat to national security and racial harmony as a problem of crisis proportions. It also made the violence in Indonesia “our own” with great

emotional engagement appeals (Taylor, 2000). The *JP* framed terrorism as a threat to the country's economy and national stability. The *NST* portrayed terrorism as related to threats from Islamic militants to overthrow the government and a threat to racial harmony between people of different races and religions in Malaysia and in Singapore.

These varied interpretations confirm scholarly discussions that terrorism means different things to different people (Sederberg 1989; Atkins, 1992; Held, 1997; Nacos, 2000; Sorel, 2003; Tuman, 2003; Venkat, 2004).

In Singapore the view that terrorism represented a threat to racial harmony reflects the understanding described by Kuo (1983; 1999) as “the potential conflict between loyalty to one's ethnic community and loyalty to the wider national community”. The multi-ethnic structure of Singapore comprises 77% Chinese, 15% Malays, 6% Indians and 2% other smaller ethnic groups (Kuo, 1983, 1999; Kassim, 2002). The three main ethnic groups are encouraged to see themselves as having separate ethnic and cultural identities and, at the same time, as members of a unified nation (Kitley & Mules, 2000:88). The most recent initiative to define group identity was undertaken by MUIS to understand the process and challenges of forming the Singaporean Muslim identity (Salleh, M., *Today*, 21 September 2005, p.3).

Singapore has a pro-active stance to the formation of the nation identity with foci on secure economic growth and harmonious ethnic ties. In 1988 then cabinet minister Lee Hsien Loong, addressing journalists at the Singapore Press Club said, “You must educate Singaporeans – not just with facts, but also in terms of national education and values. The press moulds the perception of Singaporeans. It should do so constructively – both supporting national campaigns and also day to day, in the way

news is presented, analysed, organized” (Loo, 2000:217). Lee Hsien Loong became Singapore’s third prime minister in August 2004. He replaced Go Chok Tong, who stepped down after 14 years in power.

In order to strengthen the construction of a national identity, the media in Singapore “tends to use narrative frameworks and subjects that stress civic interpretations that emphasise tolerance, solidarity and compassion as nation values to provide a common core around political order and social stability” (Kluver & Weber, 2003, citing Kluver and Powers, 1999; Waisbord, 2004). In the past Singapore has witnessed instability caused by racial tensions, as for example in December 1950, again in May 1955 and in September 1964 (Nair, 1989; Tan, 1991; Kluver & Weber 2003). This kind of narrative about social instability in the past and the need for tolerance tend to create fear of instability in the society.

The *NST*’s construction of terrorism as a threat to racial harmony reflects claims by the Malaysian government that JI members wanted to incite ethnic discord. The Malays comprise 60% of the population while Chinese and Indians comprise 24% and 7% respectively. The two groups of ‘minorities’ (Chinese and Indian) traditionally dominate the local economy (Reardon, 2005). It appears that the framing of terrorism in this case is based on historical events. It is believed that since the race riots in 13 May 1969, the Malaysian media have the role to maintain racial harmony and political stability (Loo, 2000:210). Sederberg explains that, “within dominant systems of values, some positions may be defined as ‘extreme’ or ‘utopian’, and thus are easily ignored rather than fairly debated” (1989:9). Quasthoff (1989), van Dijk (1989), and Campbell (1995), argue that claims of threats to racial harmony based on perceptions of social prejudice in terms of wealth, social recognition and community

position is a resource for the use of political power. Semetko (2004:358) calls this kind of claim a “frame of political opportunity”.

Appendices A (p.289), A.1 (p.290), A.2 (p.291) and A.3 (p.292), provide a visual of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ and the subcategories drawn from the study: images of terrorists, roots of violence, connection between violence and religion. The fourth subcategory, the victims, has not been included.

I believe the media coverage of the victims deserves a full and independent investigation. The real victims of the bombings just happened to be at the wrong place at the time and they were involuntary players in the production of massive news reporting, especially in the case of 2002 Bali bombings. In the other bombings the victims were largely ignored while attention was given to the targets: the JW Marriott Hotel and the Australian Embassy. Other buildings badly affected by the explosions were not mentioned in the stories. Another aspect is that extraordinary media attention to the victims compels governments to take actions in order to prevent terrorist acts. Governments can take advantage of the situation and implement social policies that tend to curb civil liberties. In places where freedom of expression and civil liberties are taken for granted, people tend to compromise some restraints immediately after terrorist acts (Nacos, 2006), but in places where freedom of expression is regulated and civil liberties a façade, more control can have diverse consequences.

On the other hand, emotion-laden human-interest stories are high on most newspapers’ agendas. These stories have the potential to increase the drama and its news value either for commercial or political reasons – but this was not the case with the *News Straits Times*; the newspaper hardly reported on the victims. The role of the

*NST* can be seen to be twofold: one that the newspaper was not giving the terrorists any distinction for conducting their atrocities; the second, that the new format of the newspaper does not provide space for extraordinary media coverage, but only to report on the events.

### **7.3 The Framing of News and its Implications**

The social and political consequences of the framing of terrorism in the news reflected an understanding that national unity, quality of life and wealth were at risk. McLeod and Hertog (1999), argue that “the media are linked to the social power structure, including political, business, educational and religious institutions”, and “these ties shape the nature of mass-mediated control messages” (p.309). In order to guarantee national security and to maintain civic order and continuous economic development, it became necessary to introduce new public policies to promote social control with the view to deterring terrorist related activities. These initiatives were widely reproduced in the publications’ coverage. McLeod and Hertog (1999) argue that “mechanisms” of social control embedded within the media messages include story framing, reliance on official sources and depictions of protest groups’ deligitimation. (p.305); the approach tends to create homogeneity in media portrayals of events and accentuate public support for the status quo.

The comparison of news coverage in representative publications of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore has allowed a number of dominant hypotheses in the sociology of news such as homogenization narrative, partisan tones, and a high proportion of interpretation and opinion mixed with factual reporting (Benson & Hallin, 2007) to be assessed.

### **7.3.1 *Straits Times***

The *ST*'s broad range of themes included calls for increased surveillance by citizens, the need to manage relations between races and religions and encouragements issued to Malays to be moderate. The framing of terrorism also promoted Singapore as a medical hub in the region, especially serving Indonesia. The *ST* portrayed Singapore as a good neighbour with offers to help fighting radicals and suggestions on counter-terrorism measures; in addition, it emphasized how charitable Singaporeans were. The latter theme tended to demonstrate a loving, caring people that are not driven by materialistic purposes.

### **7.3.2 *Jakarta Post***

The *JP* framed terrorism in relation to Indonesia's economic interests, usually expressed in terms of the need for the government to maintain foreign investors' confidence in Indonesia and to maintain tourism as a source of revenue. The *JP* framed violence as 'normal', historical and committed by a few culprits. In its reportage of the latest bombings, the *JP* framed terrorism with the view to encourage community surveillance and the monitoring of residents. One of the results could mean the return of the kind of abuses committed during the Suharto regime against the population, when the military had a free hand to act against alleged individuals who could represent a threat to the nation. The framing of news concerned with terrorism appeared to have been delineated by Indonesia's rich neighbours, Singapore

and Australia. Both countries are among major investors in Indonesia's economy, along with the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, China, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The news in the *JP* became drowned out by the 'global war on terrorism' and Australian interests. Indonesia started adopting counter-terrorism measures in answer to international pressure.

### **7.3.3 *New Straits Times***

The *NST* constructed terrorism within a frame of political power as a threat from the opposition. Terrorism was also framed so as to make it possible to combat violent crimes and to stop the teaching of radical Islam. A domestic audience was the target. As result, the framing suggested that the government was not to accept political challenges and any disturbance of civic order. Security was increased to protect the population against gangs and crimes that could be associated with terrorism. The use of the Internal Security Act was framed as a measure for making Malaysia safe and something that should be adopted by Indonesia.

The publications tailored and contextualised the framing of terrorism within historical and prevailing interests in each country. Nevertheless, the global discourse on 'the war on terror' provided a larger frame for the reporting that constructed a perceived emergence of terrorism by Islamic militants as a problem of crisis proportions. International and local interests set the agenda for the coverage. The *ST*, the *JP* and the *NST* uncritically subscribed to the official lines, resulting in the endorsement and reinforcement of dominant power structures.

Figure (1) shows an overview of the claims and consequences of news framing as addressed in the newspapers.



**Figure 1**

The News Frame of Terrorism and its Consequences

<i>ST</i>	Result	<i>JP</i>	Result	<i>NST</i>	Result
1-Increased surveillance, organization of lives of citizens.	Do not challenge the government. Do not disturb social order.	1- Economic interests: to maintain the flow of foreign investments and international tourism.	Do not interrupt economic development. Quick arrest of culprits.	1-Political power: the establishment and anti-establishment; KMM/PAS vs. UMNO.	Do not challenge the government. Do not disturb social order.
2- Race Relations: reformulate madrassahs. Malays must be moderate. Chinese must be friendly.	Moderate versus radical Muslims. Reform of Islamic teachings.	2- Violence taken for granted as normal and historical.	Islamic militancy and political terrorism were drowned together.	2-Terrorism framed to address domestic audience.	Police action against gangs and crimes allegedly associated with terrorism.
3- Medical centre for tourism and terrorism victims.	Regional medical hub.	3-Discourse of terrorism became subordinated to rich neighbours while news became drowned out by Australian interests.	Singapore and Australia are among the major investing partners of the Indonesian economy along with US, UK and some other countries.	3-Radical teaching of Islam in parts of the country.	To fight the teaching of radical Islam.
4- Foreign Diplomacy: Pressure on Indonesia to act on Islamic militants. Good neighbour relations. It offers support to Indonesia	Newspaper constructed Islamic militancy terrorism as a problem of crisis proportions.	4- Lately, the newspaper made calls for increased community surveillance and residents monitoring.	Some of the old habits of military abuse could re-appear.	No threat of terrorism in Malaysia	The Internal Security Act is efficient in the fight against terrorism.

The figure reveals the primary themes and purposes of news framing observed.

#### **7.4 News Production: Resources Utilized in the Framing of Terrorism**

Schudson (1995) argues that there are three conditions under which the ideal of objectivity is suspended: tragedy, danger and a threat to national security. Cohen-Almagor (2001), however, believes that objective reporting is often rather wishful thinking because journalists cannot help being subjective. In the cases of the publications studied, it is relevant to bear in mind that the relationships of the media with the centres of power determined particular media biases.

Considering that in Malaysia, media should be “constructive, consensual and development-orientated” (Loo, 2000:218), in Singapore, “the mainstream press is ideologically aligned with the state” (George, 2006: 49), and in Indonesia, where the press is still “a member of the development team” (Romano, 2000:55)<sup>18</sup>, certain aspects of the coverage were emphasized more than others through the use of news framing. Some of the frames focused on patriotism or foreign policy, along with other news production resources that included the use of headlines to convey messages, interviews with suspected terrorists, and stories based on intelligence information.

##### **7.4.1 Media Patriotism**

When a traumatic event like the Bali bombings happens, the media show their true colours by losing objectivity in reporting and toeing the official line (Schudson, 1995; Navasky, 2002: xiv, xv; Johnson-Cartee, 2005). The *ST* and the *NST*’s reporting presented different levels of discourse on patriotism, a characteristic not observed in either the *JP*’s or *Tempo*’s reporting. One explanation could be the historical fact that

---

<sup>18</sup> The author claims that the quote refers to the media’s situation during Suharto, and not to describe the media’s conditions that exist after Suharto’s 1998 resignation from the presidency.

the press in Malaysia and Singapore has been used to foster national unity and identity.

The *ST*'s reporting had represented nation building (Anderson, 1996), and racial harmony. It contributed to heightening anxiety by framing Singapore as a nation at risk (Norris, et al., 2003) in what Waisbord (2002, 2004) calls 'chauvinist' media patriotism. Waisbord (2004:389) describes 'chauvinist' media patriotism as being the role of the media in "heightening anxiety about foreign risks to the nation; the demonization of the 'others', coverage of moral panics affecting the nation".

The *NST*'s patriotic discourse was based on how well the country had done in dealing with threats from 'Islamic militants', and how investors know that Malaysia is not a country at risk.

Media patriotism follows the adage 'think correctly' and 'act correctly', often telling stories of tasks accomplished well under difficult and harsh conditions (Yu, 1963:260).

Media patriotism is a constant feature in the *ST*. Examples can be found in its reporting of viral epidemics, such as the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) crisis and the threat of dengue fever, where Singaporeans were exhorted to be united against such a malaise (Lewis, 2006:62). The *NST*'s patriotic reporting is evident in its coverage of illegal migrants from Indonesia in Malaysia and of disputes with Singapore, such as that over water supply.

The *ST* used extensively the news framing of mood creation in its coverage of the bombings with emotional appeals to fear and tragedy, and with a sense of anger and distrust (Edelman, 1977; Rajecki 1990; Glassner, 1999). One of the peculiarities of

the *ST*'s reporting was its 'domestication' or localization of news. 'Domestication', the process of 'bringing information home', occurs when far-away events are framed in a 'relevant' form to appeal to domestic audiences (Clausen, 2003:15, citing Gurevitch, Levy and Roeh, 1991; Louw, 2005:263). In the *ST*'s reporting the bombings were framed not *if* but *when* it might happen 'here'. This shows that the *ST* created the mood of "threatening situations then promise salvation, contingent on people's continued support" (Graber, 1981:209; 1993).

Abel (2005) argues that the "discourse of crisis is one of the main strategies adopted by the Singapore government to maintain its ideology of control, anchor its people to the nation and create a climate of domestic uncertainty about the fragility of the state and the economy" (Abel, 2005:92). By contrast, the *NST* maintained the line that the country was doing well in fighting terrorism and the government had confidence that investors recognized that Malaysia was a country not in danger of acts of terrorism. Thus the *NST* presented a more positive image of the country. But on the other hand, in the reports of the bombings the *NST* presented a 'generic vagueness' in comparison with the *ST* and the *JP*. The reason can be either because most of its coverage was sourced to news agencies or because it did not want to create an atmosphere of domestic crisis. The *ST* on the other hand provided saturation coverage with stories on a wide-range of topics. One could argue the *ST*'s extensive and detailed reporting functioned to make the accounts more authentic and plausible (Potter, 1996). The *ST*'s reportage showed strong traits of communal mass communication and its relationship with nationalism (Pye, 1963:20). This tendency was observed in its frequent messages about unity; its appeals for public support; its claims of how 'bad' they ['Other'] are and of how well 'we' are doing; and its systematic repetition of information. In sum, the media patriotism used in the *ST* and

the *NST* was in support of their own governments whereas the *JP* undermined support for Indonesia's political leaders and in people's trust in government institutions (Brewer, Aday & Gross, 2003).

#### **7.4.2 Use of Headlines to Convey Interpretations**

The *ST* mostly used particular headlines to convey messages and sometimes opinions. The practice was not applied all the time. As Reah (2002) and Silverblatt (2001) observe, headlines are the window to a news story. Their function is to inform the reader about the story, to condense the story in a few words and to attract attention. But Reah (2002:32) argues that, "in the attempt to attract readers to a story, headlines can be ambiguous, confusing or still be used as an opinion manipulator". Examples of this are the following: 'Is that my brother?' (*ST*, 15 October 2002, p.8); 'Top politicians going soft on Bashir' (Go, R., *ST*, 22 October 2002, p.1); 'Bashir may be arrested but Hambali still directs JI' (*ST*, 23 October 2002p.A6); 'More grief on Sunday?' (Asmarani, D., *ST*, 12 August 2003, p. A1); 'Can this happen in Singapore?' (Nirmala, M., Laurel Teo, L., *ST*, 7 August 2003, p.3); 'Singaporeans must unite against common threat' (Soh, N., *ST*, 11 September 2004, p. A4); 'Manny's dad: My wife never cheated on me' (Xueying, L. *ST*, 19 September 2004, p.14).

The *NST* used leading headlines to portray a positive view of Malaysia. For example, 'Najib: Situation here well under control' (*NST*, 10 August 2003, p.: 4); 'Malaysia is now an excellent role model in war on terror' (Pollard, R., *NST*, 11 September 2004, p.20). The *JP* was the newspaper with the least headlines providing or anchoring interpretations, despite a few cases of sensationalism, for example, 'Two

fathers of 5-year-old-Jakarta blast victim' (Ng, A., *JP*, 14 September 2004, p.2), in addition to titles critical to the President, 'Mega's poor leadership hurts nation' (Nafik, M., *JP*, 29 October 2002, p.2).

#### **7.4.3 JI 'Official' Gives Interview**

The *ST* was the only newspaper to present information obtained from a 'JI official'. The *ST*'s strategy can be interpreted as, firstly, seeking a balanced approach with information provided by terrorists, presenting both sides of the story, and secondly, the 'relationship' between *ST* and JI as conferring respectability to JI's representative (Nacos, 2000; 2002). One could argue that the second point was hardly part of the *ST*'s strategy, but instead it was an outcome that perhaps the newspaper anticipated but was not concerned about it.

#### **7.4.4 Faceless Source of Information**

Faceless information providers, such as 'eyewitnesses', 'a police guard', 'hospital officials' and particularly 'intelligence sources', were observed to various degrees in all four publications. The problem with 'intelligence sources' is that their accounts are based on intelligence information and is therefore not verifiable. Willis (1990) argues that anonymity and confidentiality robs the reader and editors of the chance to judge the veracity of the information.

#### **7.4.5 Leak of Information**

Public authorities are the prime producers of data and information. However, the *ST* demonstrated not only to have ‘certified’ relationship with sources within the JI group but also to be the favoured newspaper to receive and be permitted to publish secret official documents provided by intelligence sources. Tiffen (1989) argues that leaks are used with the intention to affect policy changes, to dramatize a problem and to force a government to take action, but it is not clear when it is legitimate to use confidential sources or secret documents as the basis for news stories. The *ST* published ‘secret documents’ with the intention to produce drama and to mobilize a reaction against the militants while putting pressure on Indonesian authorities to act against the alleged suspects.

#### **7.4.6 Foreign Policy Frame**

Media diplomacy is not new in some countries in Southeast Asia. Throughout Flor Contemplacion’s affair and her execution, there were fierce exchange of ‘messages’ between Singapore and the Philippines (Kitley & Mules, 2000). A Singaporean court convicted Contemplacion, a Filipina maid, of killing another Filipina maid and the three years old Singaporean son of her employer on 4 May 1991. Flor Contemplacion was hanged on 17 March 1995. The execution caused major media and diplomatic row between Singapore and the Philippines, after Singapore rejected an appeal from the Philippines President, Fidel Ramos.

Singapore and Malaysia are constantly exchanging messages through their newspapers. More recently the practice has been observed between Australia and

Singapore in the case of the hanging of an Australian citizen, Nguyen Tuong Van. The situation is no different between Indonesia and Singapore.

O’Heffernan (1993) observes that media influence foreign policy decisions both by what they report and how they report, particularly by giving overall political salience. The *ST* and the *NST* used their coverage of the JI arrests in Singapore and the bombings to convey messages demanding that Indonesia act against radical Muslims. In turn, the *JP* and *Tempo* conveyed messages demanding that Singapore should prove there were terrorists in Indonesia.

Gilboa (2002:740,741) argues that, “international mediation by journalists may raise difficult ethical and professional problems”. The fact that in the Cold War era leaders used media diplomacy because there were no adequate direct channels of communication does not apply to Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Therefore, one of the implications of media diplomacy between these countries is that ASEAN’s (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) fundamental principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs is observed less than it seems since the newspapers work as unofficial mouthpieces of their governments or of organizations they represent (Menon 1994).

#### **7.4.7 ‘Standardization’ of Sources of Information**

The publications used standard sources. The journalists used the same group of informants, particularly elite sources who occupied positions of power within government organizations. High prestige sources and government officials usually provide the authoritative and trustworthy criteria journalists look for in a source of



information (Tuchman 1978; Borquez, 1993; Sahr, 1993; Johnson-Cartee, 2005). The publications also drew on the same wire services. This is a paradox since the elites, particularly in Malaysia, regularly censure the international media. It was not clear, however, whether journalists had approached sources with views that did not fit the common line (Ambrosio de Nelson, 2004). Strentz (1989) argue that government and institutionalized informants are ‘conventional sources’ that perpetuate the status quo. Therefore, at least three understandings become clear: one, that the media is passive to the elite sources of information; secondly, that the use of mainly official sources in the coverage reveals the extent to which media and state are associated; and thirdly, that agency newswire are providing the kind of content the publications want.

While the *ST* used institutionalized sources and models of propaganda (Pye, 1963), the *NST* published views from institutionalized sources in addition to some differences of opinion within government sources.

News stories on public reaction to the bombings were absent from the *NST*’s reporting. The *ST* and *JP* journalists made extensive use of ‘experts’ but failed to describe the experts’ connections to the various intelligence agencies and governments. Nevertheless, as Sahr (1993) argues, journalists do not simply select experts randomly, “governments and persons in authoritative positions certify the sources” (p.160).

## **7.5 Role of Journalists in their Social Context**

Journalists are constantly under various pressures. There is no time for carefully crafted stories. A newspaper article must go through a process of production: from the

reporter to the copy editor, to managing editor, to the headline writer before it appears in print. In the process, messages may contain unintended layers of meanings, that is, some of the social conditions of the journalist and the newsgroup may affect the final product and the embedded cultural and attitudes values can appear in the stories.

In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, the media's role is to promote nation building. Their function is to disseminate a set of practices and values in what Benedict Anderson has identified as "culturally coordinated" communities (Anderson, 1983, 1996). In Indonesia it remains to be seen what direction the media will be allowed to develop within the process of democratization under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former general under Suharto's New Order regime that was in power from 1965 to 1998. The stepping down of Suharto paved the way for a more liberal media. Despite the flourishing of publications and the exercise of a measured freedom, the laws regulating the media in Indonesia are still in place. In addition, there are controversial changes to the criminal code being drafted by the government that threaten the initial flurry of press freedom seen after Suharto's 32-year rule.

## **Chapter Eight: Inter-relationships of theories**

The September 11, 2001, attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., the 'war on terror' and the high profile bombings in Indonesia were engulfed in the spectre of 'global terrorism'. The 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 JW Marriott Hotel bombing, the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing and the 2005 Bali bombings were reported within the same breath as Western media reported on other attacks in other parts of the world such as in London, Madrid and New York.

The 'war on terror' is a rich current framing case, argues Reese (2007), saying that it is likely to be the most important of our time, and illustrates some challenges for researchers (p.152). Reese also argues that the 'war on terror' has been elevated to a macro-framework that comes closer to ideology, with political debates taking place within the boundaries set by the frame and general acceptance of the assumption built into it (ibid). The 'war on terror' frame appears to have played an important part in the shaping of press coverage in a manner similar to the anti-communism narrative of the Cold War. The solution to deal with the 'war on terror' emanates from this framework with calls for a 'war' on dissents, militant groups, management of race, the management of Islamic studies, etc.

The media spectacle produced by the publications studied reinforce Van der Veer's (2004) proposal about the inter-connectedness of national and global issues and media performance to the [mis] understanding of acts of violence. However, to

look into Indonesian issues through a global lens may result in shortcomings and serious limitations (Sidel, 2006).

Different conflicts or acts of violence need to be assessed and defined on an individual basis. However, Cole (2006:3) points out that such an exercise poses a challenge for the media, particularly in circumstances in which the act of violence is enveloped in a macro frame such as the 'war on terror'. In Cole's view, this macro frame is one of the effects of globalization when local groups seeking specific national objectives are bound together and become listed as international terrorist organizations, as has been the case of some groups in the Philippines<sup>19</sup>

The transformation of violent actions into terrorism requires an agent to explain the political, moral or discursive frames through which events are understood; therefore, questions on what are the motivations for the presentation of the facts have to be asked (Slocum, 2005:12). This study has demonstrated how the representations of acts of violence were construed in the media coverage. The publications' representations of the bombings have revealed the salience granted to certain aspects of the news and issues (and not others); the representations were institutionalised with strong reliance on sources from the authorities and their definitions of the circumstances (Dobkin, 2005). These representations have shown how some groups were stereotyped and positioned as deviant, and how others were granted legitimacy, as was the case of the Laskar Jihad<sup>20</sup> when it disbanded its members. In summary, it is fair to suggest that the news coverage was revealed as being rather stereotypical (Cottle, 2006).

---

<sup>19</sup> See page 77.

It is crucial to recognise the historical and cultural specificity of violent actions. Slocum (2005) points out that an appreciation of specific contexts and histories is often neglected in the construction and perception of a given act of violence. In the context of Malaysia, Cole (2006) claims there are several issues that could potentially contribute to the growth of militancy in the country. He points out matters such as corruption within the government, the control of the media and judiciary, the use of Internal Security Act, the unwillingness to let the opposition political party PAS implement Sharya law in Kelantan and so forth; issues that one way or the other have emerged in this study. Cole claims that the suggested problems are not fostering a growth in militancy (p.39); however he does not elaborate on the matters. Similarly, Woodier (2006) suggests that a number of possible motives for unrest or terrorism exist in Malaysia, although he neither enumerates nor elaborates on them. Hopefully, the examples drawn from the stories analysed in this project may provide a better understanding of the complexity of historical and cultural specifics and shift understanding away from the global discourse on the 'war on terror'.

The findings in this study confirm the observation made by Dennis Pluchinsky (2006:53) that one of the "by-product of the 9/11 attacks has been the way governments have used the terrorist attacks as an excuse to suppress opposition elements by designating them as terrorists, and in some cases, if they are Muslims, linking them to al-Qaeda". Woodier (2006:42) similarly advances his views that,

---

<sup>20</sup> *JP* 16 October 2002 p.1; *JP* 18 October 2002 p.2

“across the Asia Pacific region, governments are using the pretext of the ‘war on terror’ to curb basic freedoms or crack down on their domestic opponents”.

The ‘war on terror’ has placed the construction of Islam in a homogenised representation that does not make the distinction between Islamic traditions and the individual attachment to the faith. This global frame of Islam as portrayed in President George W. Bush’s interpretation of the events following 9/11 pointed to the inference that the attacks were carried out by Islamic fundamentalists, and that retaliatory measures would take place against the supporters of Islamic militancy (Spencer, 2005: 147, 148). This representation can affect how other non-Muslims view Islam. Thussu (2006:9) suggests that the U.S. and the British discourse on Islam have the tendency to present the world’s one billion Muslims as potential terrorists. In the case of the three countries studied, the publications tilt heavily towards the Eurocentric’s standpoint and reported on the perpetrators of the bombings in Indonesia within the global frame on radical Muslims. Even though the number of ‘terrorists’ in the news stories appeared to be limited, all groups with different social or political agendas were swallowed up in the ‘war on terror’ discourse.

The stance reflects the argument made by Karim (2004) that calls attention to the assumption that despite the journalistic principle of objectivity, the Western coverage of events in Muslim majority countries generically follows the framework set by powerful Western governments and Western media agencies. The result of the analysis confirms Karim’s claim in two areas: (i) Muslim majority countries (Indonesia and Malaysia) demonstrated to have uncritically and widely used the

production of Western newswire agencies; (ii) the local publications used the framework of the 'war on terror' to report on the high profile bombings in Indonesia.

The various news frames emerging from this thesis provide clarity about the game of politics, from the public acceptance of a fear-driven 'war on terror' to the election of a former general as the president of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the re-election of Prime Minister John Howard in Australia in 2004, to the management of race and Islamic studies: the management of impressions. As Woodward (2007) suggests, "to manage an event is not to escape politics or its hard choices but to invite assessment of the event's meaning in terms of known facts and the credibility of its authors" (p.4).

However, no journalist will admit that ideological forces shape their reporting. Yet, the study shows a homogenised reporting tendency in favour of specific angles. One reason could be that journalists are not critical enough to provide dissenting takes. Another possible rationale may be due to information management that is so effective that it disallows any other legitimate approach. One more cause can be that journalists ascribe to closely the ideological stance of their newspapers.

Kavoori (2006) argues that it is necessary to recognize the role the media plays in nationalism and public responsibility. The publications in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have legitimised the capitalist system and deligitimised dissent and opposition. This finding confirms the political economy perspective, particularly the "manufacturing of consent" paradigm, which holds that the media privileges

dominant views and values and marginalizes the opposition voices (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).

A comparison of the news coverage in representative publications from each country allows us to assess a number of the dominant assumptions in the sociology of news, as presented in chapter seven. The density of issues and problems uncovered in the study suggests that critical social theory needs to accommodate models that account for complexity and the historical roots of contemporary problems (Kellner, 2006:164). Altheide (2006) similarly proposes that social scientists and journalists must work together to provide theoretical understanding about how news practices are reflective of power, particularly in the reporting of conflicts in which dominant power has interest.

This thesis show that it is possible to demonstrate rigorously how the availability of some information and the lack of other information can result in depictions of a concerted, tightly-organized, transnational 'jihadist' conspiracy in Southeast Asia that might not exist or did not exist. As one could argue, if it does exist now, it could well be an unintended consequence of developments in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the role of al-Qaeda. And this would bear out Thayer's (2005) line of reasoning that militancy in Southeast Asia is routinely equated with terrorism (p.92) and international and regional experts link local groups with the al-Qaeda's network. As observed in the news stories, the complex issues were addressed from within a framework of political interests (Spencer, 2005). In Singapore, the media relationship with the state's agenda is predictable. In Malaysia, *NST* follows the agenda of the ruling party UMNO; nevertheless there are alternate voices of dissenting media in



Malaysia, something unheard of in Singapore. In Indonesia, despite the flourishing of media outlets it is still not clear what the state's agenda is. As Woodier (2006:59) says, political elites are making effort to regain central control over the flow of information and new alliances between political and business groups are materializing. State power as 'primary definer' varied little from a scenario of controlled media in a transition to democratic society (Indonesia) or in semi-democratic system (Malaysia and Singapore). The press in Malaysia and Singapore demonstrated itself to be more attuned to ideology, whereas the Indonesian print media appears to be more critical of government institutions but not necessary adversarial. The Malaysian and Singaporean press coverage are more consonant with state agendas.

The publications' use of narratives on fear and anxiety contribute to authoritarian causes, as were the cases of Malaysia and Singapore. Giroux's (2006) has shown how the media markets fear and anxiety. He suggests that this is a new kind of politics used by state and corporate news to hype violence and to create the politics of fear. Giroux claims that, "the culture of fear combined with the spectacle of terrorism substitutes a sense of compassion and caring for the other with a concern for one's personal security and a deep distrust of others, especially if those others are Arab or Muslims" (p.11). Spencer (2005), on the other hand, suggests that "fear engenders hatred and fosters dependence on authority" (p.94). As a result, the politics of fear influences social routines and social interactions and these effects can reduce critical thinking and awareness about social changes and the implications of blanket adjustments in security and policy (Altheide, 2006:220).

The literature on media studies in Southeast Asia deals mostly with issues on press freedom and government and media relationships in the region. The literature on politics in Southeast Asia deals with dissenting voices and local conflicts, whereas the literature on sociology studies the social problems that could explain some of the conflicts. The broad literature on media and terrorism is in essence divided into popular culture, new media and thirdly on politics including security. There is an abundance of literature on terrorism published after 9/11 that deals with the new media's (e.g. the television news, television imaging, Internet) representation of terrorism in various parts of the world, but mainly confined within the Eurocentric's perspective and specifically with illustration focusing on the U.S. sphere of influence. Examples can be observed in recent literature put forward by Ben-Shaul (2006), Giroux (2006), Kellner (2005) and Martin and Petro (2006); however, it seems that an interdisciplinary literature connecting simultaneously the media, sociology and politics in Southeast Asia is limited or practically non-existent.

The strength of my work is that it brings together a multidisciplinary approach and therefore, a contribution to the theory of press study in the area of terrorism in selected countries of Southeast Asia. However, while trying to examine the news coverage of the events and to provide a regional perception on how the media in the selected countries reported on terrorism, the very act of theorizing the findings had to be set against Western theories due to a shortage of literature with a regional perspective.

One common aspect observed in the literature is the neglect of the victims in the aftermath of the violence (Farid 2006); when the victims stop being newsworthy they

tumble away from the public discourse and rarely enter into the scholarly discussion of media and terrorism. In various instances the publications analysed reported on the victims and witnesses in the days following the bombings. The stories were towards entertainment rather than concern with those affected by the attacks. Stories narrated by the victims or their families could help to understand the social and historical causes of the violence itself and probably contribute to different aspects of theoretical understanding of the media and terrorism.. In that way, the media may perform a more productive role in the social pacification of violence by giving vent to feelings of grief and publicly examining the arguments for and opposing interests and the identities involved in acts of violence (Cottle, 2006:165).

Theoretically, the study contradicts the view that terrorist groups become stronger with media coverage (Nacos, 2000). In the case of the three countries studied, the military, the police and institutions became stronger with the media cheering in support for tactics and policies for counter-terrorism. Furthermore, as White (1991) proposes, the coverage of terrorism is not helpful to terrorist groups because the media focus on violence rather on the causes for the attacks (p.259). In the cases studied the coverage did not present a discourse on the political motivations of the group; the alleged reasons for the bombings were advanced by official sources; and, there was no sympathetic angle in the reporting of the attacks.

Simply put, in order to consolidate a scholarly understanding of media coverage of acts of violence defined as terrorism in Southeast Asia, future research could include media aspects, political aspects, social background and comparison between media coverage of past and contemporary conflicts taken together. Until such research is

undertaken, our understanding of conflict and media will remain partial and subject to competing claims and controversy. In such a context, this study represents a valuable insight into contemporary news reporting in the region.

## Chapter Nine: Conclusion

The complexity of terrorism goes far beyond any possible given definition. Intertwined by criminal acts that are never reported as criminal, by political interests that are never stated, partnerships that are never really explained, and media frenzy, terrorism becomes a world of its own. But it is not that simple: politics feed on terrorism for policies while terrorism feeds on politics for radicalism. The media on the other hand feed on them both and create its own form of terrorism with the spreading of fear while giving the illusion of public participation. The reporting on violence becomes a content commodity. The readers are treated as consumers. The journalists are treated as tools. The product, news coverage, is crafted within the rationale of the relationships between media and the groups they are engaged with. The events, defined and described within ideological frames, are accepted unquestionably, at least in the case of the publications which have been studied here.

This study has shown that the media's reporting on terrorism in Southeast Asia has been highly tailored and politicised. Regional and national interests played significant roles in the way the publications reported on the events. The series of bombings in Indonesia analysed in this project and the arrests of suspected terrorists in Singapore were largely reported within the context of the global 'war on terror', which precludes a deeper understanding of terrorism and Islamic militancy in Indonesia.

The news coverage of the *Straits Times*, the *Jakarta Post*, the *New Straits Times* and *Tempo* magazine has demonstrated that journalists and officials were mutually

dependent on each other. There was no challenge to the official interpretation of the events. Probably that confirms one of the main beliefs in journalism regarding the silent but powerful choice of editors and selection of journalists.

The reporting in the four publications stressed the maintenance of economic development and civic order. Social values and the stability of the state were reported as being threatened by Islamic militants. The generalization has the effect of limiting tolerance and stimulating antagonism. Moreover, the ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ and the ‘image of terrorists’ were constructed and transmitted at face value. The group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was contextualized more as a threat to society and less as a threat to state integrity within their alleged desire to create an Islamic caliphate. Suspected members of the group were personified as deviant and dangerous. The name of Jemaah Islamiyah became synonymous with terrorism in Southeast Asia. This was a simplistic framework which the publications relied upon to make sense of events such as the 2002 Bali bombings and the rise of militant tendencies in Indonesia.

The media construction of terrorism and religion had a far-reaching connection, mainly because frequently the sources of information (government officials and experts) advanced the reason for the bombings as to create an Islamic state or to install the sharyah law, the Islamic law; however, the empirical analysis demonstrated differently. Newspapers’ editorials followed the same line. The terrorist acts were contextualized within the discourse of international pressure on Indonesia to arrest radical Muslims, with the alleged implication that radical Islam breeds terrorism; thus, the teaching of Islam in the madrassahs needs to be reformed. In such a context it is overwhelming to observe how the so-called ‘moderate’ Muslims (whatever that

means) has embraced the 'war on terror' and has also used the media to embarked on a path of justifications. However, the publications failed to report on the lack of a forum for political dissents, radicals or militants to express their views. The newspapers overlooked issues such as poverty, injustice, and other real or perceived grievances as being contributory factors towards the bombings.

There was a notable contrast between the way in which foreign and Indonesian victims were reported: the latter were to a large degree ignored. By concentrating on the foreign casualties, the publications encouraged readers to see the bombings as part of the global 'war on terror', rather than as events which had specific domestic causes that needed to be analysed and addressed independently of the global situation. Causation will always be an issue in such studies. To some degree, the publications may simply be reflecting and catering to the views of their readership rather than helping to form those views. But the current study makes clear that the tone and design of the media in the countries studied probably has a substantial effect in shaping the public's views about terrorism in Southeast Asia.

Some of the social and political consequences of the news framing of the bombings and the arrests were that to guarantee national security, to maintain civic order and continuous economic development new public policies were necessary along with the engagement of the population in surveillances. To me it is not clear whether surveillance by citizens can reduce the risk of terrorist acts or if it just functions as a tool for breeding distrust among people. Equally, the introduction of regulations on race relations and religious issues cannot guarantee that terrorist acts will not happen. Nevertheless, the publications were arguably performing a role that they had played since their countries became independent: that of fostering stability

and national development, and continuity of state dominance. However, one could argue that while state authorities might control the flow over of information, on the grounds of national security or on-going information, they cannot fully control what others, e.g. journalists and the reading public make of this information or non-information.

Aside from the criminal act that the bombings represent and the killing of innocent people terrorism can fall within any definition conceivably possible, as long as it fulfils the objectives of those who define what is terrorism.

Doubtlessly, terrorism creates fears in most people, but the mass media do not help allay those fears if they adopt institutions' agendas. Time exposes those agendas to be based on particularistic rather than national interests. The Bush administration waged a war against Iraq on the pretext of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, but these were nowhere to be found. The July 7 2005 bombings in London which killed 52 people are now acknowledged as an incident with no al Qaeda link (*Agence France Presse*, 'A modest, simple, plot', *Today*, 10 April 2006, p.14). It is tempting to associate bombings in Southeast Asia to the Jemaah Islamiyah group or some readily hated group. Unless we have diverse views and alternative representations, the news media in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore will continue to propagate hegemonic, perhaps dangerously, erroneous, ideas about terrorism. The value of this thesis is that it shows how press reporting and state authorities' interventions cannot necessarily be taken for granted.



## REFERENCES

### A

Abel, Sue (2005) 'Forward-Looking News? Singapore's News 5 and the Marginalization of the Dissenting Voice', in John Nguyet Erni & Siew Keng Chua (eds.) *Asian Media Studies Politics of Subjectivities*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 91-115.

Abuza, Zachary (2005) 'Al-Qaeda Comes to Southeast Asia', in Paul J. Smith (ed.) *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*. London: M.E. Sharpe. pp.38-61.

Acharya, Amitav (2000) *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, Regional and Regionalism in the Making of Southeast Asia*. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

Agence France Presse (AFP) (2002) "Radical plans to combat piracy on high seas", *Strait Times*, 24 October, p.A7.

\_\_\_(2002) "Abubakar blames US for Sari Club blast", *New Straits Times*, 14 October, p.B21.

\_\_\_(2003) "Suspect attended Bashir's school", *Straits Times*, 11 August, p.A5.

\_\_\_(2003) "Hardline Muslim group retains Bashir as leader", *Straits Times*, 13 August, p.A6.

\_\_\_(2003) "Another terror attack certain, Australian spy chief warns", *Jakarta Post*, 13 August, p.11.

\_\_\_(2004) "Anger at the police", *Straits Times*, 11 September, p.A3.

\_\_\_(2004) "Several plots to kill Megawati", *New Straits Times*, 13 September, p.28.

\_\_\_(2004) "Indonesian Muslim purists don't engage in terror", *Straits Times*, 14 September, p.A6.

\_\_\_(2004) "Aussie PM under fire again", *New Straits Times*, 14 September, p.27.

\_\_\_(2004) "Police issue sketches of top 10 suspects in Jakarta blast", *Straits Times*, 16 September, p.A1.

\_\_\_(2006) "A 'modest, simple' plot", *Today*, 10 April, p.14.

Ahmad, Abdullah (2003) "Answer terror with courage", *New Straits Times*, 13 August, p.10.

Akmar, Shamsul (2002) "Indonesians must prepare themselves as Washington will now play God", *New Straits Times*, 19 October, p.2.

\_\_\_(2002) "Meat for some, poison to others", 20 October, p.8.

\_\_\_(2002) "Fighting global terrorism- separating real threats from the imagined", *New Straits Times*, 26 October, p.2.

Alali, A.Odasuo & Eke, Kenoye Kelvin (1991) 'Introduction: Critical Issues in Media Coverage of Terrorism', in A. Odasuo Alali & Kenoye Kelvin Eke (eds.) *Media Coverage of Terrorism Methods of Diffusion*. London: Sage. pp.3-11.

- Altheide, David L. (2006) *Terrorism and the Politics of Fear*. Lanham: AltaMira Press.
- Ambrosio de Nelson, Sonia (2004) Southeast Asian Press Coverage of Terrorism and the Bali Bombing, *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*. vol. 20: pp. 47 – 69.
- Amri, Puspa Delima (2004) “Bomb blast may stall recovery”, *Jakarta Post*, 11 September, p.6.
- Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, B. (1996) ‘Introduction’, in G. Balakrishnan (ed.) *Mapping the nation*. London: Verso. pp.1-7.
- Anuar, Mustafa K. (2000) ‘Malaysia, Country Report’, in *Media & Democracy in Asia*. Singapore: Asian Media Information and Communication Centre. pp.97-114.
- Arifin, Zainul (2005) “Who pulls the strings of the bombers”, *New Straits Times*, 5 October, p.19.
- Asian Communication Handbook (2003) Asian Media Information and Communication Centre and School of Communication and Information. Singapore: Nanyang Technological University.
- Asmarani, Devi (2002) “Indonesian media offended by SM Lee’s remarks on terrorists”, *Straits Times*, Factiva, 22 February.
- \_\_\_ (2002) “Prayers for souls, search for bodies”, *Straits Times*, 14 October, p.3.
- \_\_\_ (2002) “Mass of bodies overwhelms hospital”, *Straits Times*, 15 October, p.5.
- \_\_\_ (2002) “Police probe focuses on two Indonesians”, *Straits Times*, 16 October, p.A4.
- \_\_\_ (2002) “Plight of Balinese casualties”, *Straits Times*, 18 October, p.A1.
- \_\_\_ (2002) “Where youth are moulded for militancy”, *Straits Times*, 28 October, p.A6.
- \_\_\_ (2002) “Clashes erupt as Bashir is taken to Jakarta”, *Straits Times*, 29 October, p.1.
- \_\_\_ (2003) “Poor Indonesians are the ones killed”, *Straits Times*, 9 August, p.A1.
- \_\_\_ (2003) “Living with terror”, *Straits Times*, 10 August, p.3.
- \_\_\_ (2003) “More grief on Sunday?”, *Straits Times*, 12 August, p.A1.
- \_\_\_ (2003) “Indonesian police link Hambali to 39 bombings”, *Straits Times*, 22 August, p.A4.
- \_\_\_ (2004) “Terror strike: Warning of more to come”, *Straits Times*, 11 September, p.1.
- \_\_\_ (2005) “Oh No, Not Again”, *Straits Times*, 2 October, p.1.
- \_\_\_ (2005) “Fear and anger in Indonesia”, *Straits Times*, 4 October, p.9.
- Associated Press (AP) (2002) “Deadly bombings could aid Australia- RI ties: Analysts”, *Jakarta Post*, 15 October, p.10.
- \_\_\_ (2002) “Canberra pours more money into security after Bali blasts”, *Straits Times*, 24 October, p.A7.
- \_\_\_ (2002) “Rebels’ message eerily similar to Osama’s”, *Straits Times*, 26 October 2002, p.8.

- \_\_\_(2002) "Attacks on Muslims on the rise in Sydney", *Straits Times*, 29 October, p.A6.
- \_\_\_(2003) "World condemns attack", *Straits Times*, 6 August, p.8.
- \_\_\_(2003) "I am happy, especially if Muslims did it", *Straits Times*, 7 August, p.A4.
- \_\_\_(2003) "The perfect family man", *Straits Times*, 22 August, p.A4.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Megawati hails business sector as markets weather bomb blast", *The Jakarta Post.com*, 12 September.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Girl hurt in bombing flown to Singapore", *New Straits Times*, 11 September, p.6.
- \_\_\_(2004) "DNA test proves Australian is biological father", *New Straits Times*, 15 September, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Manny progressing after recovering from coma", *New Straits Times*, 16 September, p.29.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Megawati fumbles during TV debate", *New Straits Times*, 16 September, p.7.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Region on alert, security stepped up", *New Straits Times*, 4 October, p.28.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Military called on to stamp out terror", *Straits Times*, 6 October, p.6.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Islamic leaders urged to slam terrorism", *Straits Times*, 8 October, p.8.
- Atkins, Stephen E. (1992) *Terrorism – A Reference Handbook Contemporary World Issues*. CA: ABC-CLIO.
- Atmanta, Dwi (2005) "TNI fight against terrorism could be the terror itself", *Jakarta Post*, 8 October, p.3.
- Atran, Scott (2005) "Democracy is not enough", *Straits Times*, 6 October, p.26.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Along with democracy, Jakarta needs resolve", *New Straits Times*, 10 October, p.19.
- Atwood, Margaret (2003) 'International Terrorism', in Pamala L.Griset & Sue Mahan (eds.), *Terrorism in Perspective*. London: Sage pp. 45-57.
- Augustin, Sean, & Singh, D. (2005) "The decision that saved their lives", *New Straits Times*, 3 October, p.8.
- Aurora, Leony (2004) "Security guard recalls horror of Thursday embassy attack", *Jakarta Post*, 11 September, p.2.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Policeman still on critical list, others ok", *Jakarta Post*, 15 September, p.2.
- Aurora, Leony, & Fidrus, Fidrus (2004) "Manuela flown to S'pore for treatment", *Jakarta Post*, 11 September, p.1.

## B

- Baharuddin, Noor Adzman (2002) "KMM's activities under control", *New Straits Times*, 17 February, p.2.

- Bandoro, Bantarto (2002) "Lessons from the Bali blast", *Jakarta Post*, 16 October, p.6.
- Bangkuai, Joniston (2002) "Stay united to ward off threats, BN parties told", *New Straits Times*, 20 October, p.2.
- Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2004) *War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia*. Manila: Rex Book.
- Barton, Greg (2005) 'Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorism and Radical Islamism in Indonesia', in Shahram Akbarzadeh & Samina Yasmeen (eds.) *Islam and the West reflections from Australia*. New South Wales: University Press of New South Wales. pp.114-131.
- Bayuni, Endy M. (1996) 'Asia Values in Journalism: Do they Exist?', in Murray Masterton (ed.) *Asian Values in Journalism*. Singapore: Asian Media Information and Communication Centre. pp. 39-43.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Bali blast tests Indonesia – Australia ties", *Jakarta Post*, 21 October, p.3.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "For many Australians, Bali is part of Australia", *Jakarta Post*, 23 October, p.3.
- Benson, Rodney & Daniel C. Hallin (2007) How States, Markets and globalization Shape the News – The French and US National Press, 1965-97, *European Journal of Communication*, vol22 (1):27-48.
- Bingkasen, Joseph, & Tony Emmanuel, & Joniston Bangkuai, Jaswinder Kaur, Leslie Andres, & Sharanja Singh, (2000) "IGP: Abductions may be political", *New Straits Times*, 25 April, p.1.
- Boedhiwardhana, Wahyoe (2005) "Susilo, Lee agree to boost fight against terrorism", *Jakarta Post*, 4 October, p.3.
- Boey, David (2004) "FPDA tackles terror threat in drill", *Straits Times*, 11 September, p.3.
- Boey, David (2004) "S'pore take note: Strikes may fail but terrorists don't forget", *Straits Times*, 14 September, p.15.
- Bokhorst-Heng, Wendy (2002) Newspapers in Singapore: A mass ceremony in the imagining of the nation, *Media Culture and Society*, 24:559-569.
- Borquez, Julio (1993) 'Newsmaking and Policymaking: Steps toward a Dialogue', in Robert J. Spitzer (ed.) *Media and Public Policy*. Connecticut: Praeger. pp. 31-40.
- Bradley, John R., & Osman, Salim (2004) "Muslims turn on terror in name of Islam", *Straits Times*, 15 September, p.3.
- Brewer Paul, Sean Aday, Gross Kimberly (2003) 'Rallies All Around: The Dynamics of System Support', in Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, Marion Just (eds.) *Framing Terrorism the News Media, the Government, and the Public*. London: Routledge. pp.229-235.
- Brewer Paul R., Joseph Graf, Lars Willnat (2003) 'Priming or Framing – Media Influence on Attitudes toward Foreign Countries', *Gazette: The International Journal For Communication Studies*, vol.65 (6): pp.493-508.
- Brummett, Barry (2003) *The World and How We Describe It – Rhetorics of Reality, Representations, Simulation*. Connecticut: Praeger.

## C

- Campbell, Christopher P. (1995) *Race, Myth and the News*. CA: Sage.
- Carruthers, Susan (1996) 'Reporting Terrorism: the British State and the Media, 1914-94', in Ian Stewart & Susan Carruthers (eds.) *War, Culture and the Media: Representations of the Military in 20<sup>th</sup> century Britain*. Wiltshire: Flicks Books. pp. 101-129.
- Chalk, Peter (2002) 'Al-Qaeda and its Links to Terrorist Groups in Asia', in Andrew Tan & Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.) *The New terrorism anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies*. Singapore: Times Media. pp.107-128.
- Chalk, Peter (2005) 'Militant Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia', in Paul J. Smith (ed.) *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*. London: M.E. Sharpe. pp.19-37.
- Chew, Amy (2004) "Jakarta blast horror", *New Straits Times*, 10 September, p.1.
- \_\_\_ (2004) "Police hunt three militants", *New Straits Times*, 11 September, p.6.
- \_\_\_ (2004) "Indonesia hunts for 10 suicide bombers", *New Straits Times*, 14 September, p.29.
- \_\_\_ (2005) "Three nameless heads", *New Straits Times*, 4 October, p.8.
- \_\_\_ (2005) "Bombers may be from new terrorist cell", *New Straits Times*, 8 October, p.32.
- Chew, Lee Kim (2002) "The Challenge for progressive Muslims", *Straits Times*, 30 September, p.14.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Time for Megawati to take tough action", *Straits Times*, 15 October, p.12.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Apec awaits Megawati's moves on terror", *Straits Times*, 26 October, p.4.
- Chia, Rebecca Lee Sue-Ann (2003) "NTU Economists: we made honest error" *Straits Times*, 2 August.
- Chia, Sue-Ann & Arshad, Arlina & Yeo, Alicia (2002) "Religious code goes beyond keeping peace", *Straits Times*, 16 October, p.H2.
- Chieh, Lee Hui (2004) "Five-year-old blast victim treated here", *Straits Times*, 11 September, p.1.
- Chonkittavorn, Kavi (2002) 'Southeast Asia Media Struggle to be Free', *Nieman Reports*. vol. 56 (2): pp.59-60.
- Choong, William (2002) "Investors will be scared off S-E Asia", *Straits Times*, 15 October, p.6.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie & Fairclough, Norman (1999) *Discourse in late Modernity-Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press.
- Christie, Michael (2002) "Blast signals maturity in Australia-Indonesia ties", *Jakarta Post*, 19 October, p.3.
- Clausen, Lisbeth (2003) *Global News Production*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press. 1<sup>st</sup> Ed.
- Cohen, Stanley (1972) *Folk Devils & Moral Panics The Creation of the Mods and Rockers*. Massachusetts: Blackwell.

Cohen-Almagor R. (2001) *Speech, Media, and Ethics – The Limits of Free Expression*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Cole, Benjamin (2006) 'Introduction', in Benjamin Cole (ed.) *Conflict, Terrorism and the Media in Asia*. London: Routledge. pp.1-4.

Cole, Benjamin (2006) 'Al-Qaeda and the struggle for moderate Islam in Malaysia', in Benjamin Cole (ed.) *Conflict, Terrorism and the Media in Asia*. London: Routledge. pp.23-40.

Colombijn, Freek & Lindblad, J. Thomas (2002) 'Introduction', in Colombijn, Freek & Lindblad, J. Thomas (eds.) *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp.1-31.

Cottle, Simon (2006) *Mediatized Conflict, Developments in Media and Conflict Studies*. New York: Open University Press.

Crouch, Harold (2002) 'The recent resurgence of political Islam in Indonesia', *Trends in Southeast Asia*, no.1, January. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp.1-6.

Curran, James (2002) *Media and Power*. London: Routledge.

## D

David, Adrian (2003) "Traumatic experience for five in Malaysia", *New Straits Times*, 8 August, p.2.

Desker, Barry (2002) "After Bali, will Indonesia act?", *Straits Times*, 31 October, p.14.

Devan, Janadan (2003) "Emerging role of religion in Malaysian politics", *Straits Times*, 8 August, p.24.

Dixit, Kunda (1999) 'Global Media and empire', in Sheila S. Coronel (ed.) *News in Distress: the Southeast Asian Media in a Time of Crisis*. Quezon: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. pp. 49-56.

Dobkin, Bethami A. (1992) *Tales of Terror Television News and the Construction of the Terrorist Threat*. London: Praeger.

Dobkin, Bethami A. (2005) 'The Television Terrorist' in J.David Slocum (ed.), *Terrorism, Media, Liberation*. London: Rutgers University Press. pp.121-136.

Drexler, Elizabeth (2006) Provoking violence, authenticating separatism Aceh's Humanitarian Pause, in Charles A Coppel (ed.), *Violent Conflicts in Indonesia analysis, representation, resolution*. London: Routledge. pp. 163-173.

## E

Edelman, Murray (1974) *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Edelman, Murray (1977) *Political Language Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail*. London: Academic Press, Inc.

Edelman, Murray (2001) *The Politics of Misinformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elson, R.E. (2002) 'In fear of the people Suharto and the justification of state-sponsored violence under the New Order', in Colombijn, Freek & Lindblad, J. Thomas (eds.) *Roots of violence in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp.173-195.

Emmanuelle, Anashtasya, & Siboro, Tiarna (2002) "U.S.hails RI antiterrorism bid", *Jakarta Post*, 18 February, p.8.

Emmanuel, Tony, & Joheng, Jalina (2002) "Five KMM members arrested", *New Straits Times*, 17 October, p.1.

En-Lai, Yeoh (2002) "S'pore doctors treating Balinese", *Straits Times*, 16 October, p.A2.

\_\_\_(2002) "Bali's Muslims say they too are victims", *Straits Times*, 19 October, p.A6.

\_\_\_(2002) "Tears and prayers flow as devastation sinks in", *Straits Times*, 21 October, p.A3.

\_\_\_(2002) "S'poreans collect cash and supplies for Bali victims", *Straits Times*, 21 October, p.A5.

Entman, Robert (1993) Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, *Journal of Communication*, vol. 43: pp. 51-58.

Erman, Erwiza (2002) 'Generalized violence a case study of the Ombilin coal mines, 1892-1996', in Colombijn, Freek & Lindblad, J. Thomas (eds.) *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp.105-131.

Esposito, John (1987) *Islam in Asia: religion, politics and society*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Esposito, John (2003) Beyond the Headlines, *Harvard International Review*, Summer, vol.25 (2): pp.16-20.

Eyal, Jonathan (2005) "National pride hindering anti-terror war", *Straits Times*, 3 October, p.5.

## F

Fairclough, Norman (2001) *Language and Power*. New Jersey: Allyn and Bacon. 2<sup>nd</sup>. Edition.

Fairclough, Norman (2001b) 'Critical Discourse Analysis', in Alec McHoul & Mark Rapley (eds.), *How to Analyse Talk in Institutional Settings A Casebook of Methods*. London: Continuum. pp.23-38.

Farid, Hilmar (2006) 'Political economy of violence and victims in Indonesia', in Charles A. Coppel (ed.), *Violent Conflicts in Indonesia Analysis, Representation, Resolution*. London: Routledge. pp.269-285.

Fernandez, Warren (2005) "Bali blasts: The 'can't happen here' factor", *Straits Times*, 8 October, p.S13.

Fibri, Rommy (2002) "Two tales of One Horrific Night", *Tempo* 22-28 October, p.38.

Fidrus, Multa (2004) "Grieving Musu says Manuela is his daughter", *Jakarta Post*, 12 September, p.1.

Fong, Tanya (2005) "Bali's Day of Prayer", *Straits Times*, 6 October, p.9.

Foucault, M. (1978) *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction vol.1*, New York: Random House.

Franks, Janson (2006) *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

## G

Ganesan, Vasantha (2003) "Tourism players to discuss Jakarta blast", *New Straits Times*, 6 August, p.6.

Gans, H. J. (1979) *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBS Nightly News, NewsWeek and Time*. New York: Pantheon.

George, Cherian (2002) 'Singapore: Media at the Mainstream and the Margins', in Russell H.K. Heng (ed.) *Media Fortunes- Asean States in Transition- Changing Times*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp.173-200.

George, Cherian (2003) The Internet and the Narrow Tailoring Dilemma for "Asian Democracies", *The Communication Review*, vol.6 (3): pp.247-268.

George, Cherian (2006) *Contentious Journalism and the Internet Towards Democratic Discourse in Malaysia and Singapore*. Singapore: University Press.

Ghanem, Salma (1997) 'Filling in the Tapestry: The Second Level of Agenda Setting', in Maxwell McCombs, Donald L. Shaw, David Weaver (eds.) *Communication and Democracy Exploring the Intellectual Frontiers in Agenda-Setting Theory*. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 3-14.

Gilboa, Eytan (2002) Global Communication and Foreign Policy, *Journal of Communication*, December: pp.731-748.

Giroux, Henry (2006) *Beyond the Spectacle of Terrorism*. London: Paradigm.

Gitlin, T. (1980) *The Whole World is Watching*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Glassner, B. (1999) *The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things*. New York: Basic Books.

Go, Robert (2002) "187 killed in Bali blasts", *Straits Times*, 14 October, p.1.

\_\_\_ (2002) "Blasts show need for crackdown", *Straits Times*, 14 October, p.12.

\_\_\_ (2002) "Jakarta blames Al-Qaeda", *Straits Times*, 15 October, p.1.

\_\_\_ (2002) "Mega seeks special powers to fight terror", *Straits Times*, 16 October, p.1.

\_\_\_ (2002) "Jakarta got US warnings of attack", *Straits Times*, 17 October, p.1.

\_\_\_ (2002) "Radical Bashir's arrest by police looks imminent", *Straits Times*, 18 October, p.3.

\_\_\_ (2002) "Enforcing new terror laws will be the test", *Straits Times*, 20 October, p.15.

\_\_\_ (2002) "Supporters block police from arresting Bashir", *Straits Times*, 21 October, p.A4.

\_\_\_ (2002) "Top politicians going soft on Bashir", *Straits Times*, 22 October, p.1.

\_\_\_ (2003) "Keep out of international hotels", *Straits Times*, 14 August, p.A3.



\_\_\_(2004) "Heart of capital like a war zone with bodies and mangled cars", *Straits Times*, 10 September, p.2.

Go, Robert, & En-Lai Yeo (2002) "Jakarta signs tough new laws, Bashir detained", *Straits Times*, 20 October, p.1.

Goffman, Erving (1974) *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of Experience*. New York: Harper Colophon.

Graber, Doris (1981) 'Political Language', in Dan D. Nimmo and Keith R. Sanders (eds.) *Handbook of Political Communication*. London: Sage. pp.195-223.

Graber, Doris A. (1993) 'Media Impact on the Political Status Quo: What is the Evidence?', in Robert J. Spitzer (ed.) *Media and Public Policy*. Connecticut: Praeger. pp.19-29.

Gunaratna, Rohan (2002) "Gravity of terrorism shifting to region", *Straits Times*, 15 October, p.7.

## H

Hafidz, Tatik (2002) "Mega's response decisive", *Straits Times*, 17 October, p.16.

Hakim, Zakki, & Ntoma, Rizky KD. (2003) "Suspected Marriott bomber had explosive powder: Police", *Jakarta Post*, 10 August, p.1.

Hamid, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul (2002) 'An Islamicist's View of an Islamic State and Its Relevance to a Multi-Racial Society', *Trends in Southeast Asia*, no.1 January, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp.9-16.

Hanazaki, Yasuo (1996) *The Indonesian press in an era of keterbukaan: a force for democratization?* Unpublished PhD thesis. Victoria, Australia: Monash University.

Hari, Kurniawan (2002) "Fathur has no links to al-Qaeda- Da'i" *Jakarta Post*, 29 January, p.8.

\_\_\_(2004) "Poor coordination allows bombing", *Jakarta Post*, 11 September, p.2.

Hari, Kurniawan & Unidjaja, Fabiola Desy (2003) "Govt, legislators differ on draconian law", *Jakarta Post*, 12 August, p.1.

Harsanto, Damar (2002) "Cafes, bars turn quiet after Bali carnage", *Jakarta Post*, 15 October, p.8.

\_\_\_(2002) "Muslim militant grilled over nightclub violence, vandalism", *Jakarta Post*, 17 October, p.2.

\_\_\_(2002) "Al-Faruq admits RI ties, Ba'asyir a suspect", *Jakarta Post*, 18 October, p.1.

\_\_\_(2003) "Sketches of bomber released", *Jakarta Post*, 7 August, p.1.

\_\_\_(2003) "Police confirm Asmar's JI ties", *Jakarta Post*, 13 August, p.1.

\_\_\_(2003) "Militants arrested over possible link to Hotel blast", *Jakarta Post*, 15 August, p.1.

\_\_\_(2003) "Police name suspects in Marriott bombing" *Jakarta Post*, 16 August, p.2.

\_\_\_(2004) "Antiterror center lost in action", *Jakarta Post*, 11 September, p.8.

- Harsanto, Damar, & Siboro, Tiarna (2003) "Sketches of bomber released", *Jakarta Post*, 7 August, p.1.
- Harsanto, Damar, & Unidjaja, Fabiola Desy (2003) "The bomb weighed over 10kg", *Jakarta Post*, 11 August, p.1.
- Harsono, Andreas (2000) 'Indonesia: dancing in the dark', in Louise Williams and Roland Rich (eds.) *Losing Control: Freedom of the Press in Asia*. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press. pp.74-92.
- Hassan, Muhammad Haniff (2004) "Militants hurting the Muslims they claim to fight for", *Straits Times*, 17 September, p.22.
- Hassan, Sharifah Zaleha Syed (2001) 'Islamization and the Emerging Civil Society in Malaysia-A Case Study', in Mitsuo Nakamura, Sharon Siddique, Omar Farouk Bajunid (eds.) *Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp.76-88.
- Hatchen, William A. (1996) *The World News Prism- Changing Media of International Communication*. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 4<sup>th</sup> edition.
- Held, Virginia (1997) 'The Media and Political Violence', *The Journal of Ethics*, June, vol.1 (2): pp.187-202.
- Heng, Russell Hiang-Khng (2002) 'Media in Southeast Asia: A Literature Review of Post 1980 Development', in Russell H.K.Heng (ed.) *Media Fortunes – ASEAN States in Transition, Changing Times*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp.1-25.
- Herman, E. & Chomsky, N. (1988) *Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon.
- Heryanto, Ariel & Stanley Yoseph Adi (2001) 'The Industrialization of the Media in Democratizing Indonesia', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, August, vol.23 no. 2: pp.327-355.
- Hill, David T. (1994) *The Press in New Order Indonesia*, Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press.
- Hitam, M. B. (1996) 'Human rights and the media: The ASEAN Scenario', in H. Robert (ed.) *Human rights and the media*. Kuala Lumpur: Asian Institute for Development Communication. pp.1-6.
- Ho, Chua Kong (2005) "Look what you can find on Google", *Straits Times*, 9 October, p.4.
- Ho, Chua Kong, & Ng, Sarah (2005) "Three shocked Singaporeans recount their experiences", *Straits Times*, 2 October, p.3.
- Hobart, Mark (2006) Entertaining Illusions: How Indonesian Elites Imagine Reality TV Affects the Masses, *Asian Journal of Communication*, vol.16 (4), December. pp.393-410.
- Hooi, Alexis (2003) "S'porean victims continue fight", *Straits Times*, 8 August, p.A3.
- Hooi, Alexis (2003) "We miss his laughter", *Straits Times*, 9 August, p.A2.
- Hooi, Alexis, & Vijayan, K.C. (2003) "Injured S'poreans keep spirits up", *Straits Times*, 7 August, p.A3.

Hoong, Chua Lee (2002) "Terror's sinister symphony wafts closer to home", *Straits Times*, 15 October, p.12.

Hopkins, Andrea (2002) "Australia wants Jemaah Islamiah on UN terror list", *Jakarta Post*, 16 October, p.12.

Hor, Michael (2002) 'Terrorism and the Criminal Law: Singapore's Solution', *Singapore Journal of Legal Studies*, July (1): pp.30-55.

Hotland, Tony (2004) "Tourism sector continues to grow", *Jakarta Post*, 14 September, p.13.

Hudiono, Urip (2004) "Beloved daughter still awaits father's return", *Jakarta Post*, 11 September, p.2.

Huei, Peh Shing, & Koh, Leslie (2005) "PM Lee to meet Indonesian President in Bali today", *Straits Times*, 3 October, p.1.

## I

Ismartono, Yuli (2002) "Kuta tragedy leads to antiterrorism resolve", *Tempo*, 15-21 October, p.16.

## J

Jacob, Paul (2004) "Jakarta blast a grim reminder in S'pore's backyard", *Straits Times*, 11 September, p.H17.

*Jakarta Post* (2002) "Wolfowitz rules out direct U.S. attack on RI", *Factiva*, 9 January, p.1.

\_\_\_(2002) "Indonesia asks for patience in dealing with terrorism", 31 January, p.3.

\_\_\_(2002) "The threat of terrorism", 23 September, p.6.

\_\_\_(2002) "Nation unites in condemning bombing", 14 October, p.1.

\_\_\_(2002) "National tragedy", 14 October, p.6.

\_\_\_(2002) "Intelligence failure", 15 October, p.6.

\_\_\_(2002) "Downer pledges aid for Bali blast probe", 16 October 1.

\_\_\_(2002) "Police question two suspects over blast", 16 October, p.1.

\_\_\_(2002) "Bali tragedy the last wake-up call for govt", 16 October, p.3.

\_\_\_(2002) "Stay home, Mrs. President", 16 October, p.6.

\_\_\_(2002) "Megawati is the key to rebuilding devastated Bali", 17 October, p.3.

\_\_\_(2002) "Mourners continue to flock to blast site", 17 October, p.3.

\_\_\_(2002) "Police detain FPI chairman", 18 October, p.2.

\_\_\_(2002) "The future of our nation is at stake- Syafii", 18 October, p.3.

\_\_\_(2002) "Police work in Bali", 19 October, p.6.

\_\_\_(2002) "VP denies govt interference in the arrest of Ba'asyir", 22 October, p.2.

\_\_\_(2002) "Police release sketches of Bali bomb suspects", 31 October, p.1.

\_\_\_(2003) "My poor boy! He had three children", 6 August, p.1.

- \_\_ (2003) "Govt. condemns blast as calls mount for immediate action", 6 August, p.3.
- \_\_ (2003) "Compensation for terror victims", 6 August, p.4.
- \_\_ (2003) "Terrorists strike again", 6 August, p.6.
- \_\_ (2003) "Indonesia gets world support in blast aftermath", 7 August, p.3.
- \_\_ (2003) "Only a panic reaction", 7 August, p.6.
- \_\_ (2003) "Bringing terrorists to court is waste of time", 7 August, p.8.
- \_\_ (2003) "Bali verdict raises fears of new attacks", 8 August, p.11.
- \_\_ (2003) "Mega breaks Marriott silence, kind of", 9 August, p.1.
- \_\_ (2003) "Asmar graduated from Ngruki school", 11 August, p.2.
- \_\_ (2003) "RI, Australia plan counterterrorism summit: Downer", 11 August, p.3.
- \_\_ (2003) "We must fight rampant crimes", 11 August, p.6.
- \_\_ (2003) "The Jakarta bombing", 11 August, p.6.
- \_\_ (2003) "Australian military to renew ties with Indonesia's Kopassus", 12 August, p.3.
- \_\_ (2003) "A 'pansus' on Marriott", 12 August, p.6.
- \_\_ (2003) "Opposition grows to government-proposed draconian security law", 13 August, p.1.
- \_\_ (2003) "Police complete preliminary reconstruction of Marriott blast", 14 August, p.2.
- \_\_ (2003) "Govt may revise terror law", 14 August, p.1.
- \_\_ (2003) "Govt to boost security in vital projects", 14 August, p.13.
- \_\_ (2003) "Top JI operative captured in Thailand", 16 August, p.1.
- \_\_ (2003) "Most Marriott suspects linked to Bali blast, other bombings", *JP*, 19 August 2003, p.1
- \_\_ (2003) "Malaysia detains terror suspect Hambali's wife under new law", 19 August, p.2.
- \_\_ (2004) "Carnage in Jakarta", 10 September, p.1.
- \_\_ (2004) "Mega appeals for calm", 10 September, p.1.
- \_\_ (2004) "Australians shaken, but go on despite bombing", 10 September, p.2.
- \_\_ (2004) "Religious leaders condemn bombing, call for unity", 10 September, p.3.
- \_\_ (2004) "Blast rocks Jakarta", 10 September, p.5.
- \_\_ (2004) "Fighting an uneven battle", 10 September, p.6.
- \_\_ (2004) "Footage shows suicide car: Police", 11 September, p.1.
- \_\_ (2004) "Blast victims fund set up", 11 September, p.1.
- \_\_ (2004) "The ties that bind", 11 September, p.6.
- \_\_ (2004) "No panic reaction", 14 September, p.6.

- \_\_\_(2004) "Rupiah to stabilize, stocks to soar further, say analysts", 14 September, p.13.
- \_\_\_(2004) "5-year-old blast victim wakes up crying", 15 September, p.2.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Muslims told to curb radicalism", 16 September, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Intelligence failure?", 16 September, p.6.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Police arrest eight over embassy bombing", 17 September, p.1.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Police inch closer to Azahari's inner circle", 18 September, p.1.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Spying on neighbors?", 18 September, p.6.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Police brace for terrorist activity ahead of presidential polls", 19 September, p.2.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Source of embassy bomb funding same as Marriott: Police", 21 September, p.5.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Islam's leaders condemn Bali blasts", 3 October, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Terrorists among us", 3 October, p.6.
- \_\_\_(2005) "A Ramadhan of Jihad", 4 October, p.6.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Intelligence failure", 5 October, p.6.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Police hot on trail of Bali blast masterminds", 5 October, p.2.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Stay in the barracks", 10 October, p.6.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Military officers deployed to villages", 8 November, p.1.

Jansen, Paul (2002) "Attacks will scare away investors, says ex-US envoy", *Straits Times*, 18 October, p.A4.

Jenkins, Philip (2003) *Images of Terrorism- What we can and can't know about terrorism*. New York: Walter de Gruyter, Inc.

Joheng, Jalina (2002) "Forensic team sent to Jakarta", *New Straits Times*, 10 August, p.2.

\_\_\_(2002) "Head of Johor KMM held", *New Straits Times*, 28 September, p.1.

\_\_\_(2003) "Five Malaysians attending course hurt in Jakarta blast", *New Straits Times*, 6 August, p.1.

\_\_\_(2003) "Forensic team sent to Jakarta", *New Straits Times*, 10 August, p.2.

Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. (2005) *News Narratives and News Framing Constructing Political Reality*. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Junaidi, Ahmad (2002) "Fallout from Bali also felt in Jakarta", *Jakarta Post*, 14 October, p.8.

Juniartha, I Wayan (2002) "Bombing turns paradise island into hell", *Jakarta Post*, 15 October, p.19.

Juniartha, I Wayan, & Widiadana Rita A. (2002) "Innocence lost, RI's day of horror", *Jakarta Post*, 14 October, p.1.

Juniartha, I Wayan, & Wijaksana, Dadan (2002) "Blast probe focuses on seven suspects", *Jakarta Post*, 17 October, p.1.

\_\_\_(2002) "Explosive used in Bali blast contains RDX – Investigators", *Jakarta Post*, 17 October, p.2.

## K

Kadir, Suzaina (2004) 'Islam, state and society in Singapore'. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, vol.5 (3): 357-371.

Karim, H.Karim (2004) 'War, Propaganda, and Islam in Muslim and Western Sources', in Yahya R. Kamalipour & Nancy Snow (eds.) *War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. pp.107-116.

Kassim, Yang Razali (2002) 'The Relationship between Singapore's Muslim community and International Events', *Trends in Southeast Asia*, no1. January. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia. pp.25-35.

Kaur, Hardev (2002) "Malaysian allegedly linked to Bali bombing is an Indonesian", *New Straits Times*, 19 October, p.1.

Kavoori, Anandam P. (2006) 'International Communication after Terrorism: Toward a Postcolonial Dialect', in Anandam P.Kavoori & Todd Fraley (eds.) *Media, Terrorism, and Theory*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. pp.179-197.

Kelley, Matt (2002) "Attacks may prompt resumption of U.S. – TNI ties", *Jakarta Post*, 16 October, p.3.

Kellner, Douglas (2005) *Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy: Terrorism, War, and Election Battles*. London: Paradigm.

Khalik, Abdul (2004) "I saw body parts strewn around me, says bombing witness", *Jakarta Post*, 10 September, p.2.

\_\_\_(2004) "Police name 3 suspects, offer Rp 1b for tip-offs", *Jakarta Post*, 15 September, p.1.

\_\_\_(2004)"Police beef up security ahead of runoff", *Jakarta Post*, 16 September, p.4.

\_\_\_(2004) "Blast perpetrated by lone suicide bomber, say police", *Jakarta Post*, 20 September, p.2.

\_\_\_(2005) "Police tighten security for expats, foreign interests", *Jakarta Post*, 8 October, p.1.

Khalik, Abdul, & Nugroho, I D.(2004) "Police release photos of bombing suspects", *Jakarta Post*, 16 September, p1.

Khalik, Abdul, & Siboro, Tiarna (2004) "Blast blamed on Malaysian fugitives", *Jakarta Post*, 10 September, p.2.

Kin, Kwan Weng (2002) "DPM Lee urges decisive action by Jakarta", *Straits Times*, 18 October, p.3.

Kin, Kwan Weng (2002) "Investors raised security worries with DPM Lee", *Straits Times*, 19 October, p.A7.

Kingsbury, Damien (2001) *South-East Asia A Political Profile*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kitley, Philip & Mules, Warwick (2000) 'The Flor Contemplacion case as a media event', in Damien Kingsbury, Eric Loo, Patricia Payne (eds.) *Foreign devils and other journalists*. Monash: Monash Asia Institute. pp.77-94.

Kluver, Randolph & Weber, Ian (2003) 'Patriotism and the Limits of Globalization: Renegotiating Citizenship in Singapore', *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, October, 27 (4): pp.371-388.

Koh, Leslie (2005) "PM gives full backing to Jakarta", *Straits Times*, 4 October, p.1.

\_\_\_(2005) "PM Lee confident of Indonesian resolve", *Straits Times*, 5 October, p.6.

Kristof, Nicholas. (2002). "Give Saudi women the freedom of choice", *Straits Times*, 28 October, p.14.

Kuo, Eddie C.Y. (1983) 'Language Policy and Nation-Building in a Multi-Ethnic Society: The Case Singapore Model, Cultural Identity and Modernization in Asian Countries'. Paper presented at Kokugakuin University centennial symposium. Japan: Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics.

Kuo, Eddie C.Y. (1999) 'The Role of the Media in the Management of Ethnic Relations in Singapore', in Anura Goonasekera & Yovichi Ito (eds.) *Mass Media and Cultural Identity – Ethnic Reporting in Asia*. Sterling,VA: Pluto Press. pp. 223-255.

Kurniawan, Moch. N. (2002) "TNI accused of prolonging regional conflicts", *Jakarta Post*, 15 October, p.4.

\_\_\_(2002) "Experts warn of underground extremist movement", *Jakarta Post*, 21 October, p.4.

\_\_\_(2003) "Scholars oppose attempts to link Islam with terror", *Jakarta Post*, 16 August, p.4.

\_\_\_(2003) "Public discourse best way to exercise fundamentalism", *Jakarta Post*, 15 August, p.2.

## L

Laqueur, Walter (1987) *The Age of Terrorism*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Latif, Asad (2003) "Creating modernity in Muslim society", *Straits Times*, 19 August, p.15.

Latif, Asad & Karen Wong (2002) "Danger of terror attack not over yet", *Straits Times*, 18 February.

Lawrence, James T. (ed.) (2004) *Human Rights in Asia and the Pacific*. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

Lee, Jane (2002) "Plea to get rid of racial stereotypes", *Straits Times*, 21 October, p.H2.

Lewis, Glen (2006) *Virtual Thailand The media and cultural politics in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore*. New York: Routledge.

Lewis, Jeff (2005) *Language Wars – The role of Media and Culture in Global Terror and Political Violence*. London: Pluto Press.

Lim, Ivan (1996) 'Media Monitors in Singapore', in K.S. Venkateswaran (ed.) *Media Monitors in Asia*. Singapore: Asian Media Information and Communication Centre. pp.73-80.

Lim, Lydia (2001) "Terrorists tried to recruit S'poreans", *Straits Times*, 15 October, p.1.

\_\_\_(2002) "Fears over identity breeding religious intolerance", *Straits Times*, 19 October, p.H19.

\_\_\_(2005) "Do we have what it takes to carry on after a terror attack?", *Straits Times*, 7 October, p.33.

Livingstone, Sonia (2003) 'On the Challenges of Cross-National Comparative Media Research', *European Journal of Communications*, vol. 18 (4): pp.477-500.

Loh, Jahan (2002) Arab head scarf on the head of a bomber (illustration), *Straits Times*, 16 October, p.16.

Long, Susan (2002) "Detentions-Govt may release White Paper", *Straits Times*, Factiva, 14 January.

Long, Susan (2002) "What now?". *Straits Times*, 20 October, p.29.

Longmore, Mary (2003) "Howard to attend Bali blast service despite new fears", *Jakarta Post*, 11 August, p.3.

Loo, Eric (2000) 'The Malaysian media: prescribed loyalty, proscribed practices', in Damien Kingsbury, Eric Loo, Patricia Payne (eds.) *Foreign devils and other journalists*. Monash: Monash Asia Institute. pp. 209-228.

Louw, P. Eric (2005) *The Media and Political Process*. London: Sage.

## M

Maarif, Syafii (2002) "The future of our nation is at stake-Syafii", *Jakarta Post*, 18 October, p.3.

Macartney, Jane (2003) "Al-Qaeda brand of terror wins Asian recruits: Experts", Reuters (Jakarta), *Jakarta Post*, 9 August, p.3.

Maine, Wong S., & Osman, Ahmad (2002) "Condemn JI terrorists: Yaacob", *Straits Times*, 22 February, p.3.

Mariani, Evi. (2004) "I can't bear the pain, father says", *Jakarta Post*, 10 September, p.1.

Martin, Andrew & Patrice Petro (2006) 'Introduction' in Patrice Petro & Andrew Martin (eds.), *Rethinking global security: media, popular culture, and the "war on terror"*. New Brunswick, N.J.:Rutgers Univesity Press. pp.1-12.

Massey, Brian L. & Arthur Chang, Li-Jing (2002) Locating Asian Values in Asian Journalism: A Content Analysis of Web Newspapers, *Journal of Communication*, vol.52 (4): pp.987-1003.

Maynard, Roge. (2005) "World leaders quick to condemn bombers and their objectives", *Straits Times*, 3 October, p.5.

McBeth, John (2005) "Dealing with hardliners – the kid gloves must come off", *Straits Times*, 8 October, p. S14.



- McCargo, Duncan (2003) *Media and Politics in Asia Pacific*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- McLeod, Douglas M., & Hertog, James K. (1999) 'Social Control, Social Change and the Mass Media's Role in the Regulation of Protest Groups', in David Demers & K. Viswanath (eds.) *Mass Media, Social Control, and Social Change A Macrosocial Perspective*. Ames: Iowa State University Press. pp.305-330.
- McNair, Brian (1998) *The Sociology of Journalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Menon, V. (ed.) (1994) *Press Systems in ASEAN States*. Singapore: Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre.
- Mitsuo, Nakamura (2001) 'Introduction', in Nakamura Mitsuo, Sharon Siddique, Omar Farouk Bajunid (eds.) *Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp.1-30.
- Moestafa, Berni K. (2002) Bali attack puts fragile economy at risk", *Jakarta Post*, 14 October, p.1.
- Mohamad, Ainon & Waheed, Sajahan (2002) "Dr. M: Terror will win no cause", *New Straits Times*, 15 October, p. 1.
- Mohammad, Fida (1999) 'Jihad as Terrorism- The Western Media and the Defamation of the Qu'ran', in Jeff Ferrell & Neil Websdale (eds.) *Making Trouble – Cultural Constructions of Crime, Deviance and Control*. New York: Aldine De Gruyer. pp.303-317.
- Muhibat, Shafiah Fifi (2004) "Global war on terror and car bomb in Jakarta", *Jakarta Post*, 11 September, p.6.
- Mulchand, Arti (2002) "Victims to be flown to S'pore for treatment", *Straits Times*, 14 October, p.4.
- \_\_\_ (2003) "Marriott lunch turns into nightmare for four colleagues", *Straits Times*, 7 August, p.1.
- Muninggar, Sri Saraswati (2002) "Analysts blame debacle on intelligence failure", *Jakarta Post*, 15 October, p.3.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Government urged to move against JI, affiliates, members", *Jakarta Post*, 26 October, p.2.
- \_\_\_ (2003) "Poor intelligence work due to lack of coordination", *Jakarta Post*, 9 August, p.2.
- \_\_\_ (2003) "Government to give more power to TNI", *Jakarta Post*, 15 August, p.1.
- Muninggar S. Saraswati & Tiarna Siboro (2002) "Legal experts decry arrest of al-Qaeda suspect al-Faruq", *Jakarta Post*, 20 September, p.2.
- Muninggar S. Saraswati & Tiarna Siboro (2002) "Authorities to continue drive against terrorists", *Jakarta Post*, 21 September, p.1.
- Mu'ti, Abdul (2002) "Understanding, dialog may counter terrorism", *Jakarta Post*, 21 October, p.7.

## N

Nacos, Brigitte L. (2000) 'Accomplice or Witness? The Media's Role in Terrorism', *Current History*, April, vol. 99, no.636: pp.174-178.

Nacos, Brigitte L. (2002) *Mass-Mediated Terrorism The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Nacos, Brigitte L. (2006) *Terrorism and Counterterrorism Understanding Threats and Responses in the Post- 9/11 World*. New York: Pearson/Longman.

Nadarajan. Ben (2004) "Police-people ties help in terror fight", *Straits Times*, 17 September, p.H5.

\_\_\_(2005) "S'porean almost had dinner with friends at Jimbaran beach", *Straits Times*, 3 October, p.3.

Nafik, Muhammad (2002) "War on terrorism- A political slogan or the real thing?", *Jakarta Post*, 16 September, p.3.

\_\_\_(2002) "Hard-line group told to emulate Laskar Jihad's move to disband", *Jakarta Post*, 18 October, p.2.

\_\_\_(2002) "Mega's poor leadership hurts nation", *Jakarta Post*, 29 October, p.2.

Nafik, Muhammad, & Kurniawan, Hari (2002) "Government told to get tougher with radicals", *Jakarta Post*, 17 October, p.2.

Nain, Zaharom (2002) 'The Media and Malaysia's Reformasi Movement', in Russell H.K. Heng (ed.) *Media Fortunes- Asean States in Transition –Changing Times*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp.119-137.

Nair, Basskaran (1989) 'Singapore', in Achal Mehra (ed.) *Press Systems in Asean States*. Singapore: Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre. pp.85-90.

Nathan, Dominic (2002) "Terror network disrupted, no cause for panic", *Straits Times*, January 7, p.1.

Navasky, Victor (2002) 'Foreword', in Barbie Zelizer & Stuart Hall (eds.) *Journalism After September 11*. London: Routledge.

Neild, Barry (2004) "Terror fight blasts into polls battle", *Agence France Presse, New Straits Times*, 13 September, p.19.

Neuman, Lawrence W. (2005) *Power, State, and Society: an Introduction to Political Sociology*. Singapore: McGraw-Hill.

*New Straits Times* (2002) "Police on alert for terror teams working with Jemaah Islamiah", 13 February, p.4.

\_\_\_ (2002) "Curbing the deviants", 17 January, p.10.

\_\_\_(2002) "Arrests an attempt to cause fear", 6 January, p.6.

\_\_\_(2002). "DPA seeks early briefing on al-Qaeda from Norian", 12 January, p.2.

\_\_\_(2002). "Link among militant groups, says PM", 13 January, p.4.

\_\_\_(2002) "We'll act against terrorists, says PM", 18 September, p.2.

\_\_\_(2002) "DPM: No benefit in creating discord", 24 September, p.3.

- \_\_ (2002) “Strengthening co-operation on security issues”, 24 September, p.4.
- \_\_ (2002) “63 with links to KMM arrested”, 28 September, p.4.
- \_\_ (2002) “Singapore’s code of interaction for religious harmony”, 29 September, p.4.
- \_\_ (2002) “World” (photo illustration) 14 October, p. B21.
- \_\_ (2002) “Isis: Bombings will affect investments”, 15 October, p.4.
- \_\_ (2002) “US, Britain urged to discuss problem with others”, 15 October, p.4.
- \_\_ (2002) “Prevention better than cure”, 15 October, p.10.
- \_\_ (2002) “Bali blasts jolt Jakarta into facing reality of terrorism”, 15 October, p.B22.
- \_\_ (2002) “World in pictures” (photo illustration), 15 October, p.B23.
- \_\_ (2002) “Syed Hamid: Let’s not point fingers until probe is completed”, 16 October, p.4.
- \_\_ (2002) “Police tightening security at foreign-owned places”, 16 October, p.15.
- \_\_ (2002) “Test of Megawati’s leadership”, 16 October, p.B21.
- \_\_ (2002) “Conspiracy theories abound after bombings in Bali”, 16 October, p.B23
- \_\_ (2002) “Security alert stepped up after Bali bombing”, 17 October, p.6.
- \_\_ (2002) “Nik Aziz: Don’t link it to Muslims”, 17 October, p.6.
- \_\_ (2002) “No more excuses”, 17 October, p.10.
- \_\_ (2002) “Terrorism issue not being handled properly”, 18 October, p.2.
- \_\_ (2002) “Studies in contrasts”, 18 October, p.10.
- \_\_ (2002) “Sabah hopes Bali blast won’t hit its tourism”, 18 October, p.14.
- \_\_ (2002) “Call to stop labelling of countries as terrorist bases”, 19 October, p.4.
- \_\_ (2002) “BN, Opposition leaders condemn report”, 19 October, p.6.
- \_\_ (2002) “ISA to give absolute powers to the Executive on national security matters”, 20 October, p.2;
- \_\_ (2002) “Army wants public to be more security conscious”, 20 October, p.7.
- \_\_ (2002) “Be more vigilant, Sarawak folk advised”, 20 October, p.7.
- \_\_ (2002) “Be alert at all times, advises MB”, 21 October, p.4.
- \_\_ (2002) “Foreign investors know better, says Mustapha”, 21 October, p.4.
- \_\_ (2002) “Dr. Ling advises local port, airport managements to tighten security”, 21 October, p.4.
- \_\_ (2002) “Sleeping giant awakened”, 21 October, p.10.
- \_\_ (2002) “Najib – We can handle terrorism threat”, 22 October, p.4.
- \_\_ (2003) “Difficult passage”, 6 August, p.10.
- \_\_ (2003) “Only three Malaysians injured, says embassy”, 7 August, p.2.
- \_\_ (2003) “Musa: Police and army on full alert following attack”, 7 August, p.2.

- \_\_\_(2003) "Concerned tourism industry players meet to discuss impact of bombing", 7 August, p.2.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Jakarta jolt", 7 August, p.12.
- \_\_\_(2003) "No adverse impact on economy, says PM", 8 August, p.2.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Abdullah: Address political dimension of terrorism", 8 August, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Terrorism's political motive", 8 August, p.10.
- \_\_\_(2003) "The beating heart of global terror", 9 August, p.10.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Najib: Situation here well under control", 10 August, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Life will never be the same for Jakarta after Marriott bombing" 10 August, p.8.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Indonesia bracing for more attacks", 10 August, p.8.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Nightmare thwarted", 13 August, p.10.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Hambali caught in Thailand", 16 August, p.1.
- \_\_\_(2003) "US authorities tracking Hambali since 1995", 16 August, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Hambali's wife detained under new ISA", 19 August, p.7.
- \_\_\_(2003) "They only knew Hambali as a religious teacher", 21 August, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2004) "National Security supersedes individual rights", 10 September, p.8.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Malaysian fugitive bomber main suspect", 10 September, p.18.
- \_\_\_(2004) "US praises PM's leadership", 12 September, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Tracking the deadly bombers", 15 September, p.18.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Police looking for second van with explosives", 16 September, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Which one is the real Azahari?", 17 September, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Work of three suicide bombers", 3 October, p.6.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Defeating the terror within", 4 October, p.20.

*New York Times* (2002) "Saudi groups filling Al-Qaeda's coffers", reprinted in *Straits Times*, October 18, p.12.

Ng, Ansley (2004) "Two fathers of 5-year-old Jakarta blast victim keep bedside vigil", (*Associated Press*, Singapore), *Jakarta Post*, 14 September, p.2.

Nirmala, M. (2002) "Terrorists win if S'poreans chase shadows", *Straits Times*, 21 October, p.H2.

\_\_\_(2004) "Two Jemaah Islamiah detainees released", *Straits Times*, 16 September, p.3.

Nimarla, M., & Teo, Laurel (2003) "Can this happen in Singapore?", *Straits Times*, 7 August, p.3.

Noor, Farish (2002) "Western powers exploit Bali blasts", *New Straits Times*, 19 October, p.11.

Noor, Farish A. (2003) 'Blood, Sweat and Jihad: The Radicalization of the Political Discourse of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) from 1982 Onwards', *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, n.2, August. pp.200-232.

Noor, Farish A. (2004) 'When Osama and friends came a-calling', in Peter van der Veer and Shoma Munshi (eds.) *Media, War, and Terrorism Responses from the Middle East and Asia*. London: Routledge Curzon: pp.197-223.

Nordholt, Henk Schulte (2002) 'A genealogy of violence', in Colombijn, Freek & Lindblad, J. Thomas (eds.) *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. p.43.

Norris, Pippa, Ken Montague, Marion Just (2003) 'Framing Terrorism', in Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion Just (eds.) *Framing Terrorism – The News Media, the Government, and the Public*. London: Routledge, New York. pp.3-23.

Nugroho, Bimo (2006) 'Writing the dark side Publishing about violence in Indonesia', in Charles A. Coppel (ed.), *Violent Conflicts in Indonesia Analysis, representation, resolution*. London: Routledge. pp.206-216.

Nugroho, I.D. (2005) "Moderate Muslims 'need to balance' hard-liners", *Jakarta Post*, 3 October, p.4.

Nurbianto, Bambang (2002) "No arrest of militants, Muslim leaders warn", *Jakarta Post*, 7 January, p.1.

\_\_\_ (2004) "Directive to report to RT chiefs ignored", *Jakarta Post*, 14 September, p.8.

## O

O'Heffernan, Patrick (1993) 'Mass media and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy', in Robert J. Spitzer (ed.) *Media and Public Policy*. Connecticut: Praeger. pp 187-212.

Osman, Ahmad (2003) "S'poreans know blast not linked to religion", *Straits Times*, 8 August, A5.

Osman, Salim (2003) "Abdullah vows zero tolerance for extremist groups", *Straits Times*, 9 August, p.A17.

\_\_\_ (2004) "How it happened Again", *Straits Times*, 11 September, p.A2.

\_\_\_ (2004) "Anger at the bombers", *Straits Times*, 11 September, p.A3.

\_\_\_ (2004) "Islamic groups cautious over bombing blame", *Straits Times*, 13 September, p.A6.

\_\_\_ (2005) "Suicide bombers behind Bali blasts", *Straits Times*, 3 October, p.1.

\_\_\_ (2005) "Blasts unlikely to deter foreign investors", *Straits Times*, 7 October, p.8.

## P

Palmer, Ronald D. (2004) 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia', in John Davis (ed.) *The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response*. New York: Nova Science. pp.127-142.

Pan, Zhongdang & Kosicki, Gerald M. (1993) 'Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse', *Political Communication*, vol. 10: pp.55-75.

Peletz, Michael G. (2005) Islam and the Cultural Politics of Legitimacy: Malaysia in the Aftermath of September 11, in Robert W. Hefner (ed.) *Remaking Muslim Politics Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp.240- 272

Perdana, Ari A. (2003) "Economic impact of the JW Marriott blast", *Jakarta Post*, 8 August, p.3.

Pereira, Brendan (2002) "On the run back to Indonesia", *Straits Times*, Factiva, 10 February.

\_\_\_(2002) "Unmasking radical preachers", *Straits Times*, Factiva, 10 February.

\_\_\_(2002) "KL detains five JI men – one with Osama link", *Straits Times*, 17 October, p.1.

\_\_\_(2002) "Malaysia knew terrorists had slipped through security dragnet" *Straits Times*, 17 October, p.A5.

\_\_\_(2002) "Alert and worried", *Straits Times*, 20 October, p.32.

\_\_\_(2002) "Fair or not, red flag is up for entire region", *Straits Times*, 21 October, p.A2.

Pereira, Brendan & Go, Robert (2002) "Al-Qaeda operative planned to bomb US embassies", *Straits Times*, 17 September, p.H1.

Pereira, Derwin (2002) "A potent force with network in region", *Straits Times*, Factiva, 20 January.

\_\_\_(2002) "Is there an Al-Qaeda connection in Indonesia?", *Straits Times*, Factiva, 20 January.

\_\_\_(2002) "Militants in region 'plan to strike back'", *Straits Times*, Factiva, 11 February.

\_\_\_(2002) "S'pore a target in Dec 4 strike plan", *Straits Times*, Factiva, 11 February.

\_\_\_(2002) "Jakarta officials want proof", *Straits Times*, Factiva, 20 February.

\_\_\_(2002) "Jakarta protests to Singapore envoy", *Straits Times*, Factiva, 22 February.

\_\_\_(2003) "14 dead in JI terror strike", *Straits Times*, 6 August, p.1.

\_\_\_(2003) "Warning to Megawati, Message to U.S", *Straits Times*, 6 August, p.4.

\_\_\_(2003) "Jakarta alert for fresh terror attacks", *Straits Times*, 7 August, p.1.

\_\_\_(2003) "Four hours after Jakarta explosion, the JI phoned ST to claim credit", *Straits Times*, 7 August, p.A1.

\_\_\_(2003) "It's death for 'smiling bomber'", *Straits Times*, 8 August, p.1.

\_\_\_(2003) "Radicals losing moral ground with moderate Muslim groups", *Straits Times*, 8 August, p.A3.

\_\_\_(2003) "Washington warns of more terror attacks in Indonesia", *Straits Times*, 10 August, p.15.

\_\_\_(2003) "KL fugitive behind Jakarta bomb blast?", *Straits Times*, 11 August, p.1.

- \_\_\_(2003) "ISA- type law gains support in Jakarta", *Straits Times*, 12 August, p.1.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Tussle over tougher anti-terrorism laws", *Straits Times*, 19 August, p.A1.
- \_\_\_(2004) "JI blamed for car bomb outside Australian embassy", *Straits Times*, 10 September, p.1.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Attack has imprint of JI's Azahari", *Straits Times*, 10 September, p.6.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Jemaah Islamiah's Bombs & Brains", *Straits Times*, 11 September, p.A1.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Police foiled JI plot to attack Mega", *Straits Times*, 12 September, p.1.

Phillips, Louise & Jorgensen, Marianne W. (2002) *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. London: Sage.

Picard, Robert G. (1991) 'The Journalist's Role in Coverage of Terrorist Events', in Odasuo Alali, Kenoye Kelvin Eke (eds.) *Media Coverage of Terrorism – Methods of Diffusion*. London: Sage. pp.40-48.

Pluchinsky, Dennis (2006) 'Ethnic Terrorism: Themes and Variations', in Andrew T. H. Tan (ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism – a survey*. London: Routledge. pp. 40-54.

Pollard, Robert (2004) "Malaysia is now an excellent role model in war on terror", *New Straits Times*, 11 September, p.20.

Pool, Ithiel de Sola (1963) 'The Mass Media and Politics in The Modernization Process', in Lucian W. Pye (ed.) *Communications and Political Development*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp.234- 253.

Potter, W. James (1996) *An analysis of Thinking and Research about Qualitative Methods*. California: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Purba, Kornelius (2002) "Stop pretending that we are safe", *Jakarta Post*, 18 October, p.6.

\_\_\_(2004) "Lucrative prizes for the terrorists' head", *Jakarta Post*, 14 September, p.6.

Pye, Lucian W. (1963) 'Introduction', in *Communications and Political Development*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp.3-23.

## Q

Quasthoff, Utah M. (1989) 'Social prejudice as a resource of power: towards the functional ambivalence of stereotypes', in Ruth Wodak (ed.) *Language, Power and Ideology Studies in Political Discourse*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 181-196.

Quek, Audrey (2002) "Jakarta told: Act now and act decisively", *Straits Times*, 23 October, p.1.

\_\_\_(2003) "JI chief nabbed", *Straits Times*, 16 August, p.1.

## R

Rais, Amien (2002) "Indonesia must act on terrorism: Now or never", *Jakarta Post*, 24 October, p.3.

Rajecki, D.W. (1990) *Attitudes, Second Edition*. Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates.

- Raman, B. (2002) "Anti-Iraq moves a trigger for Bali blasts", *Straits Times*, 16 October, p.16.
- Rapoport, David C. (2006) 'Modern Terror; History and Special Features', in Andrew T. H. Tan (ed.) *The Politics of Terrorism – a survey*. London: Routledge. pp.3-24.
- Rashid, Rehman (2002) "Why did the bombers pick on the Sari Club?", *New Straits Times*, 16 October, p.10.
- Ratnesar, Romesh (2002) "Confession of an Al-Qaeda Terrorist" *Time*, 23 September, vol.160, no.13.
- Reah, Danuta (2002) *The Language of Newspapers*. London: Routledge. 2<sup>nd</sup>. Edition
- Reardon, Lawrence C. (2005) 'Interpreting Political Islam's Challenge to Southeast Asia International Terrorism, Nationalism, and Rational Choice', in William Crotty (ed.) *Democratic Development & Political Terrorism – The Global Perspective*. Boston: Northeastern University Press. pp.195-226.
- Reese, D., Oscar H. Gandy Jr, August E, Grant (eds.) (2001) *Framing Public Life – Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World*. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. pp.1-31.
- Reese, D. Stephen (2007) The Framing Project: A Bridging Model for Media Research Revisited, *Journal of Communication*, 57:148-154.
- Reinarman, Craig (1996) 'The Social Construction of Drug Scares', in Erich Goode (ed.) *Social Devianc*. New Jersey: Allyn and Bacon. pp.225-234.
- Rekhi, Shefali (2002) "Jemaah Islamiah created as 'Al-Qaeda's pan-Asian outfit", *Straits Times*, Factiva, 25 January.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "JI: From a village school to a regional network of terror", *Straits Times*, 29 September, p.20.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Bombings have JI written all over them", *Straits Times*, 14 October, p.7.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Australians the new target for terrorists", *Straits Times*, 15 October, p.7.
- \_\_\_ (2003) "Finger pointed at JI militants", *Straits Times*, 6 August, p.6.
- \_\_\_ (2004) "Bombers wanted to hit Canberra-Jakarta ties", *Straits Times*, 10 September, p.6.
- \_\_\_ (2004) "South-east Asia militants back Chechnya cause", *Straits Times*, 11 September, p.29.
- \_\_\_ (2005) "All signs point to JI's hand in blasts", *Straits Times*, 2 October, p.4.
- Rekhi, Shefali, & Go, Robert (2002) "Bashir aided planned attacks on embassies", *Straits Times*, 18 September, p.H5.
- Reuters, Jakarta (2004) "Jakarta had warning of Western embassy attack: Downer", *The Jakarta Post.com*, 10 September.
- Reuters, Singapore (2002) "Saudi 'gave money' to JI for explosives, expert say", *Jakarta Post*, 17 October, p.3.
- \_\_\_ (2004) "Doctors say Manny may be partially paralysed", *New Straits Times*, 14 September, p.28.



- Riessman, Catherine Kohler (1993) *Qualitative Research Methods*, vol. 30. London: Sage.
- Rivers, William L., Susan Miller, & Oscar Gandy (1975) 'Government and the Media', in Steven H. Chaffee (ed.) *Political Communication Issues and Strategies for Research*. London: Sage. pp.217-236.
- Rodan, Garry (2000) 'Asian Crisis, Transparency and the International Media in Singapore', *The Pacific Review*, vol.13 (2): pp.217-242.
- Rodan, Garry (2002) 'Do Markets Need Transparency? The Pivotal Case of Singapore and Malaysia', *New Political Economy*, 7 (1): pp.23-47.
- Rodan, Garry (2003) 'Embracing Electronic Media but Suppressing Civil Society: Authoritarian Consolidation in Singapore', *The Pacific Review* vol. 16 (4): pp.503-524.
- Romano, Angela (2000) 'Foreign correspondents and knowledge broking in Indonesia', in Damien Kingsbury, Eric Loo, Patricia Payne (eds.) *Foreign devils and other journalists*. Monash: Monash Asia Institute. pp.51-75.
- Romano, Angela (2003) *Politics and the Press in Indonesia Understanding an evolving political culture*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Rukmantara, Arie (2005) "Politicians slam plan for TNI", *Jakarta Post*, 7 October, p.1.
- Rusciano, Frank Louis (2003) 'Framing World Opinion in the Elite Press', in Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion Just (eds.) *Framing Terrorism - The News Media, the Government, and the Public*. London: Routledge. pp.159-179.

## S

- Sahr, Robert (1993) 'Credentialing Experts: The Climate of Opinion and Journalist Selection of Sources in Domestic and Foreign Policy', in Robert J. Spitzer (ed.) *Media and Public Policy*. Connecticut: Praeger. pp.153-170.
- Said, Edward (1978) *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Said, Edward (1997) *Covering Islam- How the Media and the West Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*, Revised edition, New York: Vintage Books.
- Salleh, Maarof (2005) "Shaping the S'porean Muslim Identity", *Today*, 21 September, p.3.
- Salleh, Mohammad Syrukri (1995) 'Islamic Change in Malaysia: The Politics of Unfavourable Responses', in Jean DeBernardi, Gregory Forth & Sandra Niessen (eds.) *Managing Change in Southeast Asia: Local Identities, Global Connections*. Alberta: Canadian Asian Studies Association. pp. 227-243.
- Sayuthi, S. (2002) "DPM – Investors not deserting us", *New Straits Times*, 19 October, p.4.
- Schudson, Michael (1982) 'The Politics of Narrative Form: The Emergence of News Conventions in Print and Television', *Daedalus* (Winter-Fall) 3 (4): pp.97-112.

- Schudson, Michael (1995) *The Power of News*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Seaton, Jean (2005) *Carnage and the Media – The Making and Breaking of News About Violence*. London: Penguin Group.
- Sederberg, Peter G. (1989) *Terrorist Myths illusion, rhetoric, and reality*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Semetko, H.A., & Valkenburg, P.M (2000) 'Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news', *Journal of Communication*, 50 (2):93-109.
- Semetko, Holli A. (2004) 'Media, Public Opinion and Political Action', in John D.H. Downing, Denis McQuail, Philip Schlesinger, Ellen Wartella (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Media Studies*. London: Sage. pp. 351-374.
- Sen, Krishna & Hill, David T. (2000) *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Setia, Putu (2002) "No Armagedon for Bali", *Tempo*, 22 – 28 October, p.44.
- Setiogi, Sari P.(2004) "Pictures released of suspected bombers' accomplices", *Jakarta Post*, 19 September, p.1
- Setiogi, Sari P., & Muninggar, Sri.Saraswati (2004) "10 suicide bombers at large: Police", *Jakarta Post*, 12 September, p.1
- Sharmini, P. (2002) "Bali blasts may have domestic connection", *New Straits Times*, 15 October, p.4.
- Shi-Ian, Lee(2002) "13 KMM men held under ISA", *New Straits Times*, 5 January, p.1.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Police looking for ex-UTM lecturer", *New Straits Times*, 6 January, p.6.
- Shlapentokh, Dmitry (2005) "Russia to go Muslim? It's not impossible", *Straits Times*, 8 October, p.S16.
- Siboro, Tiarma (2003) "Govt, police link Marriott bombing to Jamaah Islamiyah", *Jakarta Post*, 7 August, p.2.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Govt to intensify ID checks, raids on suspicious places in order", *Jakarta Post*, 8 August, p.3.
- \_\_\_(2005) "TNI asks for tipoffs to help nab bombers", *Jakarta Post*, 4 October, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2005) "Antiterror chief supports TNI plan to curb terrorism", *Jakarta Post*, 8 October, p.2.
- Siboro, Tiarma & Komandjaja, Eva C. (2005) "TNI ordered to help in terror fight", *Jakarta Post*, 6 October, p.1.
- Siboro, Tiarma, & Setiogi, Sari. S. (2004) "Last victims' remains given to families", *Jakarta Post*, 15 September, p.2.
- Siboro, Tiarma, & Suryana, A'an (2002) "Bali bomb perpetrators still an enigma", *Jakarta Post*, 22 October, p.1.
- Siboro, Tiarma & Tahilramani, Y. (2002) "Indonesia could be used as 'hotbed for terrorists", *Jakarta Post*, Factiva, 15 February, p.2.

- Siboro, Tiarna, & Wijaksana, Dadan (2002) "Govt stance on terrorism cautiously welcomed", *Jakarta Post*, 26 September, p.1.
- Sidel, John T. (2006) *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad Religious violence in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Silm, Bouchaib (2004) "Countering terror with an amnesty: Why it makes sense?", *Straits Times*, 15 September 2004, p.14.
- Silverblatt, Art (2001) *Media Literacy – Keys to Interpreting Media Messages*. Westport: Praeger. 2<sup>nd</sup>. edition.
- Simamora, Adianto P. (2002) "Rini plans road shows to restore confidence", *Jakarta Post*, 16 October, p.13.
- Simon, Mafoot (2002) "It is 'yes, but' for Malay/Muslims today", *Straits Times*, 26 October, p.H17.
- Simonov, Vladimir (2003) "New approach toward global evil", *Jakarta Post*, 9 August, p.7.
- Sinclair, Andrew (2003) *An anatomy of Terror – A History of Terrorism*. London: Macmillan.
- Singh, Jasbir (2002) "KMM had links with al-Qaeda", *New Straits Times*, 25 January, p.1.
- Slocum, J. David (2005) 'Introduction: The Recurrent Return to Algiers', in J.David Slocum (ed.) *Terrorism, Media, Liberation*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. pp.1-36.
- Smith, Anthony L. (2005) 'Terrorism and the Political Landscape in Indonesia; The Fragile Post – Bali Consensus', in Paul J.Smith (ed.) *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia- Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*. London: M.E.Sharpe. pp.98-121.
- Soh, Natalie (2004) "Singaporeans 'must unite against common threat'", *Straits Times*, 11 September, p.A4.
- Sorel, Jean-Marc (2003) 'Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight Against Its Financing', *European Journal of International Law*, April, vol.14 (2): pp.365-378.
- Spencer, Graham (2005) *The Media and Peace- Vietnam to the 'War on Terror'*. New York: Palgrave.
- Spitzer, Steven (1996) 'Toward a Marxian Theory of Deviance', in Erich Goode (ed.) *Social Deviance*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon: pp.170-183.
- Sreberny, Annabelle (2004) 'Society, Culture, and Media Thinking Comparatively', in John D.H. Downing, Denis McQuail, Philip Schlesinger, Ellen Wartella (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Media Studies*. London: Sage. pp.83-103.
- Srinivas, Shefali (2005) "Australian victims airlifted to Singapore", *Straits Times*, 3 October, p.6.
- Stanley (2006) 'The media as a control and as a spur for acts of violence', in Charles A. Coppel (ed.) *Violent Conflicts in Indonesia Analysis, representation, resolution*. London: Routledge. pp.195-205.

- Straits Times* (2001) "S'pore is free of Osama links, says DPM Lee", 23 September.
- \_\_(2002) "American establishments here were group's main targets", 7 January p.3.
- \_\_(2002) "A tale with many beginnings", Factiva, 12 January.
- \_\_(2002) "No US tip-off before ISA arrests", Factiva, 19 January.
- \_\_(2002) "ISA detainees cooperative, coping well", Factiva, 24 January.
- \_\_(2002) "Three countries targeted in attack plan", Factiva, 11 February.
- \_\_(2002) "Now is time for moderates to speak up", Factiva, 11 February.
- \_\_(2002) "Jakarta reactions to SM Lee puzzling", Factiva, 21 February.
- \_\_(2002) "Don't let actions of a few destroy the social fabric", 22 February, p.34.
- \_\_(2002) "Unions act to allay fears of anti-Muslim bias", 26 February, p.4.
- \_\_(2002) "Another 21 arrested here over terrorism plans", 17 September, p.1.
- \_\_(2002) "JI plan to disrupt relations naïve", 21 September, p.H7.
- \_\_(2002) "We've been through this before", 21 September 2002, p. H5.
- \_\_(2002) "Friday sermons stress Islam rejection of violence", 21 September, p.H6.
- \_\_(2002) "Terror threats", 21 September, p.30.
- \_\_(2002) "The JI's Ground Troops", 22 September, p.3.
- \_\_(2002) "Water system secure", 22 September, p.34.
- \_\_(2002) "Muslim fringe on march in Asean region, says PM Goh", 12 October, p.A13.
- \_\_(2002) "Statement against terror not a defensive move", Factiva, 13 October.
- \_\_(2002) "Holiday heaven became hell on earth", 14 October, p.2.
- \_\_(2002) "Bali loses innocence", 14 October, p.12.
- \_\_(2002) "Security of nation under threat: Mega", 14 October, p.6.
- \_\_(2002) "PM condemns 'dastardly acts' at S'pore's doorstep" 15 October, p.1.
- \_\_(2002) "Shock and disbelief at attack so close to home", 15 October, p.3.
- \_\_(2002) "Victims arrive swathed in bandages", 15 October, p.4.
- \_\_(2002) "Bali and its after-shocks", 15 October, p.12.
- \_\_(2002) "Coping with the terror threat in S'pore", 15 October, p.13.
- \_\_(2002) "A helping hand", (caption headline), 16 October, p.1.
- \_\_(2002) "Mega should go all out", 17 October, p.16.
- \_\_(2002) "Tightened security in S-E Asia", 21 October, p. A1.
- \_\_(2002) "Bashir may be arrested but Hambali still directing JI ops", 23 October, p.A6.
- \_\_(2002) "Praying for peace", 24 October, p.A7.
- \_\_(2002) "S'poreans hailed for helping out", 25 October, p.A7.
- \_\_(2002) "Aussie cops raid homes of terror suspects", 31 October, p.A4.

- \_\_ (2002) "Education aid to be used to fight radicalism", 31 October, p.A4.
- \_\_ (2003) "Lessons of the blast", 7 August, p.16.
- \_\_ (2003) "Praise from Aussie Press" (photo caption), 9 August, p.A6.
- \_\_ (2003) "To fight terror", 11 August, p.12.
- \_\_ (2003) "A law for the times", 13 August, p.16.
- \_\_ (2004) "Terrorism a clear and present danger", 10 September, p.1.
- \_\_ (2004) "What now for polls?", 10 September, p.4.
- \_\_ (2004) "Attack on Indonesia", 10 September, p.20.
- \_\_ (2004) "Follow the path of mercy, Muslims told", 12 September, p.13.
- \_\_ (2004) "Mercy versus despair", 13 September, p.13.
- \_\_ (2004) "Three suspects in Jakarta suicide bombing detained", 17 September, p.3.
- \_\_ (2005) "Indonesia coping well", 5 October, p.20.
- \_\_ (2005) "Get well soon", photo illustration, 5 October, p.1.
- \_\_ (2005) "Joint Effort", photo illustration, 5 October, p.6.
- \_\_ (2005) "JI operative's letter warned of bombing this year", 2 October, p.4.
- Strentz, Hebert (1989) *News Reporters and News Sources: Accomplices in Shaping and Misshaping the News*, 2<sup>nd</sup>. Ames: Iowa University Press.
- Suryana, A'an (2002) "RI must swiftly act against terrorists- Businessmen", *Jakarta Post*, 15 October, p.13.
- \_\_ (2005) "babinsa<sup>21</sup> 'crucial' to help stamp out terrorists", *Jakarta Post*, 8 October, p.2.
- Susanti, Ivy (2003) "Making Jakarta a home for the wary", *Jakarta Post*, 10 August, p.1.

## T

- Tahilramani, Yogita (2002) "Surakarta police alerted to terror plan", *Jakarta Post*, Factiva, 12 February, p.2.
- \_\_ (2002) "BIN doubts validity of terror report", *Jakarta Post*, 14 February, p.1.
- \_\_ (2002) "Terror allegations not matched with evidence" *Jakarta Post*, 23 February, p.8.
- Tan, Abby (1991) 'Media and Politics in Singapore', in Carolina G. Hernandez, Werner Pfennig (eds.) *Media and Politics in Asia: Trends, Problems and Prospects*. Manila: Centre for Integrative and Development Studies: National institute for Policy Studies: Friedrich Naumann Foundation. pp. 103-110.
- Tan, Andrew (2002) 'Terrorism in Singapore: Threat and Implications', *Contemporary Security Society*, vol.23 (3): pp.1-18.

---

<sup>21</sup> Non-commissioned law enforcement officer posted in villages and affiliated with the civil administration.

- Tan, Andrew (2003) The 'New' Terrorism: How Southeast Asia Can Counter It', in Uwe Johannsen, Alan Smith, James Gomez (eds.) *September 11 & Political Freedom – Asian Perspectives*. Singapore: Selected Publishing: pp.86-113.
- Tan, Judith (2004) "Manny wakes up from 'coma' for a few hours", *Straits Times*, 14 September, p.A6.
- \_\_\_ (2004) "Manny utters first words – in Italian", *Straits Times*, 15 September, p.A6.
- \_\_\_ (2004) "Third victim airlifted here for treatment", *Straits Times*, 16 September, p.A6.
- Tan, Theresa (2002) "Singapore doctors put aside paying clients to aid blast victims", *Straits Times*, 20 October, p.14.
- Tan, Wendy (2003) "Singapore turns the page", *Straits Times*, 10 August, p.1.
- Tankard, J.W. (2001) 'The empirical approach to the study of media framing', in S.D. Reese, O.H.Gandy, & A.E.Grant (eds.), *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Pp. 95-106.
- Taufiqurrahman, M., & Harsanto, Darma (2003) "Further terror attacks imminent, police chief warns", *Jakarta Post*, 14 August, p.1.
- Taufiqurrahman, M. & Muningsgar, S.S. (2003) "Foreign help may expose police inadequacies", *Jakarta Post*, 12 August, p.2.
- Taufiqurrahman, M. & Suryana, A'an (2003) "Govt not doing enough to fight terror", *Jakarta Post*, 6 August, p.3.
- Taylor Peter M. (2000) 'Myths: The Military, the Media and the IRA: Past, Present and Future', in Stephen Badsey (ed.) *The Media and International Security*. Sandhurst: Frank Cass. pp. 34-38.
- Tekwani, Shyam (2005) 'Media, Information Revolution, and Terrorism in Southeast Asia', in Paul J. Smith (ed.) *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia Transnational Challenges to State and Regional Stability*. London: M.E. Sharpe. pp.227-247.
- Tempo* (2002) "Al Qaeda, made in Madiun?", January 29-February 4, p.16.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Al Qaeda 'Angels' Terrorist Threat, Perceived or Conceived?", 19-25 February, p.4.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Multiple charges against Hambali", 19-25 February, p.23.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Al Qaeda target?", 24-30 September, p.11.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Lifting the veil", 24-30 September, p.16.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Abu Bakar Ba'asyir: I don't know Omar Al-Faruq", 30 September, p.33.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Kuta, Bali (October 12, 2002)", 22 – 28 October, p.11.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "911 for Australia", 22- 28 October, p.33.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Indonesia Issues Antiterrorism Regulations", 22-28 October, p.36.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Resurrection from the Ashes", 22-28 October, p.38.
- \_\_\_ (2003) "August 5, 2003", 12–19 August, p.9.
- \_\_\_ (2003) "Terrorists cannot stir in Malaysia", 12-19 August, p.42.
- \_\_\_ (2003) "A Bloody Warning to Megawati", 12-19 August, p.18.

- \_\_\_ (2003) "Dead End for Hambali" *Tempo*, 12-19 August, p.77.
- \_\_\_ (2004) "Carnage at Kuningan", 14-20 September, p.12.
- \_\_\_ (2004) "Targeting Whom?", 14-20 September, p.9.
- \_\_\_ (2005) "Another Bali Tragedy", 4- 10 October, pp.12,13.
- \_\_\_ (2005) "Zulkarnaen: the Commander from Sragen", 4-10 October, p.13
- Teo, Laurel (2002) "PM on how South-east Asia can lick terrorism", *Straits Times*, 21 October, p.1.
- Teo, Laurel, & Chia, Sue-Ann (2002) "Why did they turn to terrorism?", *Straits Times*, 25 September, p.H4.
- Thayer, Carlyle A. (2004) 'Radical Islam and Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia', paper presented at ISEASS-SSA APS Winter Seminar, Globalization and Its Counter Forces, 23-27 February, Singapore.
- Thayer, Carlyle A. (2005) 'Al-Qaeda and Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia', in Paul J. Smith (ed.) *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to State and Regional Stability*. London: M.E. Sharpe. pp.79-97.
- The Washington Post* (2002) "Wealthy Saudis identified as Al-Qaeda backers", *Straits Times*, 19 October, p.10.
- Thussu, Daya Kishan (2006) 'Televising the 'War on Terrorism': The Myths of Morality', in Anandam P.Kavoori & Todd Fraley (eds.) *Media, Terrorism, and Theory*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp.3-17.
- Tiffen, Rodney (1989) *News and Power*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Tischer, Stefan, Michael Meyer, Ruth Wodak & Eva Vetter (2000) *Methods of Text and discourse Analysis*. London: Sage.
- Tuchman, Gaye (1978) *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality*. New York: Free Press.
- Tuchman, Gaye (2002) 'The Production of News', in Klaus Bruhn Jensen (ed.) *A Handbook of Media and Communication Research Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies*. London: Routledge. pp. 78-90.
- Tuman, Joseph S. (2003) *Communicating Terror –The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism*, London: Sage Publications, Inc.

## U

- Uhlin, Anders (1997) *Indonesia and the 'Third Wave of Democratization': The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World*. New York: St.Martin's Press.
- Unidjaja, Fabiola Desy (2002) "Distrust hurts Indonesia-Singapore bilateral relations, says analyst", *Jakarta Post*, 23 February.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "Government steps up anti-terrorist campaign", *Jakarta Post*, 19 September, p.1.
- \_\_\_ (2002) "RI, Australia form joint team to probe Bali attack", *Jakarta Post*, 17 October, p.1.

- \_\_\_(2002) "Security in capital heightened on fears of second attack", *Jakarta Post*, 23 October, p.1.
- \_\_\_(2002) "RI wants JI included on UN terrorist list", *Jakarta Post*, 25 October, p.1.
- \_\_\_(2002) "Government insists JI not exist in Indonesia", *Jakarta Post*, 29 October, p.4.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Nation battens down over Aug. 17 threats", *Jakarta Post*, 15 August, p.3.
- \_\_\_(2003) "RI interested in interrogating Hambali", *Jakarta Post*, 17 August, p.1.
- Unidjaja Fabiola Desy, & Gunawan, Apriadi (2003) "Washington warns of further terror attacks", *Jakarta Post*, 10 August, p.1.
- Unidjaja, Fabiola Desy, & Harsanto, Damar (2002) "Minister- Indonesian citizens lead Jamaah Islamiyah", *Jakarta Post*, 17 October, p.4.
- Unidjaja, Fabiola Desy, & Khalik, Abdul (2004) "Mega declares RI on full alert", *Jakarta Post*, 14 September, p.1.
- Unidjaja, Fabiola Desy, & Kurniawan, Moch. N. (2003) "Mega calls Bush over Hambali", *Jakarta Post*, 19 August, p.1.
- Unidjaja, Fabiola Desy, & Siboro, Tiarma (2002) "Distrust hurts Indonesia-Singapore bilateral relations, says analyst", *Jakarta Post*, 23 February, p.3.
- Unidjaja, Fabiola Desy, & Siboro, Tiarma (2004) "JI claims responsibility for bomb attack: Website", *Jakarta Post*, 11 September, p.3.

## V

- Van Dijk, Teun A. (1989) 'Mediating racism- The role of the media in the reproduction of racism', in Ruth Wodak (ed.) *Language, Power and Ideology Studies in Political Discourse*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins. pp.220-226.
- Van Gorp, Baldwin (2007) 'The Constructionist Approach to Framing: Bringing Culture Back In', *Journal of Communication*, 57:60-78.
- Veer, Peter van der (2004) 'Introduction', in Peter van der Veer & Shoma Munshi (eds.), *Media, War and Terrorism – Responses from the Middle East and Asia*. London: RoutledgeCurzon. pp.1-8.
- Venkat, Iyer (2004) 'Terrorism and the Media: Is Self- Regulation the Answer?', in S. Venkatraman (ed.) *Media in a Terrorized Word – Reflections in the Wake of 911*. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish. pp.106-119.
- Vijayan, K.C., & Natalie Soh (2002) " Families keep tense vigil over victims in SGH burns unit", *Straits Times*, 16 October, p. A2.

## W

- Wahyuni, Sri., & Pinontoan, Octovianus (2002) "Laskar Jihad dissolved, ends Ambon presence", *Jakarta Post*, 16 October, p.1.



- Waisbord, Silvio (2002) 'Journalism, Risk, and Patriotism', in Barbie Zelizer & Stuart Hall (eds.) *Journalism After September 11*. London: Routledge. pp.201-219.
- Waisbord, Silvio (2004) 'Media and the reinvention of the Nation', in John D.H. Downing, Denis McQuail, Philip Schlesinger, Ellen Wartella (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Media Studies*. London: Sage. pp.375-392.
- Wanandi, Jusuf (2002) 'Islam in Indonesia: Its History, Development and Future Challenges', *Asia-Pacific Review*, vol.9 (2):104-112.
- Weintraub, Andrew N. (2006) 'Dangdut Soul: Who are 'the People' in Indonesian Popular Music', *Asian Journal of Communication*, vol. 16 (4) December. pp.411-431.
- White, Jonathan R. (1991) *Terrorism an Introduction*. California: Brooks Cole.
- White Paper (2003) *The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*. Parliament Presentation, January 7: Ministry of Home Affairs, Republic of Singapore.
- Widiadana, Rita A. (2002) "Sanglah Hospital closed to journalists", *Jakarta Post*, 17 October, p.3.
- Widiadana, Rita A, & Juniarta, I Wayan (2002) "Tragedy unites Balinese and foreigners", 15 October, p.1.
- Wijaksana, Dadan (2002) "Bali's tourism faces gloomy future", *Jakarta Post*, 19 October, p.14.
- \_\_\_(2002) "UN officers to assist Bali investigation team", *Jakarta Post*, 18 October, p.3.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Marriott blast has limited impact", *Jakarta Post*, 11 August, p.1.
- \_\_\_(2003) "Indonesia's economy to grow as targeted despite bombing: IMF.", *Jakarta Post*, 12 August, p.3.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Economy to recover quickly from blast, says Dorodjatun", *Jakarta Post*, 10 September, p.3.
- \_\_\_(2004) "Rupiah, stocks recover from bomb incident", *Jakarta Post*, 11 September, p.13.
- Wijaksana, Dadan, & Siboro, Tiarna (2002) "Probe goes on amid snafu about suspects", *Jakarta Post*, 18 October, p.1.
- Williams, Kevin (2003) *Understanding Media Theory*. New York: Arnold.
- Willis, Jim (1990) *Journalism: State of The Art*. London: Praeger.
- Winoto, Soeryo (2002) "Religion will not prosper through violence", *Jakarta Post*, 23 October, p.2.
- Witoelar, Wimar (2002) "but Al-Qaeda not the only group in town", *Straits Times*, 17 October, p.16.
- \_\_\_(2002) "Terrorism is a fact of life in Indonesia", *Jakarta Post*, 22 October, p.7.
- Witular, Rendi A. (2002) "Bali blast to negatively affect property sector", *Jakarta Post*, 16 October, p. 14.
- Wodak Ruth (1989) *Language, Power and Ideology*. Amsterdam: J.Benjamins.
- Wodak, Ruth (1996) *Disorders of Discourse*. London: Longman.

Wodak, Ruth, & Busch, Brigita (2004) 'Approaches to Media Texts', in John D.H. Downing, Denis McQuail, Philip Schlesinger, Ellen Wartella (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Media Studies*. London: Sage. pp.105-122.

Wong, Kelvin (2003) "Calm or resigned to threat of terror?", *Straits Times*, 7 August, p.A2.

Wong, K. (2004) 'In Asia-Based Development Journalism and Political Elections: Press Coverage of the 1999 General Elections in Malaysia', *Gazette*, February, vol.66 (1): pp.25-40.

Woodier, Jonathan (2006) 'Perning in the Gyre - Indonesia, the globalised media and the 'war on terror'', in Benjamin Cole (ed.) *Conflict, Terrorism and the Media in Asia*. London: Routledge. pp. 41-60.

Woodward, Gary C. (2007) *Center Stage: Media and the Performance of American Politics*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wulandari, Fitri (2002) "Dark could hang over RI tourism after Bali bomb blasts", *Jakarta Post*, 14 October, p.13.

## X

Xiaoge, Xu (2005) *Demystifying Asian Values in Journalism*. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish.

Xueying, Li (2004) "Tug of Love over Jakarta blast girl", *Straits Times*, 12 September, p.14.

\_\_\_(2004) "Manny's dad: My wife never cheated on me", *Straits Times*, 19 September, p.14.

## Y

Yao, Souchou (2001) 'Modernity and Mahathir's rage: theorizing state discourse of mass media in Southeast Asia', in Yao Souchou (ed.) *House of Glass- Culture, Modernity, and the State in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp.46-69.

Yew, Lee Kuan (2005) "Confronting the terrorists within", *Straits Times*, 10 October, p.20.

Yu, Frederick T.C. (1963) 'Communications and Politics in Communist China', in Lucian W. Pye (ed.) *Communications and Political Development*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp.259-297.

Yusof, Helmi (2002) "A young Muslim's agony", *Straits Times*, 20 October, p.30.

## Z

Zaobao, Lianhe (2002) "Malays deserve support and trust", *Straits Times*, 30 September, p.14.

Zulkifli, Arif, & Rommy Fibri, & Jalil Hakim, & Sunudyantoro, & Arif Koko (2002) "Kuta Bali, 12-10-2002", *Tempo*, 22-28 October, p.30.

## Web sites

About:Geography

<http://geography.about.com/library/cia/blcindonesia.htm>

Amnesty International, "Indonesia Press Freedom under threat." 1 October 2005

<http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa210442003>

AsiaMedia, "Indonesia: Press Freedom eroding in Indonesia, says Reporters Sans Frontier." <http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=16240>

CNN.com./U.S. "You are either with us or against us", 6 November 2001.

<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror>

Congressional Research Service (2004) "Terrorism in Southeast Asia", Report for Congress, US State Department Code RL 31672.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/35795.pdf>

Crenshaw, Martha (1995) (ed.) *Terrorism in Context*. Pennsylvania State University Press; quoted excerpt retrieved 1 May 2007 from

<http://www.psupress.psu.edu/Justataste/samplechapters/justatasteCrenshaw.html>

Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA). (2004). "Australia backs away from SMS claim over Jakarta bombing", The Jakarta Post.com, 13 September.

<http://www.thejakartapost.com/detaillatestnews.asp?filled=20040913144249&iREC=1>

International Federation of Journalists <http://www.ifj.asia.org>

Koike, Makoto (2003) 'Globalizing Media and Local Society in Indonesia', March, *IIAS Newsletter*, IIAS News, IIASN 30\_47: International Institute for Asian Studies, The Netherlands.

<http://www.iias.nl/iiasn/30/index/html>

Koo, Katrina Lee (2005) 'Terror Australis: Security, Australia and the 'War on Terror' Discourse', *borderlands e-journal*, volume 4, number 1.

<http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au>

Pacific Media Watch, “New code threatens media freedom” 4 May 2005  
<http://www.pmw.c2o.org/2005/indon4722.html>

Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index <http://www.worldpress.org>

Risakotta, Bernard Adeney (2003) ‘Power, Religion and Terror in Indonesia’, *IIAS Newsletter*, Research Report, March, IIASNL30\_24: International Institute for Asian Studies, The Netherlands.

<http://www.ias.nl/iasn/30/index/html>

Singapore Department of Statistics  
<http://www.singstat.gov.sg/keystats/hist/population.html>

Singapore Internal Security Department, Ministry of Home Affairs  
[http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/isd/newisd\\_earlyyears.html](http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/isd/newisd_earlyyears.html)

Sidney Morning Herald (2004). “Not an attack on one country: Indonesia”, 9 September, (Reuters, Agence France Presse),  
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/09/09/1094530759500.html>

The Jakarta Post Reader’s Profile  
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/adsspecial/medkit06/readprof.html>

The World Fact Book <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bx.html>

Time magazine, “Confessions of An Al-Qaeda Terrorist”, Romesh Ratnesar, 23 September, 2002 vol.160 no.13.  
[www.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601020923,00html](http://www.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601020923,00html)

U.S. State Department Report on International Religious Freedom, 2004  
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/>

Yamin, Kafil (2006) *Half a Century of Turmoil for Indonesia’s Media*  
Retrieved on 31 October 2006. <http://www.asiamediaforum.org/node/572>

## Appendix A

### Conceptualization of Terrorism

	<b><i>ST</i></b>	<b><i>JP</i></b>	<b><i>NST</i></b>	<b><i>Tempo</i></b>
<b>JI I</b>	Plots against US targets.	Anarchy, threat to national security.	Jihad.KMM to overthrow government.	Underground movement.
<b>JI II</b>	Threat to national stability.	Danger to national stability.	Threat to national stability.	Islamic terrorist group.
<b>Bali</b>	Security and threat to religious harmony and economy.	Imminent threat to the economy.	Threat to racial harmony, economics and security issues.	Threat from militants, and old problem in Indonesia.
<b>Marriott</b>	Violence and revenge.	Threat to national stability, security.	Threat from Islamic militancy, security.	Radical groups hard to eradicate but can prevent them from becoming a threat.
<b>Australia</b>	A danger from Islamic militants.	Enemy against investors & tourists.	Islamic militancy.	Carnage.

**Images of Terrorists**

	<b><i>ST</i></b>	<b><i>JP</i></b>	<b><i>NST</i></b>	<b><i>Tempo</i></b>
<b>JI I</b>	JI, al-Qaeda, Bashir, Hambali, Bafana, Adnan Musa, Jaffar, Ali Khan and many other names.	Radical groups, Fathur Al Khozi, Indonesian Mujahidiin, Muslim militants, Bashir, Hambali, Iqbal.	JI, al-Qaeda, Bashir, Hambali, KMM, Moro Islamic Liberation Front.	Al Khozi, Bafani, JI alleged activist movement, suspects, terrorists suspects, radical Muslim network arm smugglers.
<b>JI II</b>	Bashir, Hambali, JI, al-Qaeda, MIFL, Furkan, Islamic extremists.	al Faruq	KMM linked to JI, al-Qaeda, militants.	al Faruq, Hambali and many other names, radical circles, MIFL, members of militant Islamic groups.
<b>Bali</b>	Bashir, JI, al-Qaeda, anarchists, Islamists.	Perpetrators, alleged radical Islamic groups, alleged extremists, a Yemeni, a Malaysian.	Bashir, JI, al-Qaeda, KMM, religious fanatics, murderers.	Perpetrators, unknown, suspect.
<b>Marriott</b>	JI, al-Qaeda, Hambali, Bashir, bombers, radicals, Muslim extremists, Asman, Zulkarmen, Dulmatin.	Hambali, Azahari, Asmar, Sani, Mustafa, Tohir, Ridwan, communists, Acehnese separatists, Islamic radicals.	JI, al-Qaeda, Asmar, Azahari, Hambali, Islamic militants, radical Islamists, ex students of Bashir.	JI plus ramifications, bombers, Asmar.
<b>Australia</b>	JI, Jihadi militants, Islamist minds, jihadist terrorist, Islamic terrorist, Azahari, Dulmatin.	Bombers, JI, Azahari, Noordin, suicide bomber.	Religious extremist, religious militants, bombers, JI, Azahari, Noordin.	JI, al-Qaeda, Azahari, Noordin, Dulmatin.

## Appendix A.2

### Roots of violence

	<i><b>ST</b></i>	<i><b>JP</b></i>	<i><b>NST</b></i>	<i><b>Tempo</b></i>
<b>JII</b>	Indonesia government inertia, Pan Islamic region, anniversary of 9.11, militants free to operate after Suharto's fall, extremist ideology, US targets.	Militants fighting for Islamic state in Indonesia, disenchanted people due to inequality, corruption.	To overthrow Malaysian government in order to establish an Islamic state.	Alleged to blow US interests, to set up Islamic state.
<b>JII</b>	Incite religious-ethnic conflict between M'sia and S'pore, to create Islamic state, attacks against Western interests.	Plan to kill Megawati, frustrated population.	To undermine democracy, to overthrow M'sian government.	To build a community based on Islamic Sharyah law.
<b>Bali</b>	Weak intelligence, Indonesia did not heed international warnings, anti Iraq invasion, rivalry among Indonesian agencies, Cole's anniversary attack.	Lack of law enforcement, weak government	Bombing could have domestic implication (I'sia), social-race discrimination in the entertainment industry in Bali between Western and local customers	None stated clearly
<b>Marriott Hotel</b>	To establish a Pan Islamic state in the region, trial of Bali bombers, trial of Bashir.	Trials of Bali suspects, to intimidate the court, venue for political elite, to distract people from MPR annual session, challenging the government.	Militancy fuelled by unrelenting grievance, Bashir wants Islamic state in Indonesia; JI wants Islamic state in the region.	Power struggle in Indonesia, hotel is a venue for political elite (locals and Westerns).
<b>Australian Embassy</b>	Third anniversary of 9.11; to influence outcome of Indonesian presidential election; against Australian troops in Iraq; a Pan Islamic state the ultimate goal.	To humiliate Indonesian intelligence, and poor coordination among security officials.	None stated clearly.	To humiliate and to challenge Indonesian security officials.

**Connection between Violence and Religion**

	<i><b>ST</b></i>	<i><b>JP</b></i>	<i><b>NST</b></i>	<i><b>Tempo</b></i>
<b>JI I</b>	al-Qaeda shaped JI ideology.	Struggle to create an Islamic state.	Radical Muslims with violent objectives aim to overthrow the M'sian government.	Hardline organizations with Islamic ideology.
<b>JI II</b>	Reform teaching, madrassahs teaching radicalism.	None clearly detected.	Islamic extremism with the intention to create Pan Islamic state.	Militant Muslim groups used by Indonesian intelligence, youth Muslim groups encouraged to go to Afghanistan.
<b>Bali</b>	Radical Islam breeding terrorists, in addition to stories on Islam.	International pressure on I'sia to get tough with Muslim radicals.	Bombers were Muslim.	Foreign government officials identify militants as 'Muslim-based' and Muslim 'leaders'.
<b>Marriott Hotel</b>	Bombers were Muslim extremists, plus stories on Islam.	Madrassahs, 'Osama's brand of Islam', + stories on Islam.	Bombers were Muslim.	None stated; not even the religion of the bombers.
<b>Australian Embassy</b>	Radical teaching, stories on Islam.	None stated, but JP had stories with religious leaders condemning the bombing.	Bombers were Muslim, 'religious extremists'.	None stated or apparently clear.